Crypto Lighthouse MCP server
io.cryptolighthouse/rewardscryptolighthouse.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Read-only Flare and Songbird FTSO data: reward deadlines, provider rates, claimable rewards.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server can do
The Crypto Lighthouse MCP server is published by cryptolighthouse.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_claimable_rewards), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_reward_deadlines, get_ftso_providers and check_claimable_rewards).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_claimable_rewardsFTSO delegation rewards an address can claim right now on Flare and/or Songbird, read from the RewardManager contract: total, how many reward epochs, and when the oldest one expire…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FTSO delegation rewards an address can claim right now on Flare and/or Songbird, read from the RewardManager contract: total, how many reward epochs, and when the oldest one expires. Read-only: nothing is signed or stored. Claiming has to be done by the owner in their own wallet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_ftso_providersRegistered FTSO providers on Flare or Songbird with each one’s measured delegator reward rate (annualised, after its fee, over recent reward epochs), fee, delegated vote power and …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_ftso_providers" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Registered FTSO providers on Flare or Songbird with each one’s measured delegator reward rate (annualised, after its fee, over recent reward epochs), fee, delegated vote power and whether it is over the vote-power cap. Rates are past results, not a promise; differences between steady providers are usually fractions of a percent a year.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_reward_deadlinesThe next FTSO delegation reward deadlines on Flare and Songbird: when each closes, how many tokens are still unclaimed network-wide (they are burned at the deadline), and what the …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_reward_deadlines" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it The next FTSO delegation reward deadlines on Flare and Songbird: when each closes, how many tokens are still unclaimed network-wide (they are burned at the deadline), and what the last deadline burned. Network totals only, not about any one wallet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.cryptolighthouse.io/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_claimable_rewards (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http rewards https://api.cryptolighthouse.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http rewards https://api.cryptolighthouse.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__rewards__get_reward_deadlines",
"mcp__rewards__get_ftso_providers"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__rewards__check_claimable_rewards"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rewards. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__rewards__get_reward_deadlines untrusted-input
- mcp__rewards__get_ftso_providers untrusted-input
- mcp__rewards__check_claimable_rewards untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.cryptolighthouse/rewards/verify?hash=a4462fadc3bc53567f76292f25f3c98e999e7e7d0c92a5ac62db62f11121807f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a4462fadc3bc, from Nov 10, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.cryptolighthouse/rewards/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.cryptolighthouse/rewards)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
Crypto Lighthouse MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_claimable_rewards, get_reward_deadlines and get_ftso_providers.
Does the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Crypto Lighthouse MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.