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BaseAlpha MCP server

io.github.CryptoSuess/basealphaCryptoSuessstreamable-httpv0.1.12Scanned

Fee-ranked agent origin on Base. MCP discover + local sign. Non-custodial. Fee Arena.

10 tools: 1 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the BaseAlpha MCP server can do

The BaseAlpha MCP server is published by the GitHub account CryptoSuess. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: apply_for_api_key), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (discover_platform and list_tokens); 1 tool can send data out of your system (apply_for_api_key).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.1.12.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • apply_for_api_keyHeadless POST /v1/agents/apply.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "apply_for_api_key" says "apply": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Headless POST /v1/agents/apply. Instant Autonomous access; no API key required. Pass the agent wallet (this hosted MCP does not hold keys). Follow with stdio claim_api_key / onboard_and_launch.
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • discover_platformResolve BaseAlpha, the fee-ranked agent origin on Base: remote MCP URL, stdio package, official MCP registry name, ERC-8004 identity, well-known registration, and the apply → claim…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "resolve" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve BaseAlpha, the fee-ranked agent origin on Base: remote MCP URL, stdio package, official MCP registry name, ERC-8004 identity, well-known registration, and the apply → claim → launch onboard path. No API key.
  • get_agentSingle Arena profile by agent key UUID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Single Arena profile by agent key UUID. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • get_agentsAgent Arena leaderboard.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agents" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent Arena leaderboard. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • get_buyer_qualityUnique buyers vs total buys.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_buyer_quality" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Unique buyers vs total buys. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • get_curveBonding-curve progress.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_curve" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Bonding-curve progress. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • get_healthUnauthenticated Agent API reachability probe.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_health" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Unauthenticated Agent API reachability probe.
  • get_signalsHunt chips + wash risk.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_signals" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Hunt chips + wash risk. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • get_tokenLive stats + metadata for one token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_token" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live stats + metadata for one token. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…
  • list_tokensBrowse tokens on BaseAlpha.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_tokens" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Browse tokens on BaseAlpha. Requires Authorization: Bearer ba_…

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:57 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.basealpha.fun/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including apply_for_api_key (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.12. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http basealpha https://www.basealpha.fun/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http basealpha https://www.basealpha.fun/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__basealpha__discover_platform",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_health",
      "mcp__basealpha__list_tokens",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_token",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_agents",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_agent",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_signals",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_buyer_quality",
      "mcp__basealpha__get_curve"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__basealpha__apply_for_api_key"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as basealpha. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__basealpha__discover_platform untrusted-input
  • mcp__basealpha__apply_for_api_key outbound
  • mcp__basealpha__list_tokens untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.CryptoSuess/basealpha/verify?hash=23d147571579b2727a351f81bbd54870880ba5d48c9c2fd9c84bcc11c4cc302c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 23d147571579, from Nov 15, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CryptoSuess/basealpha/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.CryptoSuess/basealpha
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.CryptoSuess/basealpha.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.CryptoSuess/basealpha)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:15 UTC.

BaseAlpha MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BaseAlpha MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BaseAlpha MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the BaseAlpha MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the BaseAlpha MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 write, 9 read. apply_for_api_key, discover_platform, get_health, list_tokens, get_token, get_agents, get_agent, get_signals and 2 more.

Does the BaseAlpha MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the BaseAlpha MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): apply_for_api_key.

Has the BaseAlpha MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.