PropertyLabs MCP server
io.github.AlgoFalgo/propertylabsAlgoFalgostreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Public building permits, property assessments, parcels and development intelligence.
3 tools: 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the PropertyLabs MCP server can do
The PropertyLabs MCP server is published by the GitHub account AlgoFalgo. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (search_address_permits, get_public_permit and search_company_activity).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_public_permitRetrieve a permit using the numeric PropertyLabs canonical permit ID and city slug.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_public_permit" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve a permit using the numeric PropertyLabs canonical permit ID and city slug. Use this for a permit already referenced by a public PropertyLabs /permit/{city}/{id} URL. Returns only fields allowed on the public permit page; applicant and contractor identities remain gated.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
search_address_permitsLook up the public PropertyLabs permit history for a specific civic address in a specific city.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_address_permits" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up the public PropertyLabs permit history for a specific civic address in a specific city. Use this for address-level construction history and activity. This follows the same public field boundary as PropertyLabs address pages and does not return applicant names, contractor names or permit numbers.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
search_company_activityGet an aggregate, city-scoped sample of permit activity matching a developer, applicant, builder or contractor name.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_company_activity" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get an aggregate, city-scoped sample of permit activity matching a developer, applicant, builder or contractor name. Only applicant/developer/contractor party-field matches are counted. Anonymous results are aggregate only and never return company-matched project addresses, permit numbers, coordinates or raw records.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http propertylabs https://propertylabs.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http propertylabs https://propertylabs.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__propertylabs__search_address_permits",
"mcp__propertylabs__get_public_permit",
"mcp__propertylabs__search_company_activity"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as propertylabs. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__propertylabs__search_address_permits untrusted-input
- mcp__propertylabs__get_public_permit untrusted-input
- mcp__propertylabs__search_company_activity untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.AlgoFalgo/propertylabs/verify?hash=910a66f5ff5495727519afd6dda0a4f8fa35463aa6ba862ccfb4628051f3640c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 910a66f5ff54, from Nov 16, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.AlgoFalgo/propertylabs/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.AlgoFalgo/propertylabs)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:14 UTC.
PropertyLabs MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the PropertyLabs MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the PropertyLabs MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the PropertyLabs MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the PropertyLabs MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 read. search_address_permits, get_public_permit and search_company_activity.
Does the PropertyLabs MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the PropertyLabs MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the PropertyLabs MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.