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TracePass MCP server

eu.tracepass/tracepasstracepass.eustreamable-httpv1.28.0Scanned

Manage products, EU Digital Product Passports, operator parties, and GS1 EPCIS supply-chain events.

9 tools: 6 can delete or cancel things and 3 change things.

Tools: 6 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 5 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the TracePass MCP server can do

The TracePass MCP server is published by tracepass.eu, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can delete or cancel things (6 tools: tracepass_products, tracepass_passports, tracepass_passport_fields, tracepass_passport_parties and 2 more) and create or change data (3 tools: tracepass_epcis, tracepass_templates and tracepass_scope). None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 10 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.28.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Deletes or cancels 6Claude Code: deny
  • tracepass_access_grantsShare restricted passport data with a partner (repairer, recycler, purchaser...) through an access grant, and see or end the grants already issued.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Share restricted passport data with a partner (repairer, recycler, purchaser...) through an access grant, and see or end the grants already issued. A grant names a role, a scope (company, chosen products or chosen passports), a purpose, optional evidence and an expiry (default 12 months). Needs an OAuth connection approved for access grants or an API key with "May manage access grants" switched on (403 access_grants_not_enabled); writing needs an admin. Authority roles (e.g. market surveillance) are dashboard-only end to end: create, update and revoke of such a grant are refused (400 role_dashboard_only). IMPORTANT: `create` returns the secret pa_ token ONCE. Hand it to the recipient and do not repeat it, store it or put it in a log. It cannot be shown again; if lost, revoke the grant and create a new one. A confirmed grant gives a third party access to restricted data: confirm the recipient, role, scope and purpose with the user first. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object). Reads never return a token. - list — { limit? (≤100), cursor?, role?, status? (active|expired|revoked), passportId?, productId? }. - get — { id }. - create — { role, label, purpose?, scope? ({ kind: company } with no ids, or { kind: products|passports, ids[] } with at least one id), evidence? ({ type: register_entry|invoice|authority_letter|contract|other, reference, note? }), expiresInDays? (1-1825; null = no expiry) }. WRITE. - update — { id, label?, purpose?, scope?, evidence?, expiresInDays? }; at least one. WRITE. - revoke — { id }. WRITE, ends the grant at once; repeating it is safe. - activity — { id, limit? (≤100), cursor? }. The grant's access log.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_passport_fieldsUpdate field values on a Digital Product Passport.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "update": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: ".... Every change is audit-logged with the credential (API key or connected app) and this MCP..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Update field values on a Digital Product Passport. Every change is audit-logged with the credential (API key or connected app) and this MCP channel. `source` (optional): omit it or pass "manual" when the user gave you the value or it comes from their own records — written with the user's rights (approved for an API key or an admin; sent to review for a connected app acting for an editor). Pass "ai_suggested" when you found or inferred it yourself: it goes to the dashboard review queue for a human, and is refused on fields only the operator may state or that must be measured (e.g. stateOfHealth). Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object): - update — { id, fieldKey, value, source? }. `value` type matches the field's dataType. - update_by_serial — { serial, fieldKey, value, gtin?, source? }. On 409 ambiguous_serial (a serial is unique only WITHIN a GTIN) pass `gtin`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_passport_lifecycleWARNING: Every action here changes what the public sees or is a legal act, some irreversible.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description says "irreversible".
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 3,484 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...atalogue. 409 while any non-archived passport references it; archive those first."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    WARNING: Every action here changes what the public sees or is a legal act, some irreversible. `archive` permanently takes the passport off public view (its URL shows an archive notice; only an authority access grant still reads it). `record_registration` records the economic operator's registration in the production EU DPP Registry and locks the passport's operator and facility identifiers. `place_on_market` submits a registration to an EN 18222 registry API. The assistant MUST confirm with the user before each call. Use `suspend` (reversible — public QR shows 'suspended') as the safe alternative to archive when a change might need to be undone; a passport placed on the market cannot be suspended, because it must stay public. EU DPP REGISTRY: the operator registers a battery passport itself, on the Registry website under its own EU Login; TracePass never submits to the Registry and never verifies the outcome. The acceptance environment has no legal effect; only a production registration counts. Paid plan; a connected app (OAuth) must act for an admin or owner. Refusal codes: resource tracepass://reference/lifecycle. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object). All are WRITEs (1 write each). A *_by_serial action takes { serial, gtin? } instead of `id` (on 409 ambiguous_serial pass `gtin`). - record_registration — { id, placedOnMarketAt? (YYYY-MM-DD), registrationId? }. Battery, published only. Records that the operator has registered this passport in the PRODUCTION EU DPP Registry, as the operator states it; TracePass does not check it. Confirm with the user first, and only after the operator has registered on the Registry website. Effects: marked placed on the market; operator and facility identifiers locked (409 operator_locked); webhook fires. - undo_registration — { id, environment: production|acceptance }. Undoes a mistaken record; production unlocks the operator identifiers (a delivered webhook is not recalled). Changes nothing in the Registry. Confirm with the user first. - place_on_market — { id }. Battery, published only. Submits to the EN 18222 registry API in the account's registry settings. NOT the way into the EU DPP Registry, which does not accept it: use prepare_registry_upi / prepare_registry_upload_file, then record_registration. A legal act for the economic operator — confirm with the user first. ASYNCHRONOUS: answers 202 "placing"; follow placeOnMarketStatus (placing → placed | rejected) by reading the passport. 409 codes include registry_host_not_allowed (the configured registry address is not allowed; check the URL) and registry_not_ready (run registry_readiness). - suspend, suspend_by_serial — { id }. Reversible — public QR shows 'suspended'. Refused with 409 passport_placed_on_market once the passport is placed on the market or its registration is under way. - archive, archive_by_serial — { id, reason? }. IRREVERSIBLE and destructive — confirm with the user first. Its URL then shows an archive notice (machine formats 404); only an authority grant still reads it. reason is REQUIRED for battery passports (400 reason_required): recycled, never_placed (never placed on the market or put into service) or duplicate_or_error; never_placed is refused (409 reason_contradicts_placement) once placed on the market. - archive_product — { id }. Archives a PRODUCT (not a passport). Reversible — soft-archives it from the catalogue. 409 while any non-archived passport references it; archive those first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_passport_partiesManage the economic-operator parties on a passport (manufacturer, importer, authorisedRepresentative, distributor, recycler, producerResponsibilityOrg).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Manage the economic-operator parties on a passport (manufacturer, importer, authorisedRepresentative, distributor, recycler, producerResponsibilityOrg). Each carries a legal name and an identifier. A party needs at least one of `gln`, `legacyOperatorId` or `operatorIdentifier` (EN 18219 §6.2–6.5; they must agree if both gln forms are given, else 400). Identifier shapes: resource tracepass://reference/parties. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object): - set — { id, role, legalName, gln?, country?, url?, tradeName?, postalAddress?, email?, legacyOperatorId?, operatorIdentifier?, facilityIdentifier? }. tradeName, postalAddress and email are public; for a battery importer they are its Battery Regulation Art. 41(3) details. - remove — { id, role }. After a battery passport is placed on the market, changing a stored operatorIdentifier or facilityIdentifier returns 409 operator_locked; other edits stay allowed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_passportsManage Digital Product Passports — create, read, run compliance checks.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.args.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 4,068 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...?, limit? (≤200), cursor? }; latest_measurements, _by_serial — { id }. Read-only."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Manage Digital Product Passports — create, read, run compliance checks. Archive, suspend, place on market and record_registration are in tracepass_passport_lifecycle. IMPORTANT: `create` makes a DRAFT passport: no plan DPP slot, never billed. The slot, and any overage past the plan cap, is taken when it is published in the TracePass dashboard, not through this tool. Each create counts against the daily write budget. EU DPP REGISTRY (battery): the operator registers a passport itself, on the Registry website under its own EU Login. TracePass prepares what it submits and records what it reports; it never submits to the Registry and never verifies the outcome. The acceptance environment has no legal effect; production is recorded with record_registration (tracepass_passport_lifecycle). Paid plan; an OAuth app must act for an admin or owner. Identifier schemes (EN 18219): gs1 | iso15459 | iec61406 | did | doi; batteries accept ONLY gs1 and iso15459. Shapes, lineage, snapshots, measurements, refusal codes: resource tracepass://reference/passports. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object). Read-only unless marked WRITE. A *_by_serial action takes { serial, gtin? } instead of `id` (on 409 ambiguous_serial pass `gtin`). - list — { page?, limit? (≤100), productId?, status?, search? }. status ∈ draft|in_review|approved|published|suspended|expired|archived. - get, get_by_serial — { id, format? (summary|full), lang? }. - compliance — { id }. compliant | compliant_with_warnings | incomplete, with regulation-cited findings and byRegulation[]. A regulation absent from byRegulation raised no finding, which is not the same as passed. - registry_readiness — { id }. Battery only. { ready, findings[] }: the Registry's FORMAL pre-submission check, not the compliance verdict. - prepare_registry_upi — { id }. WRITE, battery, published only. { upi, preparedAt } for the operator to paste into the Registry form. Submits nothing. - prepare_registry_upload_file — { passportIds (1–100) }. WRITE, battery. { xml, filename, included, excluded }: the operator uploads `xml` on the Registry website; TracePass does not. 1 write per included passport. - record_acceptance_test — { id, result: passed|failed, errorCode? }. WRITE, battery, published only. Records what the operator reports from the ACCEPTANCE environment: no legal effect, not verified. Undo: undo_registration (acceptance). - create — { productId, identifier?, gtin?, serialNumber?, lineage? }. Draft, not billed. identifier preferred, or legacy gtin + serialNumber. Battery: only gs1/iso15459, else 400. Duplicate: 409. lineage (battery): a repurposed, remanufactured or reused battery needs a NEW passport linked to the original(s) (Art. 77(7)); immutable after create. - get_qr, get_qr_by_serial — { id, format? (svg|png), symbology? (qr|datamatrix) }. One passport's QR; the bare GTIN URL is the product's model page (see products get_links). - list_snapshots — { id, page?, limit?, at? (ISO 8601) }; get_snapshot — { id, snapshotId }. EN 18221 change archive (`at` = the snapshot valid then). Entries carry contentHash, hashMethod (jcs-sha256 = RFC 8785 + SHA-256; older: sorted-json-sha256), previousHash and, in the list, chainLink plus a chain verdict. 1 read each. - get_condition_flags, _by_serial — { id }. Approved yes/no facts that gate conditional duties; an approved flag can make fields required and block publish. 1 read. - set_condition_flags, _by_serial — { id, flags: Record<flagKey, boolean|null> }. WRITE; null clears. WARNING: approving a flag can make fields required and block publishing if empty — fix them before or right after. - capture_measurements, _by_serial — { id, measurements: [ { fieldKey, value, measuredAt (ISO 8601), externalId?, unit? } ] (≤500) }. WRITE, battery, published only. Over-life data from the customer's equipment; metered against the monthly measurement allowance, not the write budget. - list_measurements, _by_serial — { id, fieldKey?, from?, to?, limit? (≤200), cursor? }; latest_measurements, _by_serial — { id }. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_productsManage the TracePass product catalogue.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...tus (json adds qrApiUrl, needs your API credentials) plus the model page URL, for a dealer..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Manage the TracePass product catalogue. A product is the catalogue layer — one product can have many passports (one per serialised unit). Products are not billable on their own. Archive is in tracepass_passport_lifecycle. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object): - list — { page?, limit? (≤100), category?, status?, search? }. Read-only. - get — { id }. Read-only. - create — { name, model, category, description? }. `category` is one of the 13 DPP categories (tracepass_templates list). - update — { id, name?, model?, description? }; at least one field. - get_links — { id, format? (json|csv), limit? (≤5000), cursor? (json: prior nextCursor) }. Every PUBLISHED passport's serial, passportUrl, status (json adds qrApiUrl, needs your API credentials) plus the model page URL, for a dealer asking for passport links. - get_model_qr — { id, format? (svg|png), gtin? (14 digits) }. QR of the model page. 404 model_not_found; 400 gtin_required (several GTINs) or invalid_gtin. - create_batch — { products: [ { name, model, category, description? }, … ] }, up to 100. Partial-success: per-item status, so some can be created while others error. The batch consumes N writes upfront; if that would exceed the daily cap NOTHING is created (429).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • tracepass_epcisGS1 EPCIS 2.0 supply-chain events.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    GS1 EPCIS 2.0 supply-chain events. `export`, `capture`, `capture_job` and `query` are on every plan, Free included. Captured events count against the plan's event allowance (10 a month on Free); over it `capture` returns an overage or hard-block message. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object): - export, export_by_serial — { id } or { serial, gtin? } (on 409 ambiguous_serial pass `gtin`). A passport's events as an EPCIS 2.0 JSON-LD document. Read-only. - capture — { events }. An EPCISDocument, a single event, or an array of events (JSON-LD). Returns 202 with a captureJobId. - capture_job — { jobId }. Poll a capture job. Read-only. - query — { params? }. Standard EPCIS query parameters as key/value (EQ_bizStep, GE_eventTime, MATCH_epc, …). Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_scopeCheck what EU law says for a product type matching the facts given: whether it needs a Digital Product Passport, from when, at which level, under which act and article, and the dut…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,459 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...n_in_progress; 429 run_cooldown. - catalogue_run_status — { runId }. Growth plan."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check what EU law says for a product type matching the facts given: whether it needs a Digital Product Passport, from when, at which level, under which act and article, and the duties of each role. Also reads the catalogue-wide scope report and triggers a refresh run. HARD RULES — always apply to scope answers: - State what the law says for product types matching the given facts. Not legal advice; never write 'you must' — use product-type phrasing ('LMT batteries need a passport from 18 February 2027, Battery Regulation Art. 77(1)'). - Cite the article given for every verdict and duty; a regulation without an article is not a citation. `not_covered` rests on no article: say our rules do not cover the product, name the nearest act given, never cite it as the basis. - A date with precision 'quarter', 'month' or 'year' is a plan, NEVER a deadline: write 'planned for Q2 2027 (planned, not law yet)', never 'from', 'by' or 'deadline'. - Relay `not_covered` and `needs_input` as results, never errors. `needs_input` = blocking questions remain — relay `ask[]` to the user before giving a verdict. - Items in an act's `planned` list are not law yet: label them 'Planned, not law yet' (`labelText`), with their `wording`. - `data.inScope`: yes = passport required; no = none required AND none planned (incl. ESPR-framework-only products, packaging): never say 'not yet' or 'yet'; pending = none today, a passport act is planned: name it from `planned[]`; depends = unanswered facts. - `ruleStatus: 'needs_recheck'`: the law behind the act changed and our rules are being re-checked (since `recheckSince`); say so. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object); values, caps and response shapes: resource tracepass://reference/scope. - check — { category?, facts?, role?, placedOnMarket?, lifecycleEvent?, contains?, productId?, passportId?, locale? }. Every plan; counts against the scope-answer cap (~100/day), not the v1 budget (429 `scope_answer_cap`). Unknown `facts` keys: 400. Omit `role` for all roles' duties. - catalogue_report — { classification?, category?, act?, changed?, q?, cursor?, limit? (≤500) }. One row per product. Growth plan or above; 403 `plan_upgrade_required` below it — tell the user this needs a plan upgrade, do not retry. - catalogue_run — {}. Start a refresh run (also nightly); poll with catalogue_run_status. Growth plan. 409 run_in_progress; 429 run_cooldown. - catalogue_run_status — { runId }. Growth plan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tracepass_templatesWhat a COMPLIANT passport must contain per category, per the governing EU regulation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What a COMPLIANT passport must contain per category, per the governing EU regulation. Read-only reference data; use it to advise on requirements before creating products/passports and to gap-check a draft. Actions (pass via `action`; `{…}` is the `args` object): - list — {}. All 13 categories with counts and governing regulation. - get — { category }. Every field: key, label, dataType, REQUIRED flag, access level, options, bounds and, where known, the mandating article. BATTERY — `required` alone is the wrong answer. SCOPE FIRST: only EV, LMT and industrial_gt_2kwh batteries owe a passport (Art. 77(1), Reg (EU) 2023/1542); for portable, SLI or industrial_lte_2kwh NO field is required — say it is out of scope and list no mandatory fields. Then use `requiredBy[batteryCategory]` (required | conditional | notApplicable), and `required` only as a fallback; skipping the scope step invents an obligation the Regulation does not impose. `conditional` fields, use data and the EV/LMT state-of-health split: resource tracepass://reference/templates.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://ai.tracepass.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://app.tracepass.eu
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (6 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ai.tracepass.eu/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including tracepass_products (destructive), tracepass_passports (destructive), tracepass_passport_fields (destructive), tracepass_passport_parties (destructive), tracepass_passport_lifecycle (destructive) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 9
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to yes
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 8

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 -> 9; Client ID metadata documents: no -> yes.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 9
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to yes
  2. Tools1 added, 3 changed.+1 added~3 changedView diff
  3. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  4. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
  5. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  6. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
  7. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 -> 8.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 8
  8. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
  9. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  10. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.28.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http tracepass https://ai.tracepass.eu/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http tracepass https://ai.tracepass.eu/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_epcis",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_templates",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_scope"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_products",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_passports",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_passport_fields",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_passport_parties",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_passport_lifecycle",
      "mcp__tracepass__tracepass_access_grants"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tracepass. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/eu.tracepass/tracepass/verify?hash=381bcd4f0561a99b068de095a157b617492140987ea6e9a8677aea576ffce17d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 381bcd4f0561, from Nov 17, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.tracepass/tracepass/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for eu.tracepass/tracepass
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/eu.tracepass/tracepass.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.tracepass/tracepass)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

TracePass MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the TracePass MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the TracePass MCP server delete data?

Yes. 6 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: tracepass_products, tracepass_passports, tracepass_passport_fields, tracepass_passport_parties, tracepass_passport_lifecycle and tracepass_access_grants.

Can the TracePass MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the TracePass MCP server have?

9 tools: 6 destructive, 3 write. tracepass_products, tracepass_passports, tracepass_passport_fields, tracepass_passport_parties, tracepass_passport_lifecycle, tracepass_access_grants, tracepass_epcis, tracepass_templates and 1 more.

Does the TracePass MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the TracePass MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the TracePass MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 10 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.