EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server
io.github.Ethersflow/EthersFlowEthersflowstreamable-httpv0.3.3Scanned
Trust gate for AI agents: multi-model adversarial consensus, signed and verifiable verdicts.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server can do
The EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account Ethersflow. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_agent_action), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in.
Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 0.3.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
verify_agent_actionGate and verify autonomous AI agent action decisions (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Gate and verify autonomous AI agent action decisions (e.g. trades, emails, claims, API calls) via EthersFlow Multi-Model Federated Adversarial Consensus before execution.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:57 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- no
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint asks for credentials (HTTP 200) but publishes no RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: no resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate and no document at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.ethersflow.com/api/mcp: initialize answered HTTP 200, without a WWW-Authenticate header
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
- Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 0; Protocol version: 2024-11-05 -> none (and 1 more).View diff
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
- Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ethersflow https://www.ethersflow.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http ethersflow https://www.ethersflow.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__ethersflow__verify_agent_action"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ethersflow. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Ethersflow/EthersFlow/verify?hash=3f001c93e50db2ab020aaf917bc464704123199b7f285ada28fbe8a797a55b8f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3f001c93e50d, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:02 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Ethersflow/EthersFlow/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Ethersflow/EthersFlow)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. verify_agent_action.
Does the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 200 without credentials, and no OAuth protected resource metadata was found.
Does the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the EthersFlow — Trust Gate for AI Agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.