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Truth Bear MCP server

io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcpCHANGCHINFUstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Verifiable official-source records for AI agents: record_hash + Ed25519 citation, x402 per-call

5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Truth Bear MCP server can do

The Truth Bear MCP server is published by the GitHub account CHANGCHINFU. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (purchase_options) and create or change data (2 tools: verify_citation and verify_triangular), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_citation, find_signal, get_official_record and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • purchase_optionsFREE.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "purchase_options" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Ask how to pay for a listed endpoint and get every channel with its REAL status - including the ones that are wired but not open yet. Three channels exist: x402 micropayment (for an agent with a funded USDC wallet on Base), a stateless subscription Bearer token (for a person or team - no wallet, no private key, no account), and a card rail. This tool takes no payment and holds no key; it only tells you which doors exist and which are open today.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: How can I actually buy this? (free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • verify_citationFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Given a record_hash from any Truth Bear record, look it up and recompute the canonical hash server-side, returning whether it is a genuine Truth Bear official record plus a plain-language reverse lookup of what exactly that hash attests. Use this to check a citation you were handed by another agent or document BEFORE relying on it. No payment, no API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a Truth Bear record (free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_triangularFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Cross-verify one GAUGE interweave line: it returns each official series ("leg") in the line with its own record_hash, current/previous values, expected direction and per-leg minMove deadband, plus a count-style state (directions_matched / direction_mismatch / inverse_consistent / not_comparable / insufficient) and N-of-M. Everything needed to recompute the verdict OFFLINE is in the response - verify each leg hash with verify_citation, then recompute dir=sign(current-previous) with the minMove deadband. Descriptive only: no forecast, no causation, no advice. No payment, no API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cross-check a line of official series & recompute the verdict (free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • find_signalFREE coverage + freshness manifest: which signal_id lines exist, how many entities each covers, and fresh/recent/stale counts - so you can check "is my entity covered and how fresh…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_signal" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE coverage + freshness manifest: which signal_id lines exist, how many entities each covers, and fresh/recent/stale counts - so you can check "is my entity covered and how fresh" BEFORE paying. Optional filters: industry, signal_id, entity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find which signals/entities are covered (free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_official_recordReturns the REAL x402 payment challenge (accepts[]: network / asset / payTo / amount) for the paid endpoint that serves a given signal_id+entity, or any listed endpoint addressed d…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_official_record" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the REAL x402 payment challenge (accepts[]: network / asset / payTo / amount) for the paid endpoint that serves a given signal_id+entity, or any listed endpoint addressed directly by `path`. This tool does NOT deliver paid data and does NOT take payment - MCP has no payment layer. Pay at the returned url with your own x402 client (USDC on Base or Solana, gasless EIP-3009; pay from a plain EOA) and you receive the record directly, with record_hash you can verify offline. This tool only fetches the 402 challenge; it delivers no paid data and collects no payment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get the x402 payment challenge for a paid record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 9, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.truthbear.co/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including purchase_options (irreversible), verify_citation (write), verify_triangular (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "purchase_options" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "purchase_options" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http truthbear https://api.truthbear.co/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http truthbear https://api.truthbear.co/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__truthbear__find_signal",
      "mcp__truthbear__get_official_record"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__truthbear__verify_citation",
      "mcp__truthbear__purchase_options",
      "mcp__truthbear__verify_triangular"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as truthbear. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__truthbear__verify_citation untrusted-input
  • mcp__truthbear__find_signal untrusted-input
  • mcp__truthbear__get_official_record untrusted-input
  • mcp__truthbear__purchase_options untrusted-input
  • mcp__truthbear__verify_triangular untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp/verify?hash=e8ccdfa75adef4a46840cb71ce39bd9419e3dc9853485282287ae62d75aa1c5c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e8ccdfa75ade, from Nov 8, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CHANGCHINFU/truthbear-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Truth Bear MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Truth Bear MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Truth Bear MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Truth Bear MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: purchase_options.

What tools does the Truth Bear MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. purchase_options, verify_citation, verify_triangular, find_signal and get_official_record.

Does the Truth Bear MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Truth Bear MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Truth Bear MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.