Skip to content

Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server

io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcpDjangodestreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Read Sjothr company fundraising campaigns on Base: USDC raises, rules, refunds and guides.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server can do

The Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server is published by the GitHub account Djangode. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: sjothr_campaigns, sjothr_campaign and sjothr_rules), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (sjothr_campaigns, sjothr_campaign, sjothr_rules and 2 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • sjothr_campaignPublic record of one Sjothr campaign by campaign id: token, vault, funding goal, capital raised, deadline, state and dossier reference.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public record of one Sjothr campaign by campaign id: token, vault, funding goal, capital raised, deadline, state and dossier reference.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sjothr_campaignsPublic fundraising campaigns on Sjothr: company token, state, funding goal and capital raised in USDC, deadline and public record page.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public fundraising campaigns on Sjothr: company token, state, funding goal and capital raised in USDC, deadline and public record page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sjothr_rulesRules of a Sjothr raise: who pays which fee, how capital is released in stages by token-holder votes, when backers are refunded, and the risks.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Rules of a Sjothr raise: who pays which fee, how capital is released in stages by token-holder votes, when backers are refunded, and the risks.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • fetchFull record of one Sjothr campaign or full text of one guide, by id (from search).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full record of one Sjothr campaign or full text of one guide, by id (from search).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://sjothr.xyz/api/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including sjothr_campaigns (write), sjothr_campaign (write), sjothr_rules (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sjothr https://sjothr.xyz/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http sjothr https://sjothr.xyz/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sjothr__search",
      "mcp__sjothr__fetch"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sjothr__sjothr_campaigns",
      "mcp__sjothr__sjothr_campaign",
      "mcp__sjothr__sjothr_rules"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sjothr. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__sjothr__sjothr_campaigns untrusted-input
  • mcp__sjothr__sjothr_campaign untrusted-input
  • mcp__sjothr__sjothr_rules untrusted-input
  • mcp__sjothr__search untrusted-input
  • mcp__sjothr__fetch untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcp/verify?hash=f61bf6f677b28234c2ea8e8b46b7b8c8b76972e2ad03d7512dafe90b21f1ec74" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f61bf6f677b2, from Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Djangode/sjothr-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. sjothr_campaigns, sjothr_campaign, sjothr_rules, search and fetch.

Does the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Sjothr company tokenization and fundraising MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.