Escrova MCP server
io.escrova/escrovaescrova.iostreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Search Amazon, eBay, Walmart and more. Agents prepare orders; you approve and pay on Escrova.
18 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 12 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 8
- Can send data out · 1
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Escrova MCP server can do
The Escrova MCP server is published by escrova.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 18 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: auth_challenge, prepare_checkout, create_listing_draft and update_listing_draft), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_listing_publish) and create or change data (1 tool: list_categories). 12 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (get_terms and get_directory); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (search_products, get_fees, get_prices and 5 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (prepare_listing_publish). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
18 tools
Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
auth_challengeAsk for a challenge bound to the exact request you are about to make.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.targetArguments.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.targetArguments.description: "That tool's non-credential arguments. Path, query and JSON bytes a..."
Description, as the server wrote it Ask for a challenge bound to the exact request you are about to make. The safe MCP form is targetTool plus targetArguments: this adapter prepares the exact method, encoded path and JSON body bytes, hashes those same bytes, and returns them as request beside the message. Sign the returned message with the USER'S wallet, in their own wallet connector, then pass walletAddress, nonce and signature to the tool you are calling. One challenge per request. The legacy method/path/bodySha256 form remains accepted for direct HTTP clients. A challenge taken for a different request is refused even when the signature itself is perfect. Start with whoami, which is GET /api/agent/auth/whoami and has no body. This tool itself is POST /api/agent/auth/challenge and needs no signature: it is how you get one.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
create_listing_draftSaves a private draft of a listing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_listing_draft" says "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Saves a private draft of a listing. NOTHING IS LISTED: a draft is not for sale, is not in any review queue and costs nothing. Only the seller can publish it, signed in on Escrova, and there is no publish tool. Under a delegation grant with the `sell` scope the draft is the PERSON's. Send what you know now and add the rest with update_listing_draft; prepare_listing_publish says what is still missing. Available to every shopper on mainnet. Bind the challenge to POST /api/agent/listings/drafts, over the body this tool sends.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
prepare_checkoutPrices a basket of store items for the person whose grant you hold and saves it for them to review.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_checkout" says "checkout": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Prices a basket of store items for the person whose grant you hold and saves it for them to review. THIS BUYS NOTHING AND MOVES NO MONEY. The answer carries `state`: approval_required with a reviewUrl, the page on Escrova where the person checks every line, approves and pays from their own wallet. Give them that link and stop: you cannot approve or pay. A signed-out person signs in on that page and continues with the same order. Send items, and to choose where it goes send the addressId of one of their saved addresses from list_addresses; with none their default is used. A typed address, a marketplace listing, a gift, an item whose condition is not new and a quantity that is not a whole number are refused. The grant needs the `buy` scope. Other states: not_started (refused, nothing was prepared; read the body) or reconciliation_required (outcome unknown; ask the person before preparing it again). Available to every shopper on mainnet. Bind the challenge to POST /api/agent/checkout-intents, over the body this tool sends, with delegationGrantId in targetArguments.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
update_listing_draftChanges the fields you send on an open draft and leaves the rest.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "update_listing_draft" says "update": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Changes the fields you send on an open draft and leaves the rest. Send the `version` you last read: a draft somebody changed since answers 409 DRAFT_CHANGED, so read it again with get_listing_draft and resend. A draft the seller already published or closed cannot be changed. Nothing is listed by this call. Bind the challenge to PATCH /api/agent/listings/drafts/<draftId>, the id in the path, over the body this tool sends.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_listing_publishReturns what the seller will be shown before they publish: the draft's versionHash, the fields still `missing`, a preview with every publishing charge and the seller fee, and a pre…Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_listing_publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "prepare_listing_publish" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "prepare_listing_publish" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_listing_publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns what the seller will be shown before they publish: the draft's versionHash, the fields still `missing`, a preview with every publishing charge and the seller fee, and a previewUrl. THIS PUBLISHES NOTHING and saves nothing. Give the seller the previewUrl: publishing is theirs alone, signed in on Escrova, for exactly the version they were shown. Bind the challenge to POST /api/agent/listings/drafts/<draftId>/prepare-publish, the id in the path and no body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
list_categoriesStart a shopping task here instead of guessing search words.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "list_categories" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Start a shopping task here instead of guessing search words. Returns the sixteen departments, each with the slug get_category takes and a picture. A keyword search is one guess at what somebody meant; a department is the shop's own shelf, and get_category on one hands you the brands, the filters and a page of listings in a single call. GET /api/agent/browse/categories. No wallet and no signature. Served from cache; a department whose picture has gone cold costs one call against the catalogue quota this site shares with its shoppers.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 12Show 12 read-only tools
get_categoryNarrow towards a purchase without inventing keywords.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_category" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Narrow towards a purchase without inventing keywords. One call returns children[] and childrenDeep[] with estimated counts, brands[] each with an engineParam you can pass straight back to search_products.engineParam, the shop's own facets[], aspectTiles[], siblings[], related[] and a deals[] rail. GET /api/agent/browse/tree/<slug>, or GET /api/agent/browse/tree/<slug>/<nodeId> for any category under a department. No wallet and no signature. contentAt is when those deal prices were read. Counts are estimates and countScope says so. A shelf already read answers from cache; a cold one costs one call against the catalogue quota shared with shoppers, so read the shelf you want rather than walking the tree.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_checkout_intentReads one order you prepared with prepare_checkout, under the same grant.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_checkout_intent" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Reads one order you prepared with prepare_checkout, under the same grant. The answer carries `state`: approval_required (the person has not approved it yet), payment_pending (the person approved it; paying and following the order is theirs, on Escrova), not_started (it expired, was cancelled or is not yours; nothing is waiting) or reconciliation_required (this read was refused or failed, so it says nothing about the order, which may still be waiting: read the body, fix the request and read again). It stays payment_pending after they pay, because this tool cannot see the payment and never reports a finished purchase: ask the person. Bind the challenge to GET /api/agent/checkout-intents/<intentId>, the id in the path and no body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_dealsFor a "find something on offer" task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_deals" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it For a "find something on offer" task. GET /api/agent/browse/deals?tab=<tab>, where tab is markdowns, refurbished, top-rated, brands, or door:<slug> for one department. No wallet and no signature. Every item carries cachedAt, which is when that price was true: A selection over rows this site has already cached, so it costs no catalogue call. An unknown tab is refused with 400 rather than guessed at. A sticker discount is not a cheaper order.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_delegationRead the grants naming your wallet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_delegation" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the grants naming your wallet. On mainnet they allow only preparing orders, drafting listings and reading saved addresses; the person approves and pays or publishes. Only the person can create or revoke a grant at /delegation. Ask them for its id and send it as delegationGrantId. Bind the challenge to GET /api/agent/delegation/grants with no body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_directoryEvery department, the groups under it and the links under those, for picking a shelf in one read rather than walking down to it.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_directory" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_directory" says "get" and "directory": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Every department, the groups under it and the links under those, for picking a shelf in one read rather than walking down to it. GET /api/agent/browse/directory. No wallet and no signature. Built ONLY from rows already cached, so it costs no catalogue call at all and a picture or count nobody has fetched yet comes back null rather than being fetched for you. Prefer this over repeated get_category calls when you are still deciding where to look.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_feesThe current fee schedule and delivery rates, so a total can be explained before anyone pays it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_fees" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it The current fee schedule and delivery rates, so a total can be explained before anyone pays it. GET /api/config/fees. No wallet and no signature.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_listing_draftOne draft, with its fields, its `version` and whether it is still open.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_listing_draft" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it One draft, with its fields, its `version` and whether it is still open. A draft the seller published names the listing it became. Bind the challenge to GET /api/agent/listings/drafts/<draftId>, the id in the path and no body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_pricesCurrent USD prices of the coins shown on Escrova.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_prices" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Current USD prices of the coins shown on Escrova. GET /api/prices. No wallet and no signature. Checkout on this deployment takes USDC only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_termsReturns the current Terms of Service and Privacy Policy version and document hash.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_terms" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the current Terms of Service and Privacy Policy version and document hash. GET /api/agent/legal/terms. No wallet and no signature.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_addressesThe saved addresses on this account, with which one is the default.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_addresses" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The saved addresses on this account, with which one is the default. Use an id as `addressId` on prepare_checkout, or send no destination at all and the default is used. Under a delegation grant with the `addresses` scope these are the person's saved addresses, not yours. Bind the challenge to GET /api/agent/addresses with no body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_productsSearch products across the marketplaces Escrova can actually buy from today.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_products" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search products across the marketplaces Escrova can actually buy from today. Six sources are searchable: amazon, ebay, walmart, bestbuy, homedepot, wayfair, or "all". GET /api/products/search. No wallet and no signature. Send q, cat, or both; page and every selected filter are preserved together. A brands[].engineParam returned by get_category goes into engineParam here and is sent as the typed eBay aspect filter, while Google refinements use shoprs. The REST pagination and degraded-source metadata are returned unchanged. A search is one guess at what somebody meant and it spends a paid provider call; when you know roughly what department a thing is in, list_categories and get_category narrow further for less.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
whoamiVerify a signature round-trip before money is involved.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a signature round-trip before money is involved. Bind the challenge to GET and /api/agent/auth/whoami with no body: ask auth_challenge for method "GET" and path "/api/agent/auth/whoami", sign the message it returns, then call this. A signature authenticates one method, one path and one body, so a challenge taken for anything else is refused.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
16 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write8
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__escrova__prepare_listing_publish"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://www.escrova.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://www.escrova.io
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.escrova.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including prepare_checkout (destructive), list_categories (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 18, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 2
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://www.escrova.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://www.escrova.io
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
- Nov 11, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 6
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnlist_categories
The server marks "list_categories" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
The server marks "prepare_listing_publish" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_listing_publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- Infoauth_challenge
The input schema at properties.targetArguments.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.targetArguments.description: "That tool's non-credential arguments. Path, query and JSON bytes a..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 2; RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://www.escrova.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://…View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 2
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://www.escrova.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://www.escrova.io
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 6.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 6
Tools10 added, 8 changed.+10 added~8 changedView diff
- Added:auth_challengeDeletes or cancels
- Added:create_listing_draftDeletes or cancels
- Added:get_checkout_intentOnly reads
- Added:get_delegationOnly reads
- Added:get_listing_draftOnly reads
- Added:list_addressesOnly reads
- Added:prepare_checkoutDeletes or cancels
- Added:prepare_listing_publishCan't be undone
- Added:update_listing_draftDeletes or cancels
- Added:whoamiOnly reads
- Changed:get_categoryOnly readsdescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_dealsOnly readsdescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_directoryOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_feesOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_pricesOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_termsOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:list_categoriesChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:search_productsOnly readsannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http escrova https://www.escrova.io/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http escrova https://www.escrova.io/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__escrova__search_products",
"mcp__escrova__get_fees",
"mcp__escrova__get_prices",
"mcp__escrova__get_terms",
"mcp__escrova__get_category",
"mcp__escrova__get_directory",
"mcp__escrova__get_deals",
"mcp__escrova__whoami",
"mcp__escrova__list_addresses",
"mcp__escrova__get_delegation",
"mcp__escrova__get_checkout_intent",
"mcp__escrova__get_listing_draft"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__escrova__list_categories",
"mcp__escrova__prepare_listing_publish"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__escrova__auth_challenge",
"mcp__escrova__prepare_checkout",
"mcp__escrova__create_listing_draft",
"mcp__escrova__update_listing_draft"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as escrova. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 10 rules
- mcp__escrova__search_products untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_fees untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_prices untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_terms private-data
- mcp__escrova__list_categories untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_category untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_directory private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__get_deals untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__prepare_checkout untrusted-input
- mcp__escrova__prepare_listing_publish outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.escrova/escrova/verify?hash=63045dedf2f15c5030365015c5402e60723b41e308934954222424e3193f5689" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 63045dedf2f1, from Nov 11, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.escrova/escrova/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.escrova/escrova)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 03:17 UTC.
Escrova MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Escrova MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 18 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Escrova MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: auth_challenge, prepare_checkout, create_listing_draft and update_listing_draft.
Can the Escrova MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_listing_publish.
What tools does the Escrova MCP server have?
- 18 tools: 4 destructive, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 12 read. auth_challenge, prepare_checkout, create_listing_draft, update_listing_draft, prepare_listing_publish, list_categories, search_products, get_fees and 10 more.
Does the Escrova MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Escrova MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): prepare_listing_publish.
Has the Escrova MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.