Iris MCP server
io.github.0xVector0/iris0xVector0streamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
On-chain investigations: wallet analysis and fund tracing on Solana, EVM chains, Bitcoin and Tron.
6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Iris MCP server can do
The Iris MCP server is published by the GitHub account 0xVector0. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (trace_transfer) and create or change data (1 tool: scan_launch_tool), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (analyze_address, trace_transfer, find_token_insiders and 1 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
trace_transferFollow one transfer through the mixer (Privacy Cash, Cloak, Umbra, encrypt.trade, MagicBlock Private Payments, ShadowWire...), exchange, or instant-swap service (SideShift, ChangeN…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "trace_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "trace_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "trace_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
Description, as the server wrote it Follow one transfer through the mixer (Privacy Cash, Cloak, Umbra, encrypt.trade, MagicBlock Private Payments, ShadowWire...), exchange, or instant-swap service (SideShift, ChangeNOW, FixedFloat, SimpleSwap, StealthEX, Changelly...) on its other side, by timing and amount: for a deposit, the withdrawals that match it after; for a withdrawal, the deposits that match it before. Gives the likely wallets with a confidence, and how many transfers of the same amount could also fit (the anonymity set). A swap service pays out in another asset, often on another chain: a deposit into SideShift is matched exactly from SideShift's public record of completed shifts (the coin, network and amount it paid out, and the Solana recipient), any other by value at the prices of the time (1 of N candidates). One-time deposit addresses that sweep to the service count as the service. Give the wallet and the signature (transaction hash) of a transaction where it sent money to, or received money from, a mixer, an exchange or a swap service (analyze_address and get_connections list them). Off Solana: on Tron through an exchange or an instant exchange, on an EVM chain through an instant exchange or a privacy pool (Tornado Cash, Railgun, Privacy Pools), on Bitcoin through a CoinJoin or an instant exchange. The chain is read from the wallet's address (pass chain for an EVM chain other than Ethereum). Costs 1 trace (or 3 pack credits), or without an API key $0.25 paid per call with x402; refunded (never settled) if it fails. Results are leads, not proof.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Trace a transfer through a mixer, exchange or swap service
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
scan_launch_toolWhether a Solana wallet launched or traded memecoins with a launch kit, Proxima (proxima.tools) or BlockX, with the evidence.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Whether a Solana wallet launched or traded memecoins with a launch kit, Proxima (proxima.tools) or BlockX, with the evidence. Proxima: its 5% sell fees (a separate bare transfer after each sell, built with it), its 5% cut of pump.fun creator-fee claims, its receipt round trips (895,880 lamports out, 890,880 back). BlockX: its fee inside each trade (0.4% to 0.8%), its nonce relay funding, cash-outs through nonce accounts created and emptied within seconds, its sweep of their rent. Lists the tokens the wallet launched and the relays tipped, the sells the tool took its fee on, each fee wallet (what it was paid, its balance now, whether it ever sent anything out), the creator-fee claims, and the tree of wallets that funded it, walked up to its root funder with what Iris knows of that root. A token's mint scans its creator. Free with an API key, or without one $0.02 paid per call with x402; never settled if it fails. Can take up to two minutes.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Scan a wallet for a launch tool (Proxima, BlockX)
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
analyze_addressAnalyze a wallet with Iris: on Solana (also a token mint or a program), Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Robinhood Chain, BNB Chain, Polygon, Bitcoin, Tron, dYdX or Noble.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_address" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze a wallet with Iris: on Solana (also a token mint or a program), Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Robinhood Chain, BNB Chain, Polygon, Bitcoin, Tron, dYdX or Noble. The chain is read from the address (0x is Ethereum unless chain says another EVM chain). Costs 1 credit (2 when depth is over 1000), or without an API key $0.05 ($0.10 deep) paid per call with x402; refunded (never settled) if it fails. A token, or a wallet Iris hasn't read recently, can take about a minute. For a wallet: what it is (exchange, MEV bot, drainer, sniper, scam or poisoning wallet, personal wallet...), its risk score, the database's labels on it, its behaviours with example transactions, who sent it its first SOL (Solana), where its money came from and went (largest counterparties, labeled), look-alike (address poisoning) addresses, and the exchanges and mixers it moved money with, with the latest transaction for each (to use with trace_transfer). For a token mint: its creator and the creator's funder, the launch bundle and who funded it, red flags, the wallets in its groups and its top holders. For a program: who can upgrade it, who deployed it, its top callers. Only the latest transactions (depth) are read. Returns a summary and a link to the full view on iriscan.app.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Analyze an address on Solana, an EVM chain, Bitcoin, Tron, dYdX or Noble
find_token_insidersFind the wallets a token's creator is linked to by money (a Solana token, or a Robinhood Chain or BNB Chain one with chain): wallets it funded, wallets that paid it, wallets with t…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_token_insiders" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find the wallets a token's creator is linked to by money (a Solana token, or a Robinhood Chain or BNB Chain one with chain): wallets it funded, wallets that paid it, wallets with the same funder, among the token's earliest buyers, the wallets handed tokens at launch and its largest holders. Says how much of the supply they bought and hold, with the transactions that link them, and why none were found when none were. Costs 2 credits, or without an API key $0.10 paid per call with x402; refunded (never settled) if it fails. Can take up to two minutes. Results are leads, not proof.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Find a token's insiders
get_connectionsEvery counterparty of an address that analyze_address analyzed in the last hour on this account (without an API key: for the x402 payer whose receipt is given): wallets it sent to …No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_connections" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every counterparty of an address that analyze_address analyzed in the last hour on this account (without an API key: for the x402 payer whose receipt is given): wallets it sent to or received from and the venues it swapped on, with labels, the native coin (SOL, ETH, BTC, TRX...) and stablecoins moved each way, the number of transactions, and the date and signature of its first and last transfer (for trace_transfer). Covers the transactions that analysis read only. For a token: the wallets in its groups (creator, bundlers, insiders, wallets handed supply) and its top holders. Free, from the earlier analysis; run analyze_address first.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Get an address's connections
get_creditsThe account's plan and what is left: analyses, traces and pack credits, when the allowance renews, and what each tool costs.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_credits" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The account's plan and what is left: analyses, traces and pack credits, when the allowance renews, and what each tool costs. Without an API key: what each tool costs per call with x402. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Get credits left
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://iriscan.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://iriscan.app
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://iriscan.app/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including trace_transfer (irreversible), scan_launch_tool (write), follow_funds (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 21, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
- Nov 14, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://iriscan.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://iriscan.app
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warntrace_transfer
The server marks "trace_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "trace_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://iriscan.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://iriscan.app; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 …View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://iriscan.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://iriscan.app
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:analyze_addressOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_connectionsOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:trace_transferCan't be undoneinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http iris https://iriscan.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http iris https://iriscan.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__iris__analyze_address",
"mcp__iris__find_token_insiders",
"mcp__iris__get_connections",
"mcp__iris__get_credits"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__iris__trace_transfer",
"mcp__iris__scan_launch_tool"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as iris. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__iris__analyze_address untrusted-input
- mcp__iris__trace_transfer untrusted-input
- mcp__iris__find_token_insiders untrusted-input
- mcp__iris__scan_launch_tool untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.0xVector0/iris/verify?hash=ac9af89b20e4712cc59d3094ac3b671824817f8795a1a35bf1a9c0d1b5f8f3b3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ac9af89b20e4, from Nov 10, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.0xVector0/iris/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.0xVector0/iris)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
Iris MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Iris MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Iris MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Iris MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: trace_transfer.
What tools does the Iris MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read. trace_transfer, scan_launch_tool, analyze_address, find_token_insiders, get_connections and get_credits.
Does the Iris MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Iris MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Iris MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.