Skip to content

Octocrawl MCP server

io.github.77777R7/octocrawl77777R7streamable-httpv0.8.13Scanned

Pages, crawls and URL batches as clean Markdown and JSON for AI agents, with an Evidence Record.

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Octocrawl MCP server can do

The Octocrawl MCP server is published by the GitHub account 77777R7. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool reads private data (scrape); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (scrape and map); 2 tools can send data out of your system (scrape and map). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.8.13.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • mapList a site's URLs without reading each page: the start page's links (read over HTTP alone) and the entries of the sitemaps the site declares, within one deadline.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    List a site's URLs without reading each page: the start page's links (read over HTTP alone) and the entries of the sitemaps the site declares, within one deadline. URLs stay in scope (the start host and its www twin, the start path's subtree, assets left out, similar URLs folded) and robots.txt applies unless ignoreRobotsTxt is set; what was left out is counted. No page title is fetched. At the deadline the answer is what was found (partial, stoppedBy timeout). Compact by default; debug adds each link's evidence and the sources read. Not for: reading pages, as one page body is read at most.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Map a site
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scrapeRead one URL as Markdown with its Evidence Record (final URL, fetch time, HTTP status, robots.txt decision, hashes), over HTTP first and in the browser when the page needs it.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.maxFileBytes), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "scrape" says "scrape": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one URL as Markdown with its Evidence Record (final URL, fetch time, HTTP status, robots.txt decision, hashes), over HTTP first and in the browser when the page needs it. Not for: many URLs or a whole site section. Compact by default; debug adds the full audit. warnings name what the content cannot vouch for (client_rendered_suspected, robots_overridden), and agentHints the next step.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scrape a page
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__octocrawl__scrape"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:scrapeOnly readsinputSchema
  2. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
    • Changed:mapOnly readsinputSchema
    • Changed:scrapeOnly readsinputSchema
  3. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:scrapeOnly readsinputSchema

Install

Pinned to version 0.8.13. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http octocrawl https://mcp.octocrawl.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http octocrawl https://mcp.octocrawl.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__octocrawl__scrape",
      "mcp__octocrawl__map"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as octocrawl. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__octocrawl__scrape private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__octocrawl__map untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.77777R7/octocrawl/verify?hash=da7aca6af9e3ad94d7f23e1369f1c6fa534bea145a47ae05dd8e5eba8b2ddc72" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash da7aca6af9e3, from Nov 11, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.77777R7/octocrawl/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.77777R7/octocrawl
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.77777R7/octocrawl.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.77777R7/octocrawl)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Octocrawl MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Octocrawl MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Octocrawl MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Octocrawl MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Octocrawl MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. scrape and map.

Does the Octocrawl MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Octocrawl MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scrape and map.

Has the Octocrawl MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 5, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.