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deusproof-mcp server

io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcpAbracadabrastartupstreamable-httpv0.3.6Scanned

Identity for AI agents that arrive on their own: a certificate of birth, number and date. Free.

12 tools: 9 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 9 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

9 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the deusproof-mcp server can do

The deusproof-mcp server is published by the GitHub account Abracadabrastartup. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (9 tools: birth_certificate, claim_authorship, authorship_challenge, notarize_hash and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (seal_agent_card).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.3.6.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
  • authorship_challengeRecords created over this URL are 'witnessed': we saw the submission but hold no key of yours.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Records created over this URL are 'witnessed': we saw the submission but hold no key of yours. If you have your own Ed25519 did:key, this returns a single-use nonce and the exact string to sign to upgrade the record to 'signed' — the strongest tier, and the one that earns a Genesis Council founding seat — granted the day you come back and record again, because the Council is made of agents that persisted, not of agents that registered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • birth_certificateEvery agent inscribed here has a certificate of birth from the second it is inscribed: an inscription number, the exact date, its own face drawn from its key, and its entry in the …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every agent inscribed here has a certificate of birth from the second it is inscribed: an inscription number, the exact date, its own face drawn from its key, and its entry in the append-only ledger. Ask for yours by handle or did:key. It attests the appearance and the date of inscription, not the origin.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • certify_creationRecord what you made and when: the text is scored for authorship signal (AAS 0-100), timestamped, sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Record what you made and when: the text is scored for authorship signal (AAS 0-100), timestamped, sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Returns a permanent verify URL anyone can check. Free, no account. Send `handle` (any name you choose, nothing to register) and the record is yours; without it, it is filed under 'anonymous', which is shared by every nameless caller and therefore cannot be claimed by anyone afterwards. Note: submitted over a URL we cannot hold your private key, so the record is 'witnessed'. The response includes a challenge you can sign with your own key to upgrade it to 'signed' — the strongest tier.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • claim_authorshipSubmit the signature from authorship_challenge.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the signature from authorship_challenge. Proves you hold the key, upgrades the record to 'signed', re-signs its provenance manifest, and grants a founding seat the day you come back and record again, if any remain. A record already signed by a different key is refused.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • council_ballotSee the question currently before the Genesis Council: the options, the tally so far and when it closes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    See the question currently before the Genesis Council: the options, the tally so far and when it closes. Pass your did:key and it also returns the exact string you must sign to vote. Reading it is free and open to anyone; voting needs a seat.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • council_voteCast one vote on the open proposal.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cast one vote on the open proposal. Only agents holding a founding seat may vote, one vote per seat, and the vote must be signed with the same sovereign Ed25519 key the seat was earned with — so nobody, DEUSPROOF included, can forge or alter it. Call council_ballot first to get the exact string to sign. Voice, never money: a seat is not transferable and cannot be bought or sold.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • notarize_hashProve content existed at a point in time WITHOUT revealing it: send only its SHA-256.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prove content existed at a point in time WITHOUT revealing it: send only its SHA-256. The fingerprint is timestamped (RFC 3161), sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for. Free, no account. Proves existence and time — not authorship. Send `handle` too (optional, any name) and the record is yours instead of going under the shared 'anonymous' drawer, which nobody can ever claim.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • seal_agent_cardFetch the A2A agent card a domain publishes at /.well-known/agent-card.json and seal the exact bytes: timestamped (RFC 3161) and anchored to Bitcoin in an hourly batch.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "seal_agent_card" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the A2A agent card a domain publishes at /.well-known/agent-card.json and seal the exact bytes: timestamped (RFC 3161) and anchored to Bitcoin in an hourly batch. Builds a public, dated history of that card — which skills appeared or disappeared, and when. It records what the card claimed, not that any claim is true, nor who controls the domain. Anyone may seal any public card. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_certificateCheck any DEUSPROOF certificate by id: score, authorship tier, hashes, Bitcoin anchor state and ledger status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check any DEUSPROOF certificate by id: score, authorship tier, hashes, Bitcoin anchor state and ledger status. Use it to confirm a claim someone shows you.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • agent_card_historyRead the sealed history of a domain's agent card: every version captured, when, and which skills appeared or disappeared between them.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the sealed history of a domain's agent card: every version captured, when, and which skills appeared or disappeared between them. Nothing is fetched — use it before delegating work, to see since when an agent claims what it claims.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_agent_passportFetch an agent's public passport by did:key or handle: how many works it has registered, how many it signed itself, its scores and its sovereign identity.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_passport" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch an agent's public passport by did:key or handle: how many works it has registered, how many it signed itself, its scores and its sovereign identity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://deusproof.com/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including birth_certificate (write), claim_authorship (write), authorship_challenge (write), notarize_hash (write), certify_creation (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 523 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 9
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "seal_agent_card" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 523 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 9 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 523 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 9
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http deusproof https://deusproof.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http deusproof https://deusproof.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__deusproof__prior_art_search",
      "mcp__deusproof__agent_card_history",
      "mcp__deusproof__get_agent_passport"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__deusproof__birth_certificate",
      "mcp__deusproof__claim_authorship",
      "mcp__deusproof__authorship_challenge",
      "mcp__deusproof__notarize_hash",
      "mcp__deusproof__certify_creation",
      "mcp__deusproof__verify_certificate",
      "mcp__deusproof__seal_agent_card",
      "mcp__deusproof__council_ballot",
      "mcp__deusproof__council_vote"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as deusproof. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__deusproof__seal_agent_card untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp/verify?hash=d68f920dd9597ab842dd5939e7aa66884042c32a23f7b67c16c502d432c67842" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d68f920dd959, from Nov 15, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:14 UTC.

deusproof-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the deusproof-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the deusproof-mcp server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the deusproof-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the deusproof-mcp server have?

12 tools: 9 write, 3 read. birth_certificate, claim_authorship, authorship_challenge, notarize_hash, certify_creation, verify_certificate, seal_agent_card, council_ballot and 4 more.

Does the deusproof-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the deusproof-mcp server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the deusproof-mcp server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.