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Arobi Immaculate MCP server

io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculateArobi-Technology-Alliance-Labstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Pre-action AI governance verdicts, grant revocation, model routing and evidence verification.

5 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 4 change things.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Arobi Immaculate MCP server can do

The Arobi Immaculate MCP server is published by the GitHub account Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab. It has 5 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: arobi_revoke_grant) and create or change data (4 tools: arobi_authorize, arobi_route_grant, arobi_classify_and_route and arobi_verify_chain). None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • arobi_revoke_grantEnd a route grant before it expires: seal a ROUTE_REVOKE record chained to the grant.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "arobi_revoke_grant" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    End a route grant before it expires: seal a ROUTE_REVOKE record chained to the grant. Pass the route_revoke it returns to arobi_authorize, and the grant authorizes nothing more. Only the tenant that made the grant can revoke it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Revoke a route grant
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • arobi_authorizeDecide whether an agent action is permitted against a sealed route grant, and seal an AUTHORIZATION record in your ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decide whether an agent action is permitted against a sealed route grant, and seal an AUTHORIZATION record in your ledger. Returns GRANTED, DENIED or ESCALATED with the reason; a GRANTED decision also carries an authorization_seal, which a consumer that spends the authorization must present back. Call arobi_route_grant first to obtain the grant. The acting principal is always the tenant your key belongs to.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Authorize an agent action
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • arobi_classify_and_routeClassify a prompt and choose the cheapest route CAPABLE of the work from your candidate set, reporting whether any cost above the cheapest capable route is justified by a named req…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Classify a prompt and choose the cheapest route CAPABLE of the work from your candidate set, reporting whether any cost above the cheapest capable route is justified by a named required capability, by measured quality under your explicit quality_exception policy, or by nothing. Also reports whether this work was already done. The decision is written to your ledger unless record is false.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Choose the cheapest capable route
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • arobi_route_grantSeal WHO granted WHAT authority to WHICH workflow, with scope, caps, attenuation and expiry, as a ROUTE_GRANT record in your ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Seal WHO granted WHAT authority to WHICH workflow, with scope, caps, attenuation and expiry, as a ROUTE_GRANT record in your ledger. One grant authorises many later arobi_authorize decisions. The grant is made by the tenant your key belongs to, and it must expire. To end one early, use arobi_revoke_grant.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Grant authority to a workflow
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • arobi_verify_chainRecompute a set of sealed spine records and report whether the hash chain is continuous, which record breaks it, and why.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recompute a set of sealed spine records and report whether the hash chain is continuous, which record breaks it, and why. Verification only — it re-derives, it does not re-execute, and it writes nothing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a sealed record chain
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://aura-genesis.org/api/v1/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including arobi_authorize (write), arobi_route_grant (write), arobi_classify_and_route (write), arobi_verify_chain (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 4 changed.+1 added~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http immaculate https://aura-genesis.org/api/v1/mcp --header 'X-Arobi-Tenant-Key: <your-x-arobi-tenant-key>'
claude mcp add --transport http immaculate https://aura-genesis.org/api/v1/mcp --header 'X-Arobi-Tenant-Key: <your-x-arobi-tenant-key>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__immaculate__arobi_authorize",
      "mcp__immaculate__arobi_route_grant",
      "mcp__immaculate__arobi_classify_and_route",
      "mcp__immaculate__arobi_verify_chain"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__immaculate__arobi_revoke_grant"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as immaculate. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculate/verify?hash=e0e4189a96b0a1435dbfd72d092865ffcbe996c450cf7e28878444c7c3bb9266" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e0e4189a96b0, from Nov 21, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculate/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculate
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculate.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Arobi-Technology-Alliance-Lab/immaculate)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Arobi Immaculate MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Arobi Immaculate MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Arobi Immaculate MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: arobi_revoke_grant.

Can the Arobi Immaculate MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Arobi Immaculate MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 destructive, 4 write. arobi_revoke_grant, arobi_authorize, arobi_route_grant, arobi_classify_and_route and arobi_verify_chain.

Does the Arobi Immaculate MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Arobi Immaculate MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Arobi Immaculate MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.