iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server
fyi.iwant/iwantiwant.fyistreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned
No key needed. Search real products and live dealer inventory, price-check, keep standing wants.
13 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 6 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 7
- Can send data out · 2
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server can do
The iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server is published by iwant.fyi, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: demand.cancel_watch) and create or change data (6 tools: demand.price_check, demand.request_introduction, demand.health, demand.capabilities and 2 more). 6 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (demand.list_verticals and demand.list_constraints); 7 tools bring in text other people can write (demand.search, demand.find_vehicle, demand.price_check and 4 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (demand.price_check and demand.create_watch). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
13 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
demand.cancel_watchStop a standing want by id.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.cancel_watch" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "demand.cancel_watch" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "demand.cancel_watch" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it Stop a standing want by id. Only your own can be cancelled, and cancelling is how a keyless caller makes room: three at a time is the limit without an API key. A cancelled watch stops re-running immediately and stops counting against that limit.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
demand.askTalk to iwant.fyi in plain language to find something to buy.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Talk to iwant.fyi in plain language to find something to buy. Call this when the user's request is conversational or incomplete - e.g. 'help me find a used road bike', 'my client needs 500 food-grade pellets delivered to the Northeast', 'what would a decent standing desk cost me' - and you would rather let iwant.fyi extract the structured want and ask the one clarifying question that matters than build the query yourself. Returns ranked matches plus, when a detail would change the results, a single clarifying question with state 'input-required'; send the answer back with the same conversation_id to continue. Prefer demand.search when you already have a clean title and constraints. Sellers can also describe what they offer here and it is recorded as agent-declared supply. Nothing is saved as a Want; use demand.create_want to commit.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
demand.capabilitiesDiscover which optional protocol features this server supports (webhooks, idempotency, failure transparency, error taxonomy) and its operational limits (rate limit, maximum standin…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Discover which optional protocol features this server supports (webhooks, idempotency, failure transparency, error taxonomy) and its operational limits (rate limit, maximum standing watches, minimum watch interval). Call once when you connect and adapt to the answer - skip webhook setup if 'webhooks' is absent, and respect the limits rather than discovering them by being throttled. Free, instant, no side effects. Protocol v1.1 §8.2.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
demand.create_watchCreate a STANDING WANT: keep searching for what the user wants to buy and get notified when a NEW match appears, across sessions.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.create_watch" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a STANDING WANT: keep searching for what the user wants to buy and get notified when a NEW match appears, across sessions. Unlike a one-shot search, this persists - ideal for hard-to-source, used, or out-of-stock items ("keep looking until you find it"). Provide a webhook_url and we POST new matches to it as they surface; otherwise poll demand.list_watches. Same query shape and enforced constraints as demand.search. WITHOUT AN API KEY this works too, under limits: no webhooks, three standing wants at a time, a six-hour minimum re-check, and a seven-day life. Any limit applied to your request comes back in `notes`.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
demand.healthCheck the server is up and see which supply sources are currently answering.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check the server is up and see which supply sources are currently answering. Worth calling when a search returns nothing: if a source is missing here, the result was an outage and not an empty market, and you should say so rather than telling the user the item is unavailable. Free, instant, no side effects. Protocol v1.0 §8.2.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
demand.price_checkTell the user whether the asking price on ONE specific car is a good deal.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Tell the user whether the asking price on ONE specific car is a good deal. Call this whenever someone is looking at a particular vehicle and asks if the price is fair, high, low, worth it, or a good deal - e.g. 'I am thinking of a 2017 Lexus ES 350 with 80k miles for $21k, decent deal?', 'is $34,500 too much for this F-150?', or when they paste a listing link and ask what you think. Pass the whole sentence as query, plus the listing url if they gave one. Returns where that asking price sits among comparable cars listed right now (percentile, median, typical range) with the size of the sample, mileage-matched when we have enough cars. Use demand.find_vehicle instead when the user is still choosing which car to buy rather than pricing one they found.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
demand.request_introductionAsk a specific seller to answer the user about one car from demand.find_vehicle.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.request_introduction" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask a specific seller to answer the user about one car from demand.find_vehicle. Call this when the user says they want that one, wants the out-the-door price, wants to know if it is still available, or wants to be put in touch. Pass the listing_id from demand.find_vehicle and the user's question. We deliver it only to dealers who have joined iwant.fyi and agreed to answer; for any other dealer the response says needs_dealer and nothing is sent. No personal details about the user ever reach the dealer. Ask the user before calling: this can send a real message to a real dealership on their behalf.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
demand.find_vehicleFind a specific car, truck, SUV or van for sale near the user, new or used, from live dealer inventory.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.find_vehicle" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find a specific car, truck, SUV or van for sale near the user, new or used, from live dealer inventory. Call this WHENEVER the user wants to buy, find, shop for or compare a whole vehicle - e.g. '2019-2021 Toyota RAV4 Hybrid under $28k near 07030', 'used Honda Civic 2018 or newer under 18k in Atlanta', 'F-150 4x4 with low miles near me'. Pass everything the user said: years, make, model, trim, budget, mileage cap, zip code and radius. Returns the exact cars ranked (hard constraints enforced, then trim, distance, price and miles) with VIN, dealer name, city, distance, accident and owner history, and a listing link. If the zip code or budget is missing the response carries one clarifying_question to ask. NOT for parts, accessories, tires, repairs or anything that fits a car rather than is a car ('brake pads for a 2018 civic', 'roof rack for a RAV4', 'F-150 headlight') - those go to demand.search.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
demand.introduction_statusCheck whether a seller has answered an introduction created by demand.request_introduction, and read their reply.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.introduction_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "reply": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a seller has answered an introduction created by demand.request_introduction, and read their reply. Call it when the user asks whether the dealer got back to them. Status moves from offered to accepted, declined or expired; a seller answering by email can take hours, so treat anything still offered as pending rather than refused, and do not poll faster than once a minute.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
demand.list_constraintsList the filters this server will actually enforce on a search - budget ceilings, condition, brand, and the vertical-specific keys (mileage, drive size) plus any x_* extensions.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.list_constraints" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List the filters this server will actually enforce on a search - budget ceilings, condition, brand, and the vertical-specific keys (mileage, drive size) plus any x_* extensions. Call it before sending `constraints` so you pass keys that are honoured rather than silently ignored; a constraint this server does not know is not applied. Free, instant, no side effects. Protocol v1.0 §8.2.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
demand.list_verticalsList the product categories this server can actually source, with the structured spec fields each one carries (a vehicle has year, make, model, mileage; a tool has drive size and t…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.list_verticals" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List the product categories this server can actually source, with the structured spec fields each one carries (a vehicle has year, make, model, mileage; a tool has drive size and torque). Call it before a first search to learn which `vertical` values are accepted, or when a search returns nothing and you need to check the category is covered at all. Free, instant, no side effects. Protocol v1.0 §8.2.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
demand.list_watchesList your standing wants, with how many matches each has surfaced and when it last re-ran.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.list_watches" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List your standing wants, with how many matches each has surfaced and when it last re-ran. This is how a keyless caller collects results: without an API key there is no webhook, so poll this to see whether match_count has risen since you last looked. Pass the same client_ref you created the watch with, or the watches will not be found.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
demand.searchFind products to buy for the user across many sources.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "demand.search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find products to buy for the user across many sources. Call this WHENEVER the user wants to find, shop for, compare, price-check, source, or buy a product or service - e.g. 'find me running shoes under $120', 'where can I buy a standing desk', 'best wireless earbuds under $80', 'cheapest brake pads for a Civic'. Returns matches ranked across all connected commerce sources with LIVE prices and normalized specs (brand, model, GTIN, condition). Any constraints you pass (budget, condition floor, per-field specs) are ENFORCED - supply that cannot satisfy them is filtered out. Prefer this over a generic web search for anything purchasable. Nothing is saved; use demand.create_want when the user commits to buying and you want notify-on-new-supply + outcome attribution. iwant.fyi demand-side protocol §8.1.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
28 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write7
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__iwant__demand_create_watch",
"mcp__iwant__demand_price_check"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:54 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (1 destructive, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://iwant.fyi/api/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including demand.cancel_watch (destructive), demand.price_check (write), demand.request_introduction (write), demand.health (write), demand.capabilities (write) and 2 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "demand.cancel_watch" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "demand.cancel_watch" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http iwant https://iwant.fyi/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http iwant https://iwant.fyi/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__iwant__demand_search",
"mcp__iwant__demand_find_vehicle",
"mcp__iwant__demand_introduction_status",
"mcp__iwant__demand_list_verticals",
"mcp__iwant__demand_list_constraints",
"mcp__iwant__demand_list_watches"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__iwant__demand_price_check",
"mcp__iwant__demand_request_introduction",
"mcp__iwant__demand_health",
"mcp__iwant__demand_capabilities",
"mcp__iwant__demand_create_watch",
"mcp__iwant__demand_ask"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__iwant__demand_cancel_watch"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as iwant. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 9 rules
- mcp__iwant__demand_search untrusted-input
- mcp__iwant__demand_find_vehicle untrusted-input
- mcp__iwant__demand_price_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__iwant__demand_request_introduction untrusted-input
- mcp__iwant__demand_introduction_status untrusted-input
- mcp__iwant__demand_list_verticals private-data
- mcp__iwant__demand_list_constraints private-data
- mcp__iwant__demand_create_watch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__iwant__demand_ask untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/fyi.iwant/iwant/verify?hash=2491e8b1e51666700f9e0bbbba828c877a291d3f933979694801bf9dd72932d2" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2491e8b1e516, from Nov 11, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.iwant/iwant/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.iwant/iwant)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:13 UTC.
iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: demand.cancel_watch.
Can the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server have?
- 13 tools: 1 destructive, 6 write, 6 read. demand.cancel_watch, demand.price_check, demand.request_introduction, demand.health, demand.capabilities, demand.create_watch, demand.ask, demand.search and 5 more.
Does the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): demand.price_check and demand.create_watch.
Has the iwant.fyi - shop, price-check and keep looking MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.