ZERO Payment Guard MCP server
host.beacon.worker.zero-payment-guard/payment-guardzero-payment-guard.worker.beacon.hoststreamable-httpv1.5.1Scanned
Base wallet snapshot, tx status, payment & token checks, company enrichment, web to Markdown; x402.
11 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 11
- Can send data out · 4
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server can do
The ZERO Payment Guard MCP server is published by zero-payment-guard.worker.beacon.host, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (usdc_payment_check) and create or change data (7 tools: company_brief, page_extract_batch, domain_enrich, page_extract and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
11 tools bring in text other people can write (company_brief, page_extract_batch, domain_enrich and 8 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (page_extract_batch, page_extract, x402_preflight and 1 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.5.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
11 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
usdc_payment_checkPaid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "usdc_payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "usdc_payment_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "usdc_payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Verify a Base mainnet transaction paid native Circle USDC (not bridged USDbC) to a recipient, with minimum amount and confirmations. Use before releasing goods or marking an invoice paid. Verdict paid/not_paid/not_found.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
company_briefPaid $0.003 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.003 per call (x402, USDC on Base). One call to research a company: everything domain_enrich returns (socials, email provider, SPF/DMARC, DNS provider, RDAP age, tech stack, SaaS signals) plus its homepage and About page as clean Markdown.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
domain_enrichPaid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Domain, URL or work email to a company profile from public sources: name, description, logo, social profiles, homepage contact emails/phones; email provider from MX, SPF/DMARC policy; DNS provider; SaaS signals from TXT verifications; RDAP registrar, creation date, age, expiry; website tech stack.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
page_extractPaid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Fetch a public web page and return its main content as clean Markdown plus metadata: title, description, canonical, language, author, dates, OpenGraph/Twitter card, JSON-LD types, headings outline, favicon, feeds, link counts (links=true for the list). Honours robots.txt.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
page_extract_batchPaid $0.008 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.008 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Extract up to 10 public web pages in parallel to clean Markdown + metadata. Per-URL errors are inline; fails (not charged) only if no URL succeeds.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
sample_reportFree: real live x402 preflight of a fixed sample endpoint and a token check of USDC on Base, same shapes as the paid tools.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free: real live x402 preflight of a fixed sample endpoint and a token check of USDC on Base, same shapes as the paid tools.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_checkPaid $0.003 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.003 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Before accepting, swapping or approving a token on Base: is it a contract, ERC-20 metadata, canonical official deployment (USDC, EURC, WETH, cbBTC...), impersonation of a major symbol, upgradeable proxy and admin type, owner, paused. Verdict canonical/ok/caution/block.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
x402_preflightPaid $0.005 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.005 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Before your agent pays an unknown x402 endpoint: fetch its 402 unpaid and check the asset is canonical Circle USDC for that network, price/scheme/timeout sanity, and payTo (contract or EOA, USDC balance on Base). Returns verdict ok/caution/block with per-option flags.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
basename_resolvePaid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "basename_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base). Resolve a Basename (alice.base.eth) to its Base address, or an address to its primary Basename with forward-verification. Use before sending funds to a name.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tx_statusPaid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tx_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.001 per call (x402, USDC on Base). State not_found/pending/success/reverted, block, confirmations, from/to, fee in ETH (incl. L1 fee), method selector, decoded ERC-20 Transfer events with symbols/amounts (canonical tokens flagged). Use to confirm a payment, swap or call landed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_snapshotPaid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "wallet_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid $0.002 per call (x402, USDC on Base). One call: ETH and canonical Base token balances (native USDC, USDbC, EURC, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH, DAI, USDT), nonce, EOA or contract, flags (fresh/unused address, holds bridged USDbC). Use before sending funds or accepting a counterparty.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write11
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out4
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 8
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://zero-payment-guard.worker.beacon.host/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including usdc_payment_check (irreversible), company_brief (write), page_extract_batch (write), domain_enrich (write), page_extract (write) and 3 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "usdc_payment_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "usdc_payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff
- Added:tx_statusOnly reads
- Added:wallet_snapshotOnly reads
Install
Pinned to version 1.5.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http payment-guard https://zero-payment-guard.worker.beacon.host/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http payment-guard https://zero-payment-guard.worker.beacon.host/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__payment-guard__basename_resolve",
"mcp__payment-guard__wallet_snapshot",
"mcp__payment-guard__tx_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__payment-guard__company_brief",
"mcp__payment-guard__page_extract_batch",
"mcp__payment-guard__domain_enrich",
"mcp__payment-guard__page_extract",
"mcp__payment-guard__x402_preflight",
"mcp__payment-guard__usdc_payment_check",
"mcp__payment-guard__token_check",
"mcp__payment-guard__sample_report"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as payment-guard. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 11 rules
- mcp__payment-guard__company_brief untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__page_extract_batch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__payment-guard__domain_enrich untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__page_extract untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__payment-guard__x402_preflight untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__payment-guard__usdc_payment_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__payment-guard__token_check untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__basename_resolve untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__wallet_snapshot untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__tx_status untrusted-input
- mcp__payment-guard__sample_report untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/host.beacon.worker.zero-payment-guard/payment-guard/verify?hash=29f8f10d851a782a2270b7112ee11083639e0d003a3ceecd780b3f866b79d3cf" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 29f8f10d851a, from Nov 13, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/host.beacon.worker.zero-payment-guard/payment-guard/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/host.beacon.worker.zero-payment-guard/payment-guard)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
ZERO Payment Guard MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: usdc_payment_check.
What tools does the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server have?
- 11 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read. usdc_payment_check, company_brief, page_extract_batch, domain_enrich, page_extract, x402_preflight, token_check, sample_report and 3 more.
Does the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server send data to outside services?
- 4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): page_extract_batch, page_extract, x402_preflight and usdc_payment_check.
Has the ZERO Payment Guard MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 13, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.