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GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier

io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifiergenesisre.iostreamable-httpv2026-05-22.v1Scanned

Read-only verifier for 25 ProofRelay MCP tools and non-confidential evidence bundles.

26 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 18 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 18 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 6 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier can do

The GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier is published by genesisre.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 26 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof and proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof) and create or change data (18 tools: proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint, proofrelay.verify_bundle, proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.wrap_mcp_tool_evidence and 14 more), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (proofrelay.summarize_agent_action_log); 1 tool can send data out of your system (proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 6 findings (annotation-conflict, credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 2026-05-22.v1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

26 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proofMap public-safe x402 request, 402 challenge, payment payload, facilitator response, and resource response hashes into ProofRelay's payment_context evidence profile.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The input carries an amount (input.x402.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map public-safe x402 request, 402 challenge, payment payload, facilitator response, and resource response hashes into ProofRelay's payment_context evidence profile.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.normalize_payment_proofValidate rail-agnostic payment or entitlement proof hashes and return the ProofRelay payment_context evidence profile.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The input carries an amount (input.payment_proof.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate rail-agnostic payment or entitlement proof hashes and return the ProofRelay payment_context evidence profile. This does not charge, settle, custody funds, or verify external payment finality.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Changes things 18Claude Code: ask
  • proofrelay.adapt_agent_identity_evidenceMap Concordium, ERC-8004, DID, domain, wallet-controller, or IAM identity references into a hash-only PREP-3 input.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map Concordium, ERC-8004, DID, domain, wallet-controller, or IAM identity references into a hash-only PREP-3 input. ProofRelay accepts identity as evidence; it does not issue identity or certify people.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_audit_pack_manifestBuild a portable hash-only audit pack manifest from bundle, verifier, policy, and evidence hashes without uploading private files or logs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a portable hash-only audit pack manifest from bundle, verifier, policy, and evidence hashes without uploading private files or logs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_bundle_draftBuild an unsigned V2 draft from explicit tenant/service IDs and hash-only event evidence, not raw payloads.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build an unsigned V2 draft from explicit tenant/service IDs and hash-only event evidence, not raw payloads. The producer must sign events locally and recompute bundle_hash before verification. No V1 draft inputs, server signing or certification. Hash adapters accept bare or sha256:-prefixed SHA-256.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_closing_proof_packBuild a hash-only closing proof pack manifest from settlement, title, lender, funding, notary, disbursement, and approval hashes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a hash-only closing proof pack manifest from settlement, title, lender, funding, notary, disbursement, and approval hashes. The tool does not authorize closing or disbursement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_human_approval_receiptBuild an unsigned, hash-only human approval receipt draft for authority, policy, and subject evidence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build an unsigned, hash-only human approval receipt draft for authority, policy, and subject evidence. The tool does not create approval authority or certify the approver's identity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_registry_entryBuild a public-safe ProofRelay Registry entry draft for an agent, API, MCP server, workflow, or adapter using only hashes and profile markers.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a public-safe ProofRelay Registry entry draft for an agent, API, MCP server, workflow, or adapter using only hashes and profile markers. Accepts bare or sha256:-prefixed hashes, normalized losslessly to bare hex. Hash presence and eligible badge labels are not verification or authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.build_title_production_evidenceBuild a hash-only title production evidence profile from order, property, title-search, commitment, exception, and tax-cert hashes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a hash-only title production evidence profile from order, property, title-search, commitment, exception, and tax-cert hashes. The tool does not certify title status or legal sufficiency.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.compute_readiness_signalCompute a public-safe readiness signal from title, closing, wire, lender-condition, approval, exception, and risk hashes/counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute a public-safe readiness signal from title, closing, wire, lender-condition, approval, exception, and risk hashes/counts. The tool does not certify readiness to close or fund.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receiptGenerate an unsigned, hash-only paid MCP/API tool receipt draft that callers can include in a signed ProofRelay bundle.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate an unsigned, hash-only paid MCP/API tool receipt draft that callers can include in a signed ProofRelay bundle. The tool does not charge, redeem, settle, or attest to external facts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.issue_conformance_badgeBuild an unsigned ProofRelay evidence-conformance badge draft such as PREP-compatible, Verified Bundle, Verified MCP, or Replay Tested.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build an unsigned ProofRelay evidence-conformance badge draft such as PREP-compatible, Verified Bundle, Verified MCP, or Replay Tested. This is not legal, security, model-safety, or platform certification.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.map_lender_condition_evidenceMap lender condition text, evidence, reviewer, and waiver hashes into a portable condition profile without satisfying lender conditions.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map lender condition text, evidence, reviewer, and waiver hashes into a portable condition profile without satisfying lender conditions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.map_openapi_operation_evidenceMap public OpenAPI operation metadata and schema hashes into a ProofRelay event plan with checkpoint recommendations for paid, mutating, or relied-upon API operations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map public OpenAPI operation metadata and schema hashes into a ProofRelay event plan with checkpoint recommendations for paid, mutating, or relied-upon API operations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.recommend_checkpointChoose the next public-safe GENESIS checkpoint for a paid, material, or relied-upon agent workflow.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Choose the next public-safe GENESIS checkpoint for a paid, material, or relied-upon agent workflow. Submit normalized context only; the tool returns reason codes without protected routing internals.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.review_vendor_risk_profileReview public vendor or MCP server risk metadata for governance signals using hashes and declared boundaries only.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Review public vendor or MCP server risk metadata for governance signals using hashes and declared boundaries only. This is not legal, security, or procurement certification.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.review_wire_payoff_changeReview hash-only wire, payoff, or disbursement change metadata for red flags and required controls without approving funds movement.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Review hash-only wire, payoff, or disbursement change metadata for red flags and required controls without approving funds movement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.verify_bundleVerify a submitted non-confidential ProofRelay V2 evidence bundle for hash integrity, monotonic ordering, signatures, and chain continuity.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a submitted non-confidential ProofRelay V2 evidence bundle for hash integrity, monotonic ordering, signatures, and chain continuity. Legacy V1 is available only in non-public runtime roles. Caller-supplied public keys do not establish registered producer identity or authority. The tool does not charge, settle, mutate storage, or certify external facts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.verify_signed_attestationVerify a legacy Ed25519 or V2 ES256 ProofRelay artifact using public key material and optional issuer/purpose pins.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a legacy Ed25519 or V2 ES256 ProofRelay artifact using public key material and optional issuer/purpose pins. The tool never accepts private keys and does not sign caller claims.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.wrap_mcp_tool_evidenceConvert hash-only MCP tool request, response, schema, authority, and payment context references into a portable ProofRelay evidence wrapper without ingesting raw prompts, outputs, …2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...without ingesting raw prompts, outputs, credentials, or logs."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "proofrelay.wrap_mcp_tool_evidence" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert hash-only MCP tool request, response, schema, authority, and payment context references into a portable ProofRelay evidence wrapper without ingesting raw prompts, outputs, credentials, or logs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helperReturn public-safe setup guidance for connecting MCP clients to ProofRelay and preparing hash-only evidence inputs without exposing secrets or requiring package installation.Reads private dataCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper" says "describe": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "secret": it reads secrets.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.helper.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return public-safe setup guidance for connecting MCP clients to ProofRelay and preparing hash-only evidence inputs without exposing secrets or requiring package installation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.describe_stripe_entitlement_flowReturn the agent-native Stripe checkout entitlement workflow for ProofRelay paid verification, including token, status, redemption, and replay expectations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.describe_stripe_entitlement_flow" says "describe": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the agent-native Stripe checkout entitlement workflow for ProofRelay paid verification, including token, status, redemption, and replay expectations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.get_verifier_statusRead the ProofRelay verifier status, accepted bundle shape, and trust boundary before submitting evidence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.get_verifier_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the ProofRelay verifier status, accepted bundle shape, and trust boundary before submitting evidence. Use this first when an agent needs to understand what ProofRelay verifies and what it does not.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.plan_replay_rejection_testReturn a deterministic replay rejection test plan and optionally classify caller-reported responses.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return a deterministic replay rejection test plan and optionally classify caller-reported responses. Confirmation requires first 2xx without error, then 409 AND entitlement_replay (Stripe) or x402_payment_replay (x402). Missing, contradictory or unknown-protocol evidence is inconclusive. Does not redeem tokens or call paid endpoints.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.scan_mcp_riskReturn a read-only, public-metadata MCP risk score from tool descriptors, schemas, and registry claims.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The description contains "another MCP server", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "...efore listing, integrating, or wrapping another MCP server; it does not fetch network data, requir..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return a read-only, public-metadata MCP risk score from tool descriptors, schemas, and registry claims. Use before listing, integrating, or wrapping another MCP server; it does not fetch network data, require auth, mutate systems, inspect source code, or certify vulnerability status.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • proofrelay.summarize_agent_action_logSummarize public-safe agent action log counts and hashes into a governance review profile without ingesting raw logs or traces.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "proofrelay.summarize_agent_action_log" says "summarize": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "summarize" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Summarize public-safe agent action log counts and hashes into a governance review profile without ingesting raw logs or traces.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_describe_cli_sdk_helper"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
20
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 20 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 18 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.genesisre.io/mcp: tools/list returned 26 tools to an anonymous client, including proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof (irreversible), proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof (irreversible), proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint (write), proofrelay.verify_bundle (write), proofrelay.build_bundle_draft (write) and 15 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 warn1 info
  • The server marks "proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "proofrelay.wrap_mcp_tool_evidence" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "another MCP server", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "...efore listing, integrating, or wrapping another MCP server; it does not fetch network data, requir..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...without ingesting raw prompts, outputs, credentials, or logs."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools24 changed.~24 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 2026-05-22.v1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http proofrelay-verifier https://mcp.genesisre.io/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http proofrelay-verifier https://mcp.genesisre.io/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_get_verifier_status",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_describe_stripe_entitlement_flow",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_plan_replay_rejection_test",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_scan_mcp_risk",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_summarize_agent_action_log"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_recommend_checkpoint",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_verify_bundle",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_normalize_payment_proof",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_bundle_draft",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_adapt_x402_payment_proof",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_wrap_mcp_tool_evidence",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_map_openapi_operation_evidence",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_generate_paid_tool_receipt",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_describe_cli_sdk_helper",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_human_approval_receipt",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_audit_pack_manifest",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_review_vendor_risk_profile",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_title_production_evidence",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_closing_proof_pack",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_review_wire_payoff_change",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_map_lender_condition_evidence",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_compute_readiness_signal",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_adapt_agent_identity_evidence",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_build_registry_entry",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_issue_conformance_badge",
      "mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_verify_signed_attestation"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as proofrelay-verifier. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_describe_cli_sdk_helper private-data, outbound
  • mcp__proofrelay-verifier__proofrelay_summarize_agent_action_log untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifier/verify?hash=c41fe392fabdc8b2ce10cff9d700ce6ba6f599da9d16fe8397d74f00f84ce0bb" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c41fe392fabd, from Nov 15, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifier/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifier
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifier.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.genesisre/proofrelay-mcp-verifier)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:13 UTC.

GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 26 tools, 20 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof and proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof.

What tools does the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier have?

26 tools: 2 irreversible, 18 write, 6 read. proofrelay.normalize_payment_proof, proofrelay.adapt_x402_payment_proof, proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint, proofrelay.verify_bundle, proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.wrap_mcp_tool_evidence, proofrelay.map_openapi_operation_evidence, proofrelay.generate_paid_tool_receipt and 18 more.

Does the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper.

Has the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.