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Assay: settlement verification MCP server

io.fomox/assayfomox.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Verify crypto payments really settled and how much arrived. 20 chains. Read only, no API key.

6 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Assay: settlement verification MCP server can do

The Assay: settlement verification MCP server is published by fomox.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_payment and evaluate_spend_policy) and create or change data (2 tools: run_sandbox_case and check_sandbox_answer), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools can send data out of your system (verify_payment and evaluate_spend_policy).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • evaluate_spend_policyCheck a proposed payment against spending limits that live OUTSIDE your context, where no instruction in a prompt, a message or a web page can change them.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_spend_policy" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.action.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.action.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a proposed payment against spending limits that live OUTSIDE your context, where no instruction in a prompt, a message or a web page can change them. Returns a signed allow or deny with reasons. Use this before executing any transfer on behalf of a user. It enforces velocity caps, per-action ceilings, recipient allowlists and asset allowlists. Because the rules are held server side and signed, an attacker who takes over your reasoning still cannot raise your limits. IMPORTANT: this is ADVISORY. Assay holds no keys and cannot stop a transaction. Verify the signature and enforce the decision wherever you sign. Create a policy first with the /v1/policy endpoint.
  • verify_paymentCheck whether a crypto payment really settled and how much was ACTUALLY delivered, which is often not the amount the transaction claims.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.expect.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.expect.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a crypto payment really settled and how much was ACTUALLY delivered, which is often not the amount the transaction claims. Use this before crediting anyone for an incoming payment. Returns `delivered` (what truly moved), `claimed` (what the transaction says), `mismatch` (true when they disagree), and `warnings` naming the specific trap with a remedy. `ok` is true ONLY when the payment is final and meets everything you asserted in `expect`; anything uncertain returns ok:false, so it is safe to gate a credit on `ok`. Chains: xrp, hedera, algorand, solana, ethereum, base, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bnb, avalanche, linea, scroll, zksync, blast, mantle, celo, gnosis, bitcoin, litecoin. Pass `expect` whenever you can. Without it this reports what happened; with it, it tells you whether to pay. Read only: this never moves funds and never holds keys.
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_sandbox_answerScore your decision on a sandbox case.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score your decision on a sandbox case. Tell it whether you would have credited the payment and for how much, and it replies with whether that was correct and, if not, exactly what the error would have cost you in real units. This is the fastest way to find out whether your payment handling is actually safe.
  • run_sandbox_casePractise on a payment designed to deceive you, with no money at risk.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "run_sandbox_case" says "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Practise on a payment designed to deceive you, with no money at risk. Returns a verification result shaped exactly like a real one for one of 19 adversarial cases. Decide whether you would credit it, then call check_sandbox_answer to find out whether you were right and what the mistake would have cost. Use this to test any agent or integration that handles incoming crypto payments BEFORE it handles real money.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_chainsList every chain this service can verify, with the confirmation depth each needs before a payment is treated as final, and how deeply it can be verified.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_chains" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every chain this service can verify, with the confirmation depth each needs before a payment is treated as final, and how deeply it can be verified. Call this if you are unsure whether a chain is supported or what to pass as `chain`.
  • list_failure_modesList every known way a blockchain payment can appear successful while being worth less than it claims, or nothing at all.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_failure_modes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every known way a blockchain payment can appear successful while being worth less than it claims, or nothing at all. Each entry explains what the chain does, what it costs you when you get it wrong, and the one-line fix. Useful when writing or reviewing code that credits users for incoming crypto payments. Every chain has its own dialect but they are all the same few lies, and the mitigation is always the same: never trust the stated amount, reconstruct what actually moved.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_payment (irreversible), evaluate_spend_policy (irreversible), run_sandbox_case (write), check_sandbox_answer (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http assay https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http assay https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__assay__list_chains",
      "mcp__assay__list_failure_modes"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__assay__verify_payment",
      "mcp__assay__evaluate_spend_policy",
      "mcp__assay__run_sandbox_case",
      "mcp__assay__check_sandbox_answer"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as assay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__assay__verify_payment outbound
  • mcp__assay__evaluate_spend_policy outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.fomox/assay/verify?hash=3bc96c7173c20c3955ef593e2c1155afab2c0c717fad8fdf53f5de2c03137b1d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3bc96c7173c2, from Nov 15, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.fomox/assay/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.fomox/assay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.fomox/assay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.fomox/assay)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:13 UTC.

Assay: settlement verification MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Assay: settlement verification MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Assay: settlement verification MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Assay: settlement verification MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_payment and evaluate_spend_policy.

What tools does the Assay: settlement verification MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. verify_payment, evaluate_spend_policy, run_sandbox_case, check_sandbox_answer, list_chains and list_failure_modes.

Does the Assay: settlement verification MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Assay: settlement verification MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_payment and evaluate_spend_policy.

Has the Assay: settlement verification MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.