warda MCP server
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/wardaArtyKOMarketsstreamable-httpv0.4.2Scanned
Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key.
11 tools: 9 do something that can't be undone and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 9
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
9 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the warda MCP server can do
The warda MCP server is published by the GitHub account ArtyKOMarkets. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
9 tools can send data out of your system (warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation and 6 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.4.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
11 tools
Can't be undone 9Claude Code: ask
warda_build_delegationAssemble an unsigned transaction that subdivides this grant into a child for a sub-agent, and return the digest to sign with the PARENT's agent key.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.parent.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.parent.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Assemble an unsigned transaction that subdivides this grant into a child for a sub-agent, and return the digest to sign with the PARENT's agent key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY. A child can only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent reserves exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Narrowing the child's allowlist needs the parent's full member list, because the witness is a path through the parent's tree and a root alone cannot produce one.
warda_build_exitAssemble an unsigned transaction that ENDS this grant and sweeps its balance to the principal.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.grant.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Assemble an unsigned transaction that ENDS this grant and sweeps its balance to the principal. 'revoke' is the emergency stop, signed by the revocation key, effective the moment it confirms — the agent cannot stop it and cannot outrun it beyond the limits it already had. 'reclaim' is the same sweep after the window has closed, signed by the principal key; the covenant enforces the timing with a CLTV, so a reclaim built early simply will not run. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES A KEY. This is the tool a monitor calls when a grant is behaving badly and something has to act.
warda_build_settlementAssemble an unsigned transaction that ends a child grant and returns its UNSPENT remainder to the parent's budget, charging the parent only what the child actually spent.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.parent.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.parent.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Assemble an unsigned transaction that ends a child grant and returns its UNSPENT remainder to the parent's budget, charging the parent only what the child actually spent. This is the other half of delegation: letting a child expire instead returns the money to the PRINCIPAL — to the human — which is no use to an agent mid-task. Returns TWO digests: the parent's half is signed by the parent's agent key, the child's by the revocation key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES EITHER. prevRoot is the parent's reserve root from before this child was pushed; warda_build_delegation returns it as parentReserveRootBefore. It cannot be derived from anything on chain — a hash chain pops by preimage.
warda_build_spendAssemble an unsigned Kaspa transaction that spends from this grant, and return the digest to sign.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Assemble an unsigned Kaspa transaction that spends from this grant, and return the digest to sign. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY and never signs: it hands back bytes, and you sign the digest wherever your key lives. It also returns the advisory verdict, but it builds the transaction either way — a local rule that is too strict must not be able to block a payment the chain would accept. If the verdict says refused, broadcasting will cost a fee and fail.
warda_check_delegationCheck whether a proposed child grant is a legal narrowing of this one.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.parent.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.parent.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a proposed child grant is a legal narrowing of this one. A child may only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent must reserve exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Advisory.
warda_check_spendCheck a proposed payment against every rule the covenant enforces, and return the same verdict the chain would.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a proposed payment against every rule the covenant enforces, and return the same verdict the chain would. Builds the recipient proof for you. ADVISORY: a 'permitted' answer is not permission — it means the covenant would accept this transaction. A 'refused' answer means no valid transaction exists, so broadcasting one would only waste a fee.
warda_grant_addressDerive the on-chain address of a grant from its terms and current state.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.grant.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Derive the on-chain address of a grant from its terms and current state. A grant's address is a HASH of its state, so it MOVES after every spend and every delegation — an address that worked yesterday holds nothing today. Use this to know which address to fund, watch, or look up.
warda_grant_authorityThe agent's spending power right now: budget left, epoch headroom, per-transaction cap, and the largest single payment currently permitted.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.grant.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it The agent's spending power right now: budget left, epoch headroom, per-transaction cap, and the largest single payment currently permitted. This is what an agent wallet's spending limit would tell you, except that it is not a setting — the covenant enforces these whether or not you ask. Use it before planning a purchase. NOT a chain balance: this server never reads the chain. It reports what the grant you passed says, so a stale descriptor gives a confident wrong number.
warda_walletThe whole wallet view in one call: the grant's current address, its spending limits, the largest payment permitted right now, and every address it is allowed to pay.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.grant.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.grant.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it The whole wallet view in one call: the grant's current address, its spending limits, the largest payment permitted right now, and every address it is allowed to pay. This is the agent-wallet shape — address, limits, spending power — with one difference worth knowing: the limits are not settings this server or your code applies. They are in the script that unlocks the coin, so a payment outside them is not refused, it is a transaction that does not exist. NO CHAIN READ: this server never connects to a node. Every figure comes from the grant descriptor you passed, so an on-chain balance is deliberately absent — reporting one from a stale record is the failure this whole protocol keeps meeting.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
warda_find_serviceSearch the Warda service registry for endpoints an agent holding a grant can pay.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "warda_find_service" says "find": a word for reading.
Findings
- Warn
The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...read the order as one. NETWORK: unlike every other tool on this server, this one makes one outb..."
Description, as the server wrote it Search the Warda service registry for endpoints an agent holding a grant can pay. Filters are a conjunction: a service must offer EVERY capability asked for and be at or under maxPrice. WHAT IS VERIFIED: that the operator controls the key the service is paid at, and that the listing was served from the same host as the endpoint it names. WHAT IS NOT: that the price is real, that the service works, or that it is worth paying — those are the operator's claims about themselves and arrive labelled as such. There is no ranking; do not read the order as one. NETWORK: unlike every other tool on this server, this one makes one outbound request, to the registry and to nothing else. It will not fetch a URL you give it. NOT REQUIRED: discovery is never in the payment path. A listing is a signed manifest at /.well-known/warda-service.json on the operator's own domain — if you already know an endpoint, read that directly and pay it without asking anyone.
warda_recover_grantRead a grant's full state back out of any transaction that spent it, and work out where it went.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a grant's full state back out of any transaction that spent it, and work out where it went. Use this when a grant's recorded state is stale, wrong, or lost and its address turns up empty. Kaspa's P2SH requires the covenant script to travel in the clear inside every spending transaction, and the grant's state is spliced into that script — so every spend publishes the grant it spent. Pass the transaction as wire JSON, or just the redeem script hex if that is all you have.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out9
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 9
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including warda_grant_authority (irreversible), warda_check_spend (irreversible), warda_check_delegation (irreversible), warda_build_spend (irreversible), warda_wallet (irreversible) and 4 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...read the order as one. NETWORK: unlike every other tool on this server, this one makes one outb..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http warda https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http warda https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__warda__warda_recover_grant",
"mcp__warda__warda_find_service"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__warda__warda_grant_authority",
"mcp__warda__warda_check_spend",
"mcp__warda__warda_check_delegation",
"mcp__warda__warda_build_spend",
"mcp__warda__warda_wallet",
"mcp__warda__warda_grant_address",
"mcp__warda__warda_build_delegation",
"mcp__warda__warda_build_settlement",
"mcp__warda__warda_build_exit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as warda. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 9 rules
- mcp__warda__warda_grant_authority outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_check_spend outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_check_delegation outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_build_spend outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_wallet outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_grant_address outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_build_delegation outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_build_settlement outbound
- mcp__warda__warda_build_exit outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda/verify?hash=8789e586e747c24c46d9f738047ca0ccc5a5d444adeaffca6e86762e8684f17b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8789e586e747, from Nov 15, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:14 UTC.
warda MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the warda MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the warda MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the warda MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 9 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend, warda_wallet, warda_grant_address and 3 more.
What tools does the warda MCP server have?
- 11 tools: 9 irreversible, 2 read. warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend, warda_wallet, warda_grant_address, warda_build_delegation, warda_build_settlement and 3 more.
Does the warda MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the warda MCP server send data to outside services?
- 9 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend, warda_wallet, warda_grant_address and 3 more.
Has the warda MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.