Truth Bear MCP server
io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcpCHANGCHINFUstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Verifiable official-source records for AI agents: record_hash + Ed25519 citation, x402 per-call
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Truth Bear MCP server can do
The Truth Bear MCP server is published by the GitHub account CHANGCHINFU. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (purchase_options) and create or change data (2 tools: verify_citation and verify_triangular), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_citation, find_signal, get_official_record and 2 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
purchase_optionsFREE.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "purchase_options" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Ask how to pay for a listed endpoint and get every channel with its REAL status - including the ones that are wired but not open yet. Three channels exist: x402 micropayment (for an agent with a funded USDC wallet on Base), a stateless subscription Bearer token (for a person or team - no wallet, no private key, no account), and a card rail. This tool takes no payment and holds no key; it only tells you which doors exist and which are open today.
Annotations the server declares
- title: How can I actually buy this? (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
verify_citationFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Given a record_hash from any Truth Bear record, look it up and recompute the canonical hash server-side, returning whether it is a genuine Truth Bear official record plus a plain-language reverse lookup of what exactly that hash attests. Use this to check a citation you were handed by another agent or document BEFORE relying on it. No payment, no API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a Truth Bear record (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
verify_triangularFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Cross-verify one GAUGE interweave line: it returns each official series ("leg") in the line with its own record_hash, current/previous values, expected direction and per-leg minMove deadband, plus a count-style state (directions_matched / direction_mismatch / inverse_consistent / not_comparable / insufficient) and N-of-M. Everything needed to recompute the verdict OFFLINE is in the response - verify each leg hash with verify_citation, then recompute dir=sign(current-previous) with the minMove deadband. Descriptive only: no forecast, no causation, no advice. No payment, no API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Cross-check a line of official series & recompute the verdict (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
find_signalFREE coverage + freshness manifest: which signal_id lines exist, how many entities each covers, and fresh/recent/stale counts - so you can check "is my entity covered and how fresh…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_signal" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE coverage + freshness manifest: which signal_id lines exist, how many entities each covers, and fresh/recent/stale counts - so you can check "is my entity covered and how fresh" BEFORE paying. Optional filters: industry, signal_id, entity.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find which signals/entities are covered (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_official_recordReturns the REAL x402 payment challenge (accepts[]: network / asset / payTo / amount) for the paid endpoint that serves a given signal_id+entity, or any listed endpoint addressed d…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_official_record" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the REAL x402 payment challenge (accepts[]: network / asset / payTo / amount) for the paid endpoint that serves a given signal_id+entity, or any listed endpoint addressed directly by `path`. This tool does NOT deliver paid data and does NOT take payment - MCP has no payment layer. Pay at the returned url with your own x402 client (USDC on Base or Solana, gasless EIP-3009; pay from a plain EOA) and you receive the record directly, with record_hash you can verify offline. This tool only fetches the 402 challenge; it delivers no paid data and collects no payment.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get the x402 payment challenge for a paid record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 9, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.truthbear.co/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including purchase_options (irreversible), verify_citation (write), verify_triangular (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnpurchase_options
The server marks "purchase_options" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http truthbear https://api.truthbear.co/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http truthbear https://api.truthbear.co/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__truthbear__find_signal",
"mcp__truthbear__get_official_record"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__truthbear__verify_citation",
"mcp__truthbear__purchase_options",
"mcp__truthbear__verify_triangular"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as truthbear. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__truthbear__verify_citation untrusted-input
- mcp__truthbear__find_signal untrusted-input
- mcp__truthbear__get_official_record untrusted-input
- mcp__truthbear__purchase_options untrusted-input
- mcp__truthbear__verify_triangular untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp/verify?hash=e8ccdfa75adef4a46840cb71ce39bd9419e3dc9853485282287ae62d75aa1c5c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e8ccdfa75ade, from Nov 8, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Truth Bear MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Truth Bear MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Truth Bear MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Truth Bear MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: purchase_options.
What tools does the Truth Bear MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. purchase_options, verify_citation, verify_triangular, find_signal and get_official_record.
Does the Truth Bear MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Truth Bear MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Truth Bear MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.