Agents Allowed MCP server
io.agentsallowed/lookupagentsallowed.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Check if a website lets AI agents browse, shop, book or log in, before acting.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agents Allowed MCP server can do
The Agents Allowed MCP server is published by agentsallowed.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_domain, check_domains, submit_update and report_block), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_domain).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_domainBefore acting on a website for a user, check whether it lets AI agents browse, shop, book or log in, and whether there's an official agent route (UCP, ACP, MCP, Visa TAP, A2A, part…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Before acting on a website for a user, check whether it lets AI agents browse, shop, book or log in, and whether there's an official agent route (UCP, ACP, MCP, Visa TAP, A2A, partner apps). Returns status (open|partial|announced|none, or unknown if we have no verified record), recommended_action (a suggestion based on public sources, not permission; the website's own terms always take priority), per-action allowances, routes, dated sources. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_domainsBatch version of check_domain for up to 50 domains or URLs.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Batch version of check_domain for up to 50 domains or URLs. Results are returned in input order. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
report_blockDeprecated alias kept for older clients.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Deprecated alias kept for older clients. Same as submit_update with type report_block (or report_works when result is works / official_route_found). Goes to human review; nothing auto-publishes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
submit_updateSuggest a change to the database: add a brand (add_brand), correct a listing (correct_listing), report that an agent was stopped on a site (report_block), or report that a task now…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_update" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Suggest a change to the database: add a brand (add_brand), correct a listing (correct_listing), report that an agent was stopped on a site (report_block), or report that a task now works (report_works). Every submission goes to a human review queue; nothing is published automatically, and a listing only changes once it is verified from a brand statement or official docs, reputable reporting, or our own documented test. Do not include personal data about the user.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentsallowed.io/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_domain (write), check_domains (write), submit_update (write), report_block (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http lookup https://agentsallowed.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http lookup https://agentsallowed.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__lookup__check_domain",
"mcp__lookup__check_domains",
"mcp__lookup__submit_update",
"mcp__lookup__report_block"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lookup. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__lookup__check_domain untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.agentsallowed/lookup/verify?hash=9b48c158284b4e6386e9b761bfebc9d2c73352b191063e93843de02abc294f60" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9b48c158284b, from Nov 9, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.agentsallowed/lookup/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.agentsallowed/lookup)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Agents Allowed MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agents Allowed MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agents Allowed MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agents Allowed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agents Allowed MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. check_domain, check_domains, submit_update and report_block.
Does the Agents Allowed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agents Allowed MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agents Allowed MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.