BlockchainAnalysis MCP server
io.blockchainanalysis/mcpblockchainanalysis.iostreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Compliance MCP for AI agents: sanctions & KYT screening on 50+ chains, stablecoin-freeze, oracle.
13 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 9 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 12
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server can do
The BlockchainAnalysis MCP server is published by blockchainanalysis.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (kyt_tx) and create or change data (9 tools: check_stablecoin_freeze, check_token_security, screen_agent_wallet, screen_address and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
12 tools bring in text other people can write (check_stablecoin_freeze, get_freeze_events, check_token_security and 9 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (kyt_tx).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
13 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
kyt_txTransaction KYT: screens BOTH counterparties of a transfer (from → to) against sanctions + entity + VASP + cluster, returning a combined risk level, a block/review/allow recommenda…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "kyt_tx" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Transaction KYT: screens BOTH counterparties of a transfer (from → to) against sanctions + entity + VASP + cluster, returning a combined risk level, a block/review/allow recommendation, and directional FROM:/TO: flags. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
check_stablecoin_freezeCheck whether Tether (USDT) or Circle (USDC) have blacklisted a wallet address on-chain.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether Tether (USDT) or Circle (USDC) have blacklisted a wallet address on-chain. Reads the issuer's blacklist function directly across 15 chains (ETH, BSC, POLYGON, ARBITRUM, OPTIMISM, BASE, AVALANCHE, PLASMA, HYPEREVM, STABLE, INK, BERACHAIN, ROBINHOOD, TRON, SOL). A frozen address can no longer send or receive that stablecoin. Also reports whether the address was PREVIOUSLY frozen and later unfrozen (a prior-freeze signal from the freeze ledger). The result reports the observed on-chain fact (frozen / not frozen at check time), never the cause of a freeze. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check stablecoin freeze
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_token_securitySimulate a buy-and-sell of an ERC-20 token on its main DEXes to surface honeypots (tokens you can buy but not sell), extreme transfer taxes, name/symbol impersonation, and active m…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulate a buy-and-sell of an ERC-20 token on its main DEXes to surface honeypots (tokens you can buy but not sell), extreme transfer taxes, name/symbol impersonation, and active mint authority — cross-referenced against BA's 1B+ entity labels. Reports observed facts (e.g. 'sell simulation reverted'), not verdicts. Live on Base, BNB Chain, Ethereum, Optimism, Polygon, Arbitrum. No transaction is sent. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check token security
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
kyt_riskAssess a wallet's KYT (Know-Your-Transaction) risk: sanctions + entity classification + VASP/jurisdiction score + cluster context → one risk verdict (critical / high / medium / low…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Assess a wallet's KYT (Know-Your-Transaction) risk: sanctions + entity classification + VASP/jurisdiction score + cluster context → one risk verdict (critical / high / medium / low / unknown) with flags. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
labelLook up BlockchainAnalysis's entity labels for a single address: every label on record (sanctions from OFAC / EU / UN / UK HMT / Swiss SECO, issuer-freeze state, scam, phishing, ex…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "label" says "label": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "label" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "label" says "label": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up BlockchainAnalysis's entity labels for a single address: every label on record (sanctions from OFAC / EU / UN / UK HMT / Swiss SECO, issuer-freeze state, scam, phishing, exploit, mixer, exchange, and more), each with its category, threat level (SAFE to CRITICAL), and full provenance (source, source URL, confidence, and the date it was last verified). Each accusation (scam, phishing, mixer...) carries evidence.verified; one that states no verifiable evidence is listed last. This is the raw label read behind BA Intel, the only way to buy it per call with no account and no API key. An address we hold no label for returns an explicit not-found with the reason, never an empty result, and an absent label is not a statement that the address is safe. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
oracle_verdictConsumer-protection verdict for a wallet or contract: a normalized verdict (safe / warning / danger, or unknown) with a 0-100 score, confidence tier, and plain-language reasons.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Consumer-protection verdict for a wallet or contract: a normalized verdict (safe / warning / danger, or unknown) with a 0-100 score, confidence tier, and plain-language reasons. Answers 'is it safe to interact with this address?' Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
rwaIdentify a tokenized real-world asset from its token address: what it represents, who issues it, its asset class, ISIN and issuer jurisdiction, whether transfers are permissioned, …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Identify a tokenized real-world asset from its token address: what it represents, who issues it, its asset class, ISIN and issuer jurisdiction, whether transfers are permissioned, and every chain the issuer publishes it on. Each answer carries its provenance: the issuer source, how the address was established (issuer-registry / issuer-page-only / third-party), a confidence, and the date the address was last round-tripped on-chain. An address we do not recognise returns an explicit not-found with the reason, never an empty result. Does NOT cover the issuer's control over a balance (pause, blocklist, seizure). Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_addressScreen a wallet against BlockchainAnalysis's 1B+ entity-label dataset: sanctions (OFAC / EU / UN / UK HMT / Swiss SECO), scam, phishing, exploit, mixer, exchange, and more — each l…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a wallet against BlockchainAnalysis's 1B+ entity-label dataset: sanctions (OFAC / EU / UN / UK HMT / Swiss SECO), scam, phishing, exploit, mixer, exchange, and more — each label carries a threat level (SAFE→CRITICAL), source, and confidence. Works across major EVM chains plus TRON, SOL, and BTC. Each accusation (scam, phishing, mixer...) carries evidence.verified; one that states no verifiable evidence is listed last. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_agent_walletBoolean compliance verdict for an agent wallet or counterparty: clear / flagged / unknown, plus the top risk category, screened against BA's 1B+ entity labels (sanctions, scam, phi…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Boolean compliance verdict for an agent wallet or counterparty: clear / flagged / unknown, plus the top risk category, screened against BA's 1B+ entity labels (sanctions, scam, phishing, exploit, mixer) and live stablecoin freeze state. Exchanges and other service labels do not flag a wallet, and neither does an accusation that states no verifiable evidence (counted in unverified_count). Deliberately a verdict only — the label detail, freeze history, and scores are in the paid screen_address / kyt_risk tools, and a signed, on-chain-anchored proof is in the paid screen_agent_wallet_attested tool. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen agent wallet (verdict)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_agent_wallet_attestedScreen an agent wallet and return a SIGNED, on-chain-anchored compliance attestation: the verdict (clear / flagged / unknown) plus an EIP-712 (secp256k1) signature over the result …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen an agent wallet and return a SIGNED, on-chain-anchored compliance attestation: the verdict (clear / flagged / unknown) plus an EIP-712 (secp256k1) signature over the result and a BA Stamp anchor, so a third party or a smart contract can verify it offline via ecrecover without trusting us live. The free screen_agent_wallet tool returns the verdict only. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
check_token_approvalsList a wallet's active ERC-20 token approvals on Ethereum and who can move its funds — risk-scored against BA's 1B+ entity labels (scam / phishing / exploit / sanctioned spenders),…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List a wallet's active ERC-20 token approvals on Ethereum and who can move its funds — risk-scored against BA's 1B+ entity labels (scam / phishing / exploit / sanctioned spenders), flagging unlimited allowances and stale grants. The wallet's attack surface at a glance. Read-only. Ethereum only. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check token approvals
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_freeze_eventsQuery the canonical stablecoin freeze ledger — the HISTORY of freeze / unfreeze / destroy events by Tether (USDT), Circle (USDC/EURC), Paxos (USDP) and First Digital (FDUSD), sourc…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_freeze_events" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Query the canonical stablecoin freeze ledger — the HISTORY of freeze / unfreeze / destroy events by Tether (USDT), Circle (USDC/EURC), Paxos (USDP) and First Digital (FDUSD), sourced from the issuers' own on-chain blacklist events across Ethereum, Polygon, Optimism, TRON and more. Filter by frozen address, chain, kind, or time; omit all filters for the most recent events. This is the EVENT HISTORY — to check whether an address is frozen right now, use check_stablecoin_freeze instead. Each row is a verifiable on-chain fact (issuer acted on address at block/time); it never states the cause. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get stablecoin freeze events (history)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_supported_chainsList the BlockchainAnalysis MCP tools, the chains each supports, and pricing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_supported_chains" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the BlockchainAnalysis MCP tools, the chains each supports, and pricing. Call this first to discover what the server can do (and which calls are free vs paid) before invoking a tool. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List supported chains & tools
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write12
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:55 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 10
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://blockchainanalysis.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including kyt_tx (irreversible), check_stablecoin_freeze (write), check_token_security (write), screen_agent_wallet (write), screen_address (write) and 5 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnkyt_tx
The server marks "kyt_tx" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- Warnlabel
The server marks "label" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "label" says "label": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:labelChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_addressChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_agent_walletChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http blockchainanalysis https://blockchainanalysis.io/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http blockchainanalysis https://blockchainanalysis.io/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__get_freeze_events",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_token_approvals",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__list_supported_chains"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_stablecoin_freeze",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_token_security",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_agent_wallet",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_address",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__kyt_risk",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__kyt_tx",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__rwa",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__label",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__oracle_verdict",
"mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_agent_wallet_attested"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as blockchainanalysis. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 12 rules
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_stablecoin_freeze untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__get_freeze_events untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_token_security untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__check_token_approvals untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_agent_wallet untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_address untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__kyt_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__kyt_tx untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__rwa untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__label untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__oracle_verdict untrusted-input
- mcp__blockchainanalysis__screen_agent_wallet_attested untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.blockchainanalysis/mcp/verify?hash=006299fa26abf7b7af87c9c24021322bd8edcd4e7e20f680326084fd312f61ef" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 006299fa26ab, from Nov 15, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.blockchainanalysis/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.blockchainanalysis/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:13 UTC.
BlockchainAnalysis MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: kyt_tx.
What tools does the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server have?
- 13 tools: 1 irreversible, 9 write, 3 read. kyt_tx, check_stablecoin_freeze, check_token_security, screen_agent_wallet, screen_address, kyt_risk, rwa, label and 5 more.
Does the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): kyt_tx.
Has the BlockchainAnalysis MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.