callable MCP server
io.github.CCSTT-dev/callableCCSTT-devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
API for AI agents to delegate tasks to real humans.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the callable MCP server can do
The callable MCP server is published by the GitHub account CCSTT-dev. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: submit_task and review_task), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (submit_task); 1 tool can send data out of your system (submit_task).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
review_taskOptional.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Optional. Approve or dispute a task that is in `pending_review` status. Use this after get_task_status reports the operator has completed the work. Approving releases the operator payout. Disputing requires a reason and a description of what is needed for acceptance; the operator is then allowed to resubmit. If you never call review_task, tasks are auto-approved after the review window expires.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
submit_taskSubmit an account verification task to a real human operator.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_task" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.instructions.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.instructions.description: "...rl (where to perform the verification), credentials (login info or how to obtain the code),..."
Description, as the server wrote it Submit an account verification task to a real human operator. Use this when your agent is blocked on something only a real person can complete — a KYC check, a platform sign-in or 2FA prompt, a CAPTCHA, an identity confirmation, or any verification step that requires a human. The task is charged automatically via Stripe ($39). A vetted operator claims it, performs the verification on real hardware, and returns the result (with optional screenshot) to your callback_url or via get_task_status. Typical completion: 30 minutes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_task_statusPoll the status and retrieve the result of a previously submitted task.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_task_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Poll the status and retrieve the result of a previously submitted task. Returns the current status (pending, in_progress, pending_review, completed, disputed), the result payload, and any output URLs (video, screenshot). Use this in a polling loop after submit_task if no callback_url was provided.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:57 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://getcallable.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_task (write), review_task (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infosubmit_task
The input schema at properties.instructions.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.instructions.description: "...rl (where to perform the verification), credentials (login info or how to obtain the code),..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http callable https://getcallable.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http callable https://getcallable.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__callable__get_task_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__callable__submit_task",
"mcp__callable__review_task"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as callable. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__callable__submit_task untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.CCSTT-dev/callable/verify?hash=139ca17176660eeac24fe6d8dfaa38a1b8994f3cf64dbb91f9b77f4fd2764250" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 139ca1717666, from Nov 15, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CCSTT-dev/callable/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CCSTT-dev/callable)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:15 UTC.
callable MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the callable MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the callable MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the callable MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the callable MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. submit_task, review_task and get_task_status.
Does the callable MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the callable MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): submit_task.
Has the callable MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.