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SealGuard MCP server

io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard2cstudiodev-webstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Check Solana wallets and transactions for risky approvals and scam tokens; find SOL to take back.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the SealGuard MCP server can do

The SealGuard MCP server is published by the GitHub account 2cstudiodev-web. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: scan_wallet and check_transaction), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_wallet, list_empty_token_accounts, list_token_approvals and 1 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_transactionBefore a wallet signs a Solana transaction, simulates it on mainnet and says whether it would hand anything over: the wallet account itself, a token account's owner, a standing app…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before a wallet signs a Solana transaction, simulates it on mainnet and says whether it would hand anything over: the wallet account itself, a token account's owner, a standing approval on its tokens, a close authority, stake or nonce authorities. Also lists the SOL and token amounts that would leave and arrive, flags durable nonces (a signed transaction that can be sent much later) and programs SealGuard doesn't know. Verdict: do_not_sign, review or no_red_flags. Read-only: nothing is signed or sent. Paid: needs a SealGuard API key (Authorization: Bearer sgk_…); new keys come with 20 free checks, then US$0.01 a check, or 1,000 a month included with the SealGuard guard. Keys at https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp-key

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_walletChecks a Solana wallet for risks and gives a 0-100 safety score: open token approvals, phishing airdrops, Token-2022 permanent delegates and transfer restrictions, stake and nonce …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks a Solana wallet for risks and gives a 0-100 safety score: open token approvals, phishing airdrops, Token-2022 permanent delegates and transfer restrictions, stake and nonce accounts controlled by someone else, and whether the wallet account itself has been taken over. Also totals the SOL the wallet could take back: empty token accounts, pump.fun deposits, small balances it could sell, and NFTs it could burn. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can fix what was found.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_empty_token_accountsLists the SOL a Solana wallet could take back: empty token accounts (left behind by sold or sent tokens) with the rent in each and which ones SealGuard suggests closing (accounts f…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_empty_token_accounts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists the SOL a Solana wallet could take back: empty token accounts (left behind by sold or sent tokens) with the rent in each and which ones SealGuard suggests closing (accounts for tokens the owner will likely receive again, or used in the last 30 days, are marked to keep, with the reason); pump.fun and PumpSwap deposits; small balances worth under US$1 that could be sold for SOL through Jupiter; and NFTs whose burn would return their rent. Selling and burning are never suggested by default: they're the owner's call. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can do it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_token_approvalsLists every token approval (delegate) on a Solana wallet: which address can still move which token, and how much.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_token_approvals" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists every token approval (delegate) on a Solana wallet: which address can still move which token, and how much. Also lists Token-2022 permanent delegates, which holders can't revoke. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can revoke approvals for free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_wallet (write), check_transaction (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 19, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
  2. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sealguard https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http sealguard https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sealguard__list_empty_token_accounts",
      "mcp__sealguard__list_token_approvals"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sealguard__scan_wallet",
      "mcp__sealguard__check_transaction"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sealguard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__sealguard__scan_wallet untrusted-input
  • mcp__sealguard__list_empty_token_accounts untrusted-input
  • mcp__sealguard__list_token_approvals untrusted-input
  • mcp__sealguard__check_transaction untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard/verify?hash=9f4ca6b1964e5ae198fb2757f14e31c98ecccbad61003dca3a51b432f212f5b1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9f4ca6b1964e, from Nov 13, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 06:17 UTC.

SealGuard MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SealGuard MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the SealGuard MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the SealGuard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the SealGuard MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. scan_wallet, check_transaction, list_empty_token_accounts and list_token_approvals.

Does the SealGuard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SealGuard MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the SealGuard MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 13, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.