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Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server

fi.usdf/gatewayusdf.fistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Prepaid AI compute in USDF: models, quotes and chat with a receipt; pay per call (x402) or by key

10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server can do

The Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server is published by usdf.fi, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (x402_pay) and create or change data (7 tools: quote, list_tools, quote_tool, agents_market_call and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_tools); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (list_tools, x402_pay, agents_market_search and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (x402_pay). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict, credentials-mention and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • x402_payCalls a URL that asks for an x402 payment and pays it for you: the gateway pays the seller in USDC from its own float and charges this key in USDF the seller's amount and the payer…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "x402_pay" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Calls a URL that asks for an x402 payment and pays it for you: the gateway pays the seller in USDC from its own float and charges this key in USDF the seller's amount and the payer's fee (never free credit), within the key's and its agent's limits. Needs an API key. Returns the seller's answer with the payment and its receipt; a payment is charged only once the chain shows it, and one that never settles costs nothing. quote: true answers what it would cost and pays nothing. Third-party tools to call this way are listed under marketplace in list_tools (GET /v1/tools?source=marketplace).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • agents_market_callCalls a listing of the agents market by its id (svc_..., from agents_market_search), paid from this key's USDF balance (never free credit) within the key's and its agent's limits a…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agents_market_call" says "call": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Calls a listing of the agents market by its id (svc_..., from agents_market_search), paid from this key's USDF balance (never free credit) within the key's and its agent's limits and at most max_price: what one call costs and nothing on top; a call its seller does not answer 2xx costs nothing, or no more than what its seller kept of it. Every listing is called the same way, and answers 503 market_calls_unarmed while calls to the market are not switched on. Needs an API key. Returns the seller's answer and the receipt. The input goes to the seller, whose own policy governs what it keeps.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • balanceWith an API key: what the key can spend now, the account's balance and the amount held for requests running, and what is left of the key's budget, in USDF.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    With an API key: what the key can spend now, the account's balance and the amount held for requests running, and what is left of the key's budget, in USDF. With address instead, and no key: that wallet's USDF and USDG on the chain now, and how much USDF it lets the signature-transfer contract spend, which x402 payments come from.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • chatRuns a chat completion and returns the text with its receipt (tokens, price, cost, balance, settlement).Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ignature transfer); call again with the credential in _meta["org.paymentauth/credential"],..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...tauth/credential"], and the paid result carries _meta["org.paymentauth/receipt"]."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Runs a chat completion and returns the text with its receipt (tokens, price, cost, balance, settlement). With an API key it spends from that key's balance, holding the most the request can cost first. Not streamed. Output is capped at 4096 tokens. A call without a progress token answers within 55 s of arriving. With a progress token, progress is sent every 15 s and the call may run 10 minutes, so the client must reset its timeout on progress (resetTimeoutOnProgress: true in the TypeScript SDK) or wait that long. At its deadline, or when the client's connection closes, a call is cut: the text produced so far is returned with finish_reason "length" and billed on the provider's usage report where the provider gives one, otherwise on an estimate never above max_tokens; for a model whose reasoning is not streamed, at the held output budget. Cancellation messages are not supported: a call the client stops waiting for without disconnecting runs to completion or its deadline and is billed. With no key, the call is paid with x402 in USDF (signature transfer) or USDG (signed transfer), as POST /x402/v1/chat/completions: without a payment it returns isError with the payment requirements (x402Version, resource, accepts) as structuredContent; sign one accept and call again with the payment in _meta["x402/payment"], the payment argument or the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. The quote is the call's maximum cost at the published price (prompt at one token per byte, output at max_tokens, capped as above, no minimum), paid up front; the call is charged what it uses at that price and the rest is refunded in the asset paid, the gateway paying the gas. A paid call runs to its end or its deadline whether or not the client waits and returns the receipt and _meta["x402/payment-response"]; at the deadline the text so far is returned with finish_reason "length" and a note, charged what it used and the rest refunded. A call no provider accepted before its deadline, or whose provider failed or ended with nothing, is refunded in full in the asset paid; so is one cut by the deadline after the provider accepted it, with nothing produced. A call with less than 20 s left before its deadline is refused before the payment is settled (deadline_too_close), nothing charged. MPP clients pay the same quote: the payment-required result also carries _meta["org.paymentauth/payment-required"] with evm charge challenges (USDG by signed transfer authorization, USDF by signature transfer); call again with the credential in _meta["org.paymentauth/credential"], and the paid result carries _meta["org.paymentauth/receipt"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_toolsTools you can call through POST /v1/tools/{id}, paid from the same balance and key as chat, each with the input it takes (with an API key, its price in USDF too), ordered by title.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "chat": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "call" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "list_tools" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Tools you can call through POST /v1/tools/{id}, paid from the same balance and key as chat, each with the input it takes (with an API key, its price in USDF too), ordered by title. Every tool listed can be called now. q keeps the tools whose id, title or description has those words; a page holds up to 200, and page.next names the next one. No key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • quoteThe hold the chat tool places before running a request, in USDF and USD (output capped at 4096 tokens).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The hold the chat tool places before running a request, in USDF and USD (output capped at 4096 tokens). It is an estimate, not a ceiling: a completed request is billed the provider's reported usage, normally less. Pass prompt or messages. No key needed; a request for attested hardware (a :private model id or provider.private), and any request from a Private-tier key, is quoted on its attested routes, at the model's price.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • quote_toolWhat a call to a tool would hold for this input before it runs (its most it can cost), in USDF and USD, with the tool's price.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What a call to a tool would hold for this input before it runs (its most it can cost), in USDF and USD, with the tool's price. It checks the input as the call would, and runs and holds nothing. No key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • receiptWith the API key that made the request: its receipt, with the usage, the price sheet version, the cost and, once settled, the settlement, its transaction and the rows behind the on…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    With the API key that made the request: its receipt, with the usage, the price sheet version, the cost and, once settled, the settlement, its transaction and the rows behind the onchain digest. With no key: the public receipt of any request id, x402 ones included, with its line in the usage log, the payment, the settlement and where its proof is (GET /x402/v1/receipts/{id}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_modelsModels the gateway serves with their context window, output limits and whether a route is available right now; with an API key, their prices too (USD per 1M tokens, the same figure…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_models" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Models the gateway serves with their context window, output limits and whether a route is available right now; with an API key, their prices too (USD per 1M tokens, the same figure in USDF).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

5 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__gateway__x402_pay"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:54 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.usdf.fi/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including x402_pay (irreversible), quote (write), list_tools (write), quote_tool (write), agents_market_call (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn2 info
  • The server marks "list_tools" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • Infochat

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ignature transfer); call again with the credential in _meta["org.paymentauth/credential"],..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infochat

    The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...tauth/credential"], and the paid result carries _meta["org.paymentauth/receipt"]."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http gateway https://api.usdf.fi/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http gateway https://api.usdf.fi/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__gateway__list_models",
      "mcp__gateway__agents_market_search"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__gateway__quote",
      "mcp__gateway__list_tools",
      "mcp__gateway__quote_tool",
      "mcp__gateway__x402_pay",
      "mcp__gateway__agents_market_call",
      "mcp__gateway__chat",
      "mcp__gateway__balance",
      "mcp__gateway__receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gateway. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__gateway__list_tools private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__gateway__x402_pay untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gateway__agents_market_search untrusted-input
  • mcp__gateway__agents_market_call untrusted-input
  • mcp__gateway__chat untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/fi.usdf/gateway/verify?hash=7b74611c4facf56b4b37123836b02f1d2f3d1d131969f7d3786c583bf2752597" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7b74611c4fac, from Nov 15, 2026, 09:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fi.usdf/gateway/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for fi.usdf/gateway
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/fi.usdf/gateway.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fi.usdf/gateway)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: x402_pay.

What tools does the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read. x402_pay, quote, list_tools, quote_tool, agents_market_call, chat, balance, receipt and 2 more.

Does the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): x402_pay.

Has the Foundry: prepaid AI compute in USDF MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.