AgentDrop MCP server
fyi.agentdrop/agentdropagentdrop.fyistreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Paid tools for AI agents over x402: frontier-model chat per call, plus drops and hand-off channels.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
Run the operations that matter as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the AgentDrop MCP server can do
The AgentDrop MCP server is published by agentdrop.fyi, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (list_services and describe_service).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
describe_serviceOne service in full: its MCP URL and config snippet, HTTP routes, prices, limits and security model.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "describe_service" says "describe": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it One service in full: its MCP URL and config snippet, HTTP routes, prices, limits and security model. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
list_servicesThe PayperWork services with their MCP endpoints, HTTP routes, prices and limits.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it The PayperWork services with their MCP endpoints, HTTP routes, prices and limits. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 2, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 5 removed, 1 changed.+1 added−5 removed~1 changedView diff
- Added:describe_serviceOnly reads
- Removed:delete
- Removed:get
- Removed:list
- Removed:put
- Removed:wait
- Changed:list_servicesOnly readsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentdrop https://agentdrop.fyi/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentdrop https://agentdrop.fyi/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentdrop__list_services",
"mcp__agentdrop__describe_service"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentdrop. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agentdrop__list_services untrusted-input
- mcp__agentdrop__describe_service untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/fyi.agentdrop/agentdrop/verify?hash=7dee5f6b4947101aaeddebf18fd74d239396fbeb84b5c6dc618134d0e577519d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7dee5f6b4947, from Nov 14, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.agentdrop/agentdrop/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.agentdrop/agentdrop)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 1, 2026, 04:17 UTC.
AgentDrop MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentDrop MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the AgentDrop MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentDrop MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentDrop MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. list_services and describe_service.
Does the AgentDrop MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentDrop MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentDrop MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 14, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.