xyz MCP by CyberXYZ
io.cyberxyz/xyz-mcpcyberxyz.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Package verdicts for AI coding agents: check npm, PyPI, Go and NuGet installs before they run.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ can do
The xyz MCP by CyberXYZ is published by cyberxyz.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_package, model_risk and package_info), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (check_package, get_vulnerability, search and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_packagePublic safety verdict for ONE package (optionally one version) from CyberXYZ's global threat data: known-malicious releases (always shown in full), advisories, commit-level analysi…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Public safety verdict for ONE package (optionally one version) from CyberXYZ's global threat data: known-malicious releases (always shown in full), advisories, commit-level analysis and version anomalies. Call it BEFORE adding or installing an npm, PyPI, Go or NuGet dependency. `decision`: block or quarantine = do not install; alert = installable but flagged; allow = ok; unknown = no record, not vetted: ask the user; unverified = the check did not complete: retry, then ask the user. Signing in adds the full install-time verdict (see `sign_in_adds`).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
model_riskCyberXYZ's public report on a Hugging Face model's install risk: risk level, XYZ score, the driving reason, the worst dependencies and recent risk events.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it CyberXYZ's public report on a Hugging Face model's install risk: risk level, XYZ score, the driving reason, the worst dependencies and recent risk events. verdict UNKNOWN (not watched, pending, gated) is not safe: ask the user. Signing in adds every reason, all flagged dependencies and per-file load safety.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
package_infoCyberXYZ's public report for a package: every published advisory (CVE/GHSA ids, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV, affected ranges, fixed version), malicious-package records in full, how m…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it CyberXYZ's public report for a package: every published advisory (CVE/GHSA ids, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV, affected ranges, fixed version), malicious-package records in full, how many packages depend on it, what it pulls in (counts and worst severity) and AI-model usage. Package-level; for a verdict on a specific version call check_package.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_vulnerabilityFull detail for one advisory id (CVE-..., GHSA-..., or an OSV id such as PYSEC-...): every affected package (`affected_packages`: package, ecosystem, ranges, fixed), the primary on…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_vulnerability" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Full detail for one advisory id (CVE-..., GHSA-..., or an OSV id such as PYSEC-...): every affected package (`affected_packages`: package, ecosystem, ranges, fixed), the primary one's version ranges and fixed version, severity, CVSS, EPSS (probability of exploitation in 30 days), CISA KEV (exploited in the wild), references and how many packages depend on the affected one. Pass `package` / `ecosystem` to describe a specific affected package. Use it to explain an advisory to the user.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
searchFind a package by name across every ecosystem (exact match first, then prefix, then most advisories), with its advisory count and worst severity.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find a package by name across every ecosystem (exact match first, then prefix, then most advisories), with its advisory count and worst severity. Use it when you do not know a package's ecosystem or exact spelling; then call package_info or check_package.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.cyberxyz.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://api.cyberxyz.io
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.cyberxyz.io/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_package (write), model_risk (write), package_info (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http xyz https://mcp.cyberxyz.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http xyz https://mcp.cyberxyz.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__xyz__get_vulnerability",
"mcp__xyz__search"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__xyz__check_package",
"mcp__xyz__model_risk",
"mcp__xyz__package_info"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as xyz. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__xyz__check_package untrusted-input
- mcp__xyz__get_vulnerability untrusted-input
- mcp__xyz__search untrusted-input
- mcp__xyz__model_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__xyz__package_info untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.cyberxyz/xyz-mcp/verify?hash=97c4fae965fd065df5a32eb8a994463bf2007d2c2ece20c5a42ae9867afe612e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 97c4fae965fd, from Nov 13, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.cyberxyz/xyz-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.cyberxyz/xyz-mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 20:17 UTC.
xyz MCP by CyberXYZ: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. check_package, model_risk, package_info, get_vulnerability and search.
Does the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the xyz MCP by CyberXYZ changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.