Ophis MCP server
fi.ophis/mcpophis.fistreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned
Ophis token quotes, bounded orders, signed-order submission, and portfolio reads on EVM chains.
13 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 9 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 12
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Ophis MCP server can do
The Ophis MCP server is published by ophis.fi, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: submit_order) and create or change data (3 tools: parse_intent, build_order and expected_surplus). 9 tools only read.
12 tools bring in text other people can write (parse_intent, get_quote, build_order and 9 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.2.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
13 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
submit_orderRelay a pre-signed order to the chain's Ophis orderbook.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_order" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Relay a pre-signed order to the chain's Ophis orderbook. Pass the exact `order` object and `fullAppData` from build_order, plus your EIP-712 `signature` and `from` (owner). Returns the order UID on success and enrolls the owner for indexing, referral attribution, and trade rewards.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Submit signed order
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
build_orderBuild a bounded, ready-to-sign order on Ophis.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Build a bounded, ready-to-sign order on Ophis. Returns { order, signing:{domain,types,primaryType}, fullAppData, appDataHash, partnerFee, next }. The receiver is ALWAYS PINNED to the owner (proceeds cannot leave the account); this public endpoint exposes no custom-receiver option. Uses the correct per-chain settlement contract (Optimism, Unichain, Robinhood Chain, and Arc are non-canonical) and applies the canonical Ophis fee policy. Apply slippage to the LIMIT side by kind: for kind 'sell' lower buyAmount (your minimum out); for kind 'buy' raise sellAmount (your maximum in). slippageBips is capped at 5000 (50%); when omitted, the enforced backstop defaults to 100 bps (1%). ENFORCED: build_order fetches a live quote and REJECTS the call if the limit is worse than slippageBips vs that quote (or if a quote cannot be fetched; retry). Sign `order` as EIP-712 with `signing`, then call submit_order.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Build signable order
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
expected_surplusEstimate how much better Ophis quotes than the open market for a sell: fetches the Ophis orderbook sell-quote and a public all-DEX aggregator (KyberSwap) quote for the same input, …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Estimate how much better Ophis quotes than the open market for a sell: fetches the Ophis orderbook sell-quote and a public all-DEX aggregator (KyberSwap) quote for the same input, and returns `beatBps` (+ = Ophis returns more of the buy token). Use before build_order to show the expected edge. The reference can reflect thin or manipulated liquidity, so treat beatBps as advisory, not a sole execution signal. Sell-side (exact-in) only. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Estimate beat-the-market surplus
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
parse_intentParse a plain-English swap request (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Parse a plain-English swap request (e.g. "swap 100 USDC for ETH on Optimism") into a structured intent: { intent: "swap"|"unknown", entities: [{type: sellToken|buyToken|amount|chain, value, raw}] }. Backed by the live Ophis parser.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Parse swap intent
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
get_balancesRead a wallet's native-token balance plus ERC-20 balances for the given token addresses on one chain, via a public RPC (one multicall).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_balances" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a wallet's native-token balance plus ERC-20 balances for the given token addresses on one chain, via a public RPC (one multicall). Returns each token's symbol, decimals, raw atoms, and human-readable amount. A token address that is not an ERC-20 is reported with an `error` and does not fail the batch. Read-only; holds no keys. Supported chains are those with a public RPC (most Ophis chains).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get wallet balances
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_gasRead a chain's current gas price (EIP-1559 maxFee/maxPriority suggestion when supported, plus an effective gasPrice in wei and gwei).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_gas" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a chain's current gas price (EIP-1559 maxFee/maxPriority suggestion when supported, plus an effective gasPrice in wei and gwei). Ophis trades are gasless for the trader, so this mainly bounds the cost of a one-time ERC-20 approval to the VaultRelayer. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get chain gas price
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_integrator_earningsLook up routed volume, the Ophis base fee, and the integrator's own fee on externally hosted chains, by appCode (your widget appCode or SDK ophisReferrer code).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_integrator_earnings" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up routed volume, the Ophis base fee, and the integrator's own fee on externally hosted chains, by appCode (your widget appCode or SDK ophisReferrer code). Routed volume is reported in USD, split by chain and by Ophis-operated versus externally hosted chains. Read-only, keyless, cumulative.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get integrator earnings
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_portfolioRead a wallet's native and (optionally) ERC-20 balances across multiple chains at once.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_portfolio" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a wallet's native and (optionally) ERC-20 balances across multiple chains at once. Pass tokensByChain (chainId -> token addresses) to include token balances; omit chainIds to scan every chain with a public RPC (max 13 chains, and at most 100 token reads total across all chains). Per-chain RPC failures are returned inline so one dead endpoint does not sink the result. Read-only; holds no keys.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get cross-chain balances
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_quoteFetch a best-execution quote from the chain's Ophis orderbook (use a chainId from list_chains' `tradeable`).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_quote" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a best-execution quote from the chain's Ophis orderbook (use a chainId from list_chains' `tradeable`). Amounts are in atoms (smallest unit, uint256 decimal string). For kind='sell' the amount is the sell amount before fee; for kind='buy' it is the desired buy amount. Returns the orderbook quote (sellAmount/buyAmount/feeAmount/validTo). Before build_order, apply slippage to the limit side by kind: kind='sell' -> lower buyAmount (min out); kind='buy' -> raise sellAmount (max in).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get swap quote
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_token_chartFetch OHLCV price history for a token from the keyless GeckoTerminal market API (resolves the token's deepest pool, then returns candles).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_token_chart" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch OHLCV price history for a token from the keyless GeckoTerminal market API (resolves the token's deepest pool, then returns candles). Use for an agent to reason about recent price action before quoting. Prices come from a single pool that may be thin or manipulated, so treat them as advisory, not a sole execution signal. The keyless tier is a shared ~30 req/min quota, so cache and do not poll tightly. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get token OHLCV chart
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_chainsList configured EVM orderbook chains, split into `tradeable` (orderbook URL configured; only route get_quote/build_order to these) and `paused` (no configured orderbook URL, so tho…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_chains" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List configured EVM orderbook chains, split into `tradeable` (orderbook URL configured; only route get_quote/build_order to these) and `paused` (no configured orderbook URL, so those tools reject the chain). This is configuration, not a live health or liquidity check. The standalone app's externally funded NEAR networks are not orderbook chains. Each tradeable chain includes its orderbook host, GPv2Settlement contract (Optimism, Unichain, Robinhood Chain, and Arc are non-canonical), and canonical Ophis fee config. No input.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List Ophis chains
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
resolve_tokenResolve an ERC-20 token SYMBOL to its CANONICAL on-chain address from the trusted Ophis token list (the same curated list the swap UI uses).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "resolve_token" says "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve an ERC-20 token SYMBOL to its CANONICAL on-chain address from the trusted Ophis token list (the same curated list the swap UI uses). Use this BEFORE quoting or building so you never trade an address taken from chat, the web, or memory: a token can spoof the symbol "USDC" at a scam address, and this fails closed. Returns { found, ambiguous, canonical: {address, decimals, name} | null, matches: [...] }. found=false means no trusted match (do NOT guess: confirm any candidate with get_balances and the user). ambiguous=true means several trusted tokens share the symbol (e.g. native vs bridged); confirm which the user means. Native coins are not returned; resolve the wrapped symbol (e.g. WETH). Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Resolve token symbol to canonical address
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
validate_orderOffline preflight for an order you built OUTSIDE build_order (no network call, no keys).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_order" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Offline preflight for an order you built OUTSIDE build_order (no network call, no keys). Catches the documented silent-failure modes before you sign or submit: wrong appCode (prevents Ophis referral attribution), wrong orderbook host (api.cow.fi silently bypasses the Ophis stack on Ophis-operated chains), wrong EIP-712 domain (signing against the upstream protocol's canonical settlement on an Ophis-operated chain yields a domain the deployed contract rejects), appData hash mismatch (order.appData must equal keccak256 of the exact fullAppData string), an unpinned receiver (proceeds leaving the owner), an expired or non-zero-fee order, and malformed partnerFee entries. Pass whatever you have (chainId is required; owner, order, fullAppData, signingDomain, orderbookUrl are all optional and each is checked if present). Returns { valid, errors, warnings, expected } where `expected` echoes the correct per-chain orderbook host, settlement, EIP-712 domain, appCode, and partnerFee. Prefer build_order to construct orders; use this to verify externally-built ones.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Validate order preflight
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write12
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:54 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.ophis.fi/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_order (destructive), parse_intent (write), build_order (write), expected_surplus (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:build_orderChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_integrator_earningsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:validate_orderOnly readsdescription
Tools12 changed.~12 changedView diff
- Changed:build_orderChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:expected_surplusChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:get_balancesOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_gasOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_integrator_earningsOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_portfolioOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_quoteOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_token_chartOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:parse_intentChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:resolve_tokenOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:submit_orderDeletes or cancelsinputSchema
- Changed:validate_orderOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ophis https://mcp.ophis.fi/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ophis https://mcp.ophis.fi/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ophis__get_quote",
"mcp__ophis__get_integrator_earnings",
"mcp__ophis__list_chains",
"mcp__ophis__get_balances",
"mcp__ophis__get_portfolio",
"mcp__ophis__get_gas",
"mcp__ophis__get_token_chart",
"mcp__ophis__resolve_token",
"mcp__ophis__validate_order"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ophis__parse_intent",
"mcp__ophis__build_order",
"mcp__ophis__expected_surplus"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__ophis__submit_order"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ophis. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 12 rules
- mcp__ophis__parse_intent untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_quote untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__build_order untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__submit_order untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_integrator_earnings untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__list_chains untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_balances untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_portfolio untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_gas untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__get_token_chart untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__expected_surplus untrusted-input
- mcp__ophis__resolve_token untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/fi.ophis/mcp/verify?hash=5e336a81b8b2c53266cfb26a8bb16ffe5a81fecd7cb4f874d3e2ad520acef480" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5e336a81b8b2, from Nov 19, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fi.ophis/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fi.ophis/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 17:17 UTC.
Ophis MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Ophis MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Ophis MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: submit_order.
Can the Ophis MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Ophis MCP server have?
- 13 tools: 1 destructive, 3 write, 9 read. submit_order, parse_intent, build_order, expected_surplus, get_quote, get_integrator_earnings, list_chains, get_balances and 5 more.
Does the Ophis MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Ophis MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Ophis MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.