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maritime MCP server

global.rootz.ship/maritimeship.rootz.globalstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Signed global shipping & commodity data: oil, LNG, grain, sanctions, fleet, emissions.

16 tools: 9 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 9 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

9 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the maritime MCP server can do

The maritime MCP server is published by ship.rootz.global, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 16 tools. It can create or change data (9 tools: shipping_sanctions, shipping_freshness, shipping_top_exporters, shipping_country_flows and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (shipping_fleet, shipping_status and shipping_doc_intel).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

16 tools

Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
  • shipping_chokepointMaritime chokepoint intelligence for Hormuz, Suez, Malacca, or Bab el-Mandeb.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Maritime chokepoint intelligence for Hormuz, Suez, Malacca, or Bab el-Mandeb. Returns authoritative EIA baseline throughput (barrels/day, % of global), a live AIS snapshot (vessels/tankers/moving/stationary) for the chokepoint, sanctioned vessels currently detected there, and dark-fleet behavioural signals (loitering + AIS gaps). This is the tool for "how is Hormuz doing".
  • shipping_country_flowsTrade partners for a specific country (who they export to / import from).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Trade partners for a specific country (who they export to / import from). Pass the country as `country` or `query`.
  • shipping_freshnessPer-dataset freshness only: pipeline refresh age vs expected cadence, newest record age, source, and status (ok / lagging / stale / empty / unknown).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Per-dataset freshness only: pipeline refresh age vs expected cadence, newest record age, source, and status (ok / lagging / stale / empty / unknown). Use before relying on a figure that must be current.
  • shipping_portWhat this service holds about ONE port, and how good the evidence is.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What this service holds about ONE port, and how good the evidence is. Returns NGA World Port Index identity (UN/LOCODE, coordinates, harbour class, channel/anchorage/pier depths), the evidence grade for our movement data (origin = the authority publishes its own board / custody = a third party publishes it / measured = AIS inference only, asserted by nobody / none), what we do NOT hold, and what happened the last time we fetched the port's own website. Pass a port name, UN/LOCODE, or WPI port number as `query`.
  • shipping_port_callsBerth-level vessel movements harvested from port authority movement boards: vessel, IMO, arrival/departure, berth, agent, declared last/next port.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "shipping_port_calls" says "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Berth-level vessel movements harvested from port authority movement boards: vessel, IMO, arrival/departure, berth, agent, declared last/next port. Each row carries its source and whether the channel was TLS-verified. This is TESTIMONY from the port, distinct from the AIS-inferred port_visits behind other tools. Pass a port name or an IMO as `query`.
  • shipping_port_coverageCoverage ledger across all 2,951 ports: how many we hold at each evidence grade, how many publish a machine-readable movement board, and what happened when we checked those that do…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Coverage ledger across all 2,951 ports: how many we hold at each evidence grade, how many publish a machine-readable movement board, and what happened when we checked those that do not. Call this to find out what this service does NOT know about ports before relying on what it does.
  • shipping_sanctionsCheck vessel/entity against OFAC sanctionsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check vessel/entity against OFAC sanctions
  • shipping_top_exportersTop oil exporting countries by value/volume (a ranking — no query needed).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Top oil exporting countries by value/volume (a ranking — no query needed). Optional `product` or `query` recognizes a product keyword (crude/refined/lng/coal/iron_ore).
  • shipping_vessel_typesFleet breakdown by vessel typeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "shipping_vessel_types" says "type": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fleet breakdown by vessel type
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • shipping_doc_intelQuery the shipping document intelligence layer: eBL platform adoption (12 platforms), MLETR country adoption (23 countries, 13 enacted), document fraud cases ($11.3B), DCSA standar…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "shipping_doc_intel" says "doc": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "query" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query the shipping document intelligence layer: eBL platform adoption (12 platforms), MLETR country adoption (23 countries, 13 enacted), document fraud cases ($11.3B), DCSA standards (10), industry stats (26 metrics). The state of shipping document digitization.
  • shipping_emissionsQuery EU MRV vessel emissions data — CO2, fuel consumption, time at sea for 22,543 vessels (2018-2024).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query EU MRV vessel emissions data — CO2, fuel consumption, time at sea for 22,543 vessels (2018-2024). Search by IMO, ship type, or year — or a free-text `query` (7-digit = IMO, else ship type/name).
  • shipping_fleetQuery tanker fleet database.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "query" and "database": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query tanker fleet database. Accepts structured filters OR a free-text `query` (matches vessel name, IMO, owner, or type).
  • shipping_oil_pricesGet oil price benchmarks (WTI, Brent)No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get oil price benchmarks (WTI, Brent)
  • shipping_oil_tradeQuery bilateral oil trade flows (EIA US imports/exports + Eurostat).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query bilateral oil trade flows (EIA US imports/exports + Eurostat). Accepts structured filters OR a free-text `query` (matches country/notes). NOTE: this is import/export flow data, NOT chokepoint throughput — for Hormuz transit volumes use shipping_chokepoint.
  • shipping_sanctioned_at_euFind sanctioned vessels that called at EU/EEA ports.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find sanctioned vessels that called at EU/EEA ports. Cross-references OFAC sanctions with EU MRV emissions data (verifiable IMO-level identity). Filter by year or a free-text `query` (sanctions program e.g. "Iran"/"Russia", flag, or vessel name).
  • shipping_statusDatabase statistics plus per-dataset freshness: how recently each dataset was refreshed by our pipeline, how old its newest record is, and whether it is ok / lagging / stale / empt…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "shipping_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "database": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Database statistics plus per-dataset freshness: how recently each dataset was refreshed by our pipeline, how old its newest record is, and whether it is ok / lagging / stale / empty. Call this to decide how much to trust anything else this server returns.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ship.rootz.global/mcp: tools/list returned 16 tools to an anonymous client, including shipping_sanctions (write), shipping_freshness (write), shipping_top_exporters (write), shipping_country_flows (write), shipping_vessel_types (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 9

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 9.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 9
  2. Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http maritime https://ship.rootz.global/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http maritime https://ship.rootz.global/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_oil_trade",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_fleet",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_oil_prices",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_status",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_emissions",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_sanctioned_at_eu",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_doc_intel"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_sanctions",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_freshness",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_top_exporters",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_country_flows",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_vessel_types",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_chokepoint",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_port",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_port_calls",
      "mcp__maritime__shipping_port_coverage"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as maritime. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__maritime__shipping_fleet private-data
  • mcp__maritime__shipping_status private-data
  • mcp__maritime__shipping_doc_intel private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/global.rootz.ship/maritime/verify?hash=3998c562fd5c6501a7274c5ae3e5702664bf7618cb58a9fc144effe8197eeb60" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3998c562fd5c, from Nov 17, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/global.rootz.ship/maritime/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for global.rootz.ship/maritime
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/global.rootz.ship/maritime.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/global.rootz.ship/maritime)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:13 UTC.

maritime MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the maritime MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 16 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the maritime MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the maritime MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the maritime MCP server have?

16 tools: 9 write, 7 read. shipping_sanctions, shipping_freshness, shipping_top_exporters, shipping_country_flows, shipping_vessel_types, shipping_chokepoint, shipping_port, shipping_port_calls and 8 more.

Does the maritime MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the maritime MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the maritime MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 3, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.