evidence-log MCP server
eu.riskrouter/evidence-logriskrouter.eustreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Tamper-evident evidence log: signed heads, proofs, and recording salted digests of your records.
8 tools: 1 change things and 7 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the evidence-log MCP server can do
The evidence-log MCP server is published by riskrouter.eu, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: record_evidence), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
record_evidenceRecord the SHA-256 of a decision record you keep yourself, so it can later be shown to be unchanged.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Record the SHA-256 of a decision record you keep yourself, so it can later be shown to be unchanged. Send the digest and a short kind, never the record. Needs your RiskRouter key in the Authorization header of the MCP connection. Entries are permanent.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Record the digest of a decision
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
get_chainThe log's signed statement of one completeness chain as of the current head: its length and, for each position, the leaf, the time and the digest.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_chain" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The log's signed statement of one completeness chain as of the current head: its length and, for each position, the leaf, the time and the digest. A position nobody showed you is a record left out.
Annotations the server declares
- title: What the log holds in one completeness chain
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_checkpointThe log's signed checkpoint in the C2SP format witnesses cosign (origin, size, root).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_checkpoint" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The log's signed checkpoint in the C2SP format witnesses cosign (origin, size, root).
Annotations the server declares
- title: C2SP checkpoint
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_consistency_proofProof that the tree at size first is a prefix of the tree at size second (or now): the log never rewrote history.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_consistency_proof" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Proof that the tree at size first is a prefix of the tree at size second (or now): the log never rewrote history.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Consistency proof between two heads
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_evidence_headThe current signed head of the evidence log: tree size, Merkle root and signature.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_evidence_head" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The current signed head of the evidence log: tree size, Merkle root and signature. Save it: any later head must be consistent with it.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Signed head of the evidence log
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_inclusion_proofProof that the entry at leaf_index is in the tree, optionally at a given tree_size.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_inclusion_proof" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Proof that the entry at leaf_index is in the tree, optionally at a given tree_size. Checkable offline with the public verifier.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Inclusion proof for one entry
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_ledger_attestationThe signed head hash of the hash-chained audit ledger of recorded quotes.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_ledger_attestation" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The signed head hash of the hash-chained audit ledger of recorded quotes.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit ledger attestation
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_usageHow much is recorded, and by how many keys that are not ours.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_usage" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How much is recorded, and by how many keys that are not ours. Counts only, nothing about anyone.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Usage in numbers
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://api.riskrouter.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://api.riskrouter.eu
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.riskrouter.eu/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including record_evidence (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.riskrouter.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://api.riskrouter.eu
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://api.riskrouter.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://api.riskrouter.eu; Dynamic client registration: not observed ->…View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.riskrouter.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://api.riskrouter.eu
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http evidence-log https://api.riskrouter.eu/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http evidence-log https://api.riskrouter.eu/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__evidence-log__get_evidence_head",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_inclusion_proof",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_consistency_proof",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_checkpoint",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_ledger_attestation",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_usage",
"mcp__evidence-log__get_chain"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__evidence-log__record_evidence"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as evidence-log. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/eu.riskrouter/evidence-log/verify?hash=4ceab8dfd8eff741df436775aeb110c9e4c9764a71dbcc9a6d1b1bebb5c0b44b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4ceab8dfd8ef, from Nov 15, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.riskrouter/evidence-log/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.riskrouter/evidence-log)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
evidence-log MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the evidence-log MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the evidence-log MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the evidence-log MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the evidence-log MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 1 write, 7 read. record_evidence, get_evidence_head, get_inclusion_proof, get_consistency_proof, get_checkpoint, get_ledger_attestation, get_usage and get_chain.
Does the evidence-log MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the evidence-log MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the evidence-log MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.