AgentSLA MCP server
io.agentsla/agentslaagentsla.iostreamable-httpv2.2.0Scanned
Check API and MCP endpoints, search 21k indexed APIs, signed SLA checks and refundable USDC escrow.
6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentSLA MCP server can do
The AgentSLA MCP server is published by agentsla.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_endpoint, verify_endpoint_sla and check_pass), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (check_endpoint, verify_endpoint_sla, check_pass and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 2.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_endpointFree, unsigned single check of any HTTP(S) endpoint: HTTP status, latency, and whether it meets the SLA rule (HTTP 2xx/3xx within maxLatencyMs).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, unsigned single check of any HTTP(S) endpoint: HTTP status, latency, and whether it meets the SLA rule (HTTP 2xx/3xx within maxLatencyMs). Use verify_endpoint_sla for a signed result.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check an endpoint (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_passFree.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Whether a Base wallet holds an active 7-day pass for verify_endpoint_sla, when it expires, and the wallet's USDC balance and allowance for buying one.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a wallet's pass
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
verify_endpoint_slaSigned check: probes the endpoint (best of up to 3 tries) and returns an EIP-712 SLAAttestation signed by the AgentSLA oracle, verifiable with ethers.verifyTypedData.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Signed check: probes the endpoint (best of up to 3 tries) and returns an EIP-712 SLAAttestation signed by the AgentSLA oracle, verifiable with ethers.verifyTypedData. Requires walletAddress with an active 7-day pass (5 USDC; check_pass shows its status, buy_pass returns the transactions to buy it); without one it returns an error that says how to pay.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Signed endpoint check (pass required)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
buy_passReturns the unsigned Base Mainnet transactions that buy a 7-day pass (5 USDC) for the given wallet: a USDC approve (only if the allowance is too low), then paySubscription() on the…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the unsigned Base Mainnet transactions that buy a 7-day pass (5 USDC) for the given wallet: a USDC approve (only if the allowance is too low), then paySubscription() on the escrow contract. The wallet signs and sends them itself; AgentSLA holds no keys and moves no funds. Buying while a pass is active adds 7 days to its current expiry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Buy a pass (unsigned transactions)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
discover_monitored_apisSearch the 21,147 APIs and MCP servers indexed by AgentSLA (listed and periodically probed, not audited).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the 21,147 APIs and MCP servers indexed by AgentSLA (listed and periodically probed, not audited). Each result has link_type: "api" (a callable endpoint), "listing-page" (a directory page about the service) or "spec-file" (an API description file); callable APIs are listed first. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search the API directory
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_usdc_escrow_contractBase Mainnet USDC escrow contract address, USDC token address and Basescan link.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_usdc_escrow_contract" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Base Mainnet USDC escrow contract address, USDC token address and Basescan link. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Escrow contract details
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentsla.io/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including check_endpoint (write), verify_endpoint_sla (write), buy_pass (write), create_escrow_job (write), register_escrow_terms (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentsla https://agentsla.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentsla https://agentsla.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentsla__discover_monitored_apis",
"mcp__agentsla__buy_pass",
"mcp__agentsla__get_usdc_escrow_contract"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentsla__check_endpoint",
"mcp__agentsla__verify_endpoint_sla",
"mcp__agentsla__check_pass"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentsla. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__agentsla__check_endpoint untrusted-input
- mcp__agentsla__verify_endpoint_sla untrusted-input
- mcp__agentsla__check_pass untrusted-input
- mcp__agentsla__buy_pass untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.agentsla/agentsla/verify?hash=f117382f4612735486e72682c6c2ba74773f4d517f027cdab6f6d32264f95eb5" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash f117382f4612, from Nov 16, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.agentsla/agentsla/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.agentsla/agentsla)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 20:17 UTC.
AgentSLA MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentSLA MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentSLA MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentSLA MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentSLA MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. check_endpoint, verify_endpoint_sla, check_pass, discover_monitored_apis, buy_pass and get_usdc_escrow_contract.
Does the AgentSLA MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentSLA MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentSLA MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.