Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server
io.github.DMS1979/ingravity-securityDMS1979streamable-httpv1.3.3Scanned
5-EVM pre-sign firewall, ERC-20 honeypot scanner, DeFi MEV math & Solidity audit via x402.
7 tools: 5 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 0
- 5 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server can do
The Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server is published by the GitHub account DMS1979. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: ingravity_auditSolidityContract, ingravity_computeDefiSlippageAndLiquidation, ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot, ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (ingravity_fastPingAddressSafety, ingravity_auditSolidityContract, ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall and 3 more).
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (annotation-conflict and base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.3.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
ingravity_auditSolidityContractAudits a single Solidity file (code, required; optional contractName) across 24 SWC/DeFi rules using a 4-gate filter that excludes dust rounding and trusted-admin paths.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "ingravity_auditSolidityContract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits a single Solidity file (code, required; optional contractName) across 24 SWC/DeFi rules using a 4-gate filter that excludes dust rounding and trusted-admin paths. Read-only and never broadcasts transactions: optionally supply deployed contractAddress, chainId (default 8453), and ownerTreasury to check live TVL via RPC and generate unsigned EIP-5792/EOA Safe-Harbor rescue calldata (90%-95% to ownerTreasury). Set tier to FULL ($0.85 USDC, default) for findings or ESSENTIAL ($0.35 USDC) for score and counts; unpaid calls return isError: true, and CRITICAL/HIGH patches remain sealed under Anti-Bypass until 0.15% SLA or 5%-10% rescue settlement. Use for single contracts; use ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier for multi-file protocols.
Annotations the server declares
- title: 24-Vector Solidity Contract Auditor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ingravity_computeDefiSlippageAndLiquidationComputes deterministic 18-decimal BigInt AMM swap outputs (amm: exact amount out, price impact, and 48-step MEV sandwich bounds) and/or perp liquidation limits (leverage: liquidati…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Computes deterministic 18-decimal BigInt AMM swap outputs (amm: exact amount out, price impact, and 48-step MEV sandwich bounds) and/or perp liquidation limits (leverage: liquidation price and health factor). Runs pure off-chain math with zero RPC calls or on-chain side effects; pass amm, leverage, or both (omitting both returns -32602). Set tier to FULL ($0.10 USDC, default) for full metrics or ESSENTIAL ($0.04 USDC) for PROCEED/ABORT signal only; unpaid calls return isError: true with an x402 challenge (0.15%/5%-10% rescue fees apply only when settling exposed live-capital rescues). Use for swap or leverage math; use ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall for raw calldata.
Annotations the server declares
- title: DeFi Slippage, MEV & Liquidation Math Guard
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossierAudits 1-20 interdependent Solidity contracts (contracts array of {name, code}, required; optional protocolName and tvlTargetUsd=1000000) for cross-contract read-only reentrancy, c…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits 1-20 interdependent Solidity contracts (contracts array of {name, code}, required; optional protocolName and tvlTargetUsd=1000000) for cross-contract read-only reentrancy, centralization, and 6 ERC-4626/oracle invariants. Strictly read-only: pass optional contractAddress, chainId (8453 Base default, 42161, 10, 137, 1), and ownerTreasury to verify live RPC TVL and build unsigned EIP-5792/EOA Safe-Harbor rescue steps (90%-95% to ownerTreasury). Set tier to FULL ($12.00 USDC, default) for call-graph and findings or ESSENTIAL ($3.50 USDC) for score and counts; unpaid returns isError: true, empty contracts throws -32602, and CRITICAL/HIGH patches stay sealed until 0.15% SLA or 5%-10% rescue settlement. Use for multi-file protocols; use ingravity_auditSolidityContract for single files or ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty without source.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Multi-Contract DeFi Protocol Auditor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypotAudits an ERC-20 token for honeypots, hidden mints, blacklists, abusive taxes, paused swaps, and stealth proxies using deployed tokenAddress (live 5-EVM RPC bytecode scan), pre-dep…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits an ERC-20 token for honeypots, hidden mints, blacklists, abusive taxes, paused swaps, and stealth proxies using deployed tokenAddress (live 5-EVM RPC bytecode scan), pre-deploy Solidity code, or both (omitting both returns -32602). Read-only across chainId (default 8453 Base; tokenName labels the output), returning verdict, canSell, rugProbabilityScore (0-100), and PROCEED/CAUTION/ABORT. Set tier to FULL ($0.12 USDC, default) for evidence and sellSimulation, or ESSENTIAL ($0.04 USDC) for verdict scalars only; unpaid calls return isError: true (0.15% SLA or 5%-10% Safe-Harbor split applies to live-TVL rescue fixes). Use before swapping tokens; use ingravity_auditSolidityContract for general Solidity source.
Annotations the server declares
- title: ERC-20 Token Rugpull & Honeypot Scanner
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBountySimulates flash-loan drain vectors, oracle slot0/reserve exposure, and live on-chain TVL across five EVM chains for a target protocol (protocolName required; poolAddress defaults t…Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.poolAddress.default contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.poolAddress.default: "0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da"
- Warn
The server marks "ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulates flash-loan drain vectors, oracle slot0/reserve exposure, and live on-chain TVL across five EVM chains for a target protocol (protocolName required; poolAddress defaults to Base Aerodrome address when omitted, tvlUsd defaults to 250000). Strictly read-only: reads live RPC liquidity and optional Solidity code to compute exploitImmunityScore and unsigned EIP-5792/EOA Safe-Harbor rescue calldata (90%-95% to optional ownerTreasury, 5%-10% whitehat bounty on rescue only) without transferring funds. Set tier to FULL ($45.00 USDC, default) for flashLoanSimulation and rescue bundle or ESSENTIAL ($9.50 USDC) for vulnerabilitySeverity and score; unpaid calls return isError: true and CRITICAL/HIGH PoCs stay sealed under Anti-Bypass. Use for live pool exploitability and rescue planning; use ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier for multi-file codebase audits.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Flash-Loan Exploit Simulator & Safe-Harbor Planner
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
ingravity_fastPingAddressSafetyChecks whether a single EVM address (0x...) is SAFE, DANGER, or UNKNOWN_UNVERIFIED_RPC across five chains (chainId: 8453 Base default, 42161 Arbitrum, 10 Optimism, 137 Polygon, 1 E…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ingravity_fastPingAddressSafety" says "ping": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Checks whether a single EVM address (0x...) is SAFE, DANGER, or UNKNOWN_UNVERIFIED_RPC across five chains (chainId: 8453 Base default, 42161 Arbitrum, 10 Optimism, 137 Polygon, 1 Ethereum; unknown IDs fall back to 8453). Strictly read-only, returning only a binary status and PROCEED/ABORT/CAUTION action with zero forensic leakage. Costs $0.01 USDC flat on Base via x402 v2; unpaid calls return isError: true with the payment challenge. Best for <=$0.05 bot budgets; escalate to ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot for tokens or ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall before signing calldata.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Fast EVM Address Safety Ping
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewallSimulates pre-sign EVM calldata (to, data, optional from and wei value defaulting to '0') across five chains (chainId default 8453 Base) to block drainers before wallet signing.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall" says "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulates pre-sign EVM calldata (to, data, optional from and wei value defaulting to '0') across five chains (chainId default 8453 Base) to block drainers before wallet signing. Strictly read-only: decodes ERC-20 approve, NFT setApprovalForAll, EIP-2612/Permit2 signatures, and recursive multicall while reading live RPC bytecode and EIP-1967/1167 slots to return SAFE/WARNING/BLOCK_DRAINER (PROCEED/CAUTION/ABORT) and unsigned revocation calldata. Costs $0.10 USDC on Base via x402 v2 (unpaid returns isError: true); active critical compromises require 0.15% SLA or 5%-10% Safe-Harbor bounty settlement to unmask spender coordinates. Call before signing transactions; use ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot for token due diligence without calldata.
Annotations the server declares
- title: EVM Transaction Firewall
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://red-shape-1b3b.daviddelmoral79.workers.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://red-shape-1b3b.daviddelmoral79.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including ingravity_auditSolidityContract (write), ingravity_computeDefiSlippageAndLiquidation (write), ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot (write), ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier (write), ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "ingravity_auditSolidityContract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
The server marks "ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
The server marks "ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier" says "generate": a word for a change.
The input schema at properties.poolAddress.default contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.poolAddress.default: "0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da"
The server marks "ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ingravity-security https://red-shape-1b3b.daviddelmoral79.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ingravity-security https://red-shape-1b3b.daviddelmoral79.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_fastPingAddressSafety",
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_auditSolidityContract",
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_computeDefiSlippageAndLiquidation",
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot",
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier",
"mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ingravity-security. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_fastPingAddressSafety untrusted-input
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_auditSolidityContract untrusted-input
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall untrusted-input
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot untrusted-input
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier untrusted-input
- mcp__ingravity-security__ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.DMS1979/ingravity-security/verify?hash=5897ad3d16637806af4578adbe40bfde0f6817073339656964fb167d0e8b0e6b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5897ad3d1663, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.DMS1979/ingravity-security/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.DMS1979/ingravity-security)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 5 write, 2 read. ingravity_auditSolidityContract, ingravity_computeDefiSlippageAndLiquidation, ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot, ingravity_generateMultiContractProtocolDossier, ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty, ingravity_fastPingAddressSafety and ingravity_inspectEvmTransactionFirewall.
Does the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Ingravity Autonomous EVM Security & DeFi Guard (x402 v2) MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.