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aether-developer MCP server

io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developerEvidInveststreamable-httpv0.3.4Scanned

Cited search over SEC filings, earnings transcripts and EU regulation, with fetch mode. 14 tools.

14 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the aether-developer MCP server can do

The aether-developer MCP server is published by the GitHub account EvidInvest. It has 14 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (seller_publish_document) and create or change data (4 tools: holdings_by_security, holdings_by_manager, seller_signup and seller_register_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (partner_search and seller_list_my_documents); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (partner_proxy_search); 3 tools can send data out of your system (partner_proxy_search, seller_publish_document and seller_register_endpoint). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (long-description and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.3.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

14 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • seller_publish_documentPublish (or update) a document into the marketplace.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "seller_publish_document" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "seller_publish_document" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publish (or update) a document into the marketplace. The content is chunked + embedded + indexed by a background worker; status moves from `pending` to `indexed` once that completes. Re-publishing the same external_doc_id replaces the prior version. Account must be status='active' for the worker to index; pending_review accounts queue indefinitely.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Publish a seller document
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • holdings_by_managerWhat a fund owns: an institutional manager's reported equity book from SEC Form 13F — top positions by value, with quarter-over-quarter share changes and new/increased/decreased fl…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What a fund owns: an institutional manager's reported equity book from SEC Form 13F — top positions by value, with quarter-over-quarter share changes and new/increased/decreased flags. Answers 'what does Bridgewater hold', 'what did this fund buy last quarter', 'show me their largest positions'. Look up by manager name (partial match; the largest matching filer wins, since names like 'Vanguard' map to several distinct CIKs) or by exact CIK. Also returns the filer's published contact details — signatory, title, phone, and business address from the filing's cover page and signature block, each citable to the accession number. EDGAR publishes no email address for 13F filers, so none is returned and none should be inferred. Coverage: quarter ends from 2024-12-31 on; the newest quarter loads daily as filings land, before its 45-day deadline. A manager who has not filed it yet returns `coverage.status: not_yet_filed` with their most recent quarter's book, named in coverage_caveat — never present those positions as the newer quarter. 13F covers US-listed long equity and options only — no shorts, cash, bonds or non-US listings — and is filed 45 days after quarter end, so it is a lagged snapshot, not a live portfolio.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: A fund's reported equity book (13F)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • holdings_by_securityWho owns a stock: institutional holders of a security from SEC Form 13F, ranked by position value, with quarter-over-quarter share changes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Who owns a stock: institutional holders of a security from SEC Form 13F, ranked by position value, with quarter-over-quarter share changes. Answers 'who are the largest holders of NVDA', 'which funds added or trimmed this quarter', 'did anyone initiate a new position'. Give a ticker (resolved via CUSIP) or a CUSIP directly. Each holder row carries its accession number and an EDGAR source_url so the figure is verifiable against the primary filing. Coverage: quarter ends from 2024-12-31 on, all ~10,000 filing managers, not just large ones. The newest quarter loads daily as filings land, BEFORE its 45-day deadline, so it can be partial: the `coverage` object gives deadline, complete (false until deadline + 2 business days), filers_loaded vs prior_quarter_filers for this security, and a quality_caveat while partial — repeat that caveat when you report the result. Quarter-over-quarter (`direction`, `change_shares`, and the `qoq` roll-up with new/increased/decreased/exited counts and the largest exits) compares only filers that filed BOTH quarters, so a holder that has not filed yet is never counted as a seller. Positions are aggregated per filer CIK — a single 13F contains one line per sub-manager (BlackRock's carries 42 separate NVDA lines), so per-line reading understates holders badly. One book per filer: the original 13F-HR, or the 13F-HR/A RESTATEMENT that replaced it (add-on amendments are excluded); values are USD even where the filer reported in thousands. Note total_value_usd is the sum across filers and may double-count where combination reports include other managers' holdings; coverage_caveat flags this when relevant. 13F covers US-listed long equity and options only — it does not show shorts, cash, bonds, or non-US listings, and is filed 45 days after quarter end.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Institutional holders of a stock (13F)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • seller_register_endpointRegister a proxy endpoint (Mode B).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a proxy endpoint (Mode B). Aether stores your auth secret encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM) and routes agent queries server-to-server — agents never see your URL or token. Charge per call via the `price_per_call_usd_cents` field. Account must be status='active' for traffic to be routed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register a seller endpoint
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • seller_signupCreate a new marketplace seller account.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a new marketplace seller account. Returns an API key (shown once). New accounts default to status='pending_review' — they can publish documents and register endpoints, but content is not surfaced in search until ops approves the account. Use the `invite_code` arg if the operator gave you one to bypass review.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register as a data seller
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • list_partnersList active marketplace partners (sellers) and what each offers.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_partners" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List active marketplace partners (sellers) and what each offers. Each partner has zero or more 'modes': `indexed` (free queries via partner_search against published documents) and/or `proxy` (queries routed server-to-server to the seller's own API via partner_proxy_search, consuming prepaid Aether credits per call). Use the returned per-call credit costs to budget calls before invoking partner_proxy_search.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List data partners
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • seller_list_my_documentsList documents this seller has published.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "seller_list_my_documents" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "seller_list_my_documents" says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List documents this seller has published. Returns status (pending / indexed / failed / revoked) and the indexed chunk count (`indexed_chunk_count`; the legacy alias `vespa_chunk_count` carries the same value for one release).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List my published documents
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • seller_list_my_endpointsList proxy endpoints this seller has registered.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "seller_list_my_endpoints" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List proxy endpoints this seller has registered. Secrets are never returned — only a `secret_configured` boolean.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List my registered endpoints
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__aether-developer__partner_proxy_search"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:57 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://aether.evidinvest.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://aether.evidinvest.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://aether.evidinvest.com/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including seller_publish_document (irreversible), holdings_by_security (write), holdings_by_manager (write), seller_signup (write), seller_register_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info
  • Infosearch

    The description is 2,249 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...ns do not go through search at all: holdings_by_security and holdings_by_manager."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...s of result count). Aether holds seller credentials — agent never sees URL or token. Pass `..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http aether-developer https://aether.evidinvest.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http aether-developer https://aether.evidinvest.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__aether-developer__search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__financial_search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__transcript_search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__regulation_search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__list_partners",
      "mcp__aether-developer__partner_search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__seller_list_my_documents",
      "mcp__aether-developer__seller_list_my_endpoints"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__aether-developer__holdings_by_security",
      "mcp__aether-developer__holdings_by_manager",
      "mcp__aether-developer__partner_proxy_search",
      "mcp__aether-developer__seller_signup",
      "mcp__aether-developer__seller_publish_document",
      "mcp__aether-developer__seller_register_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aether-developer. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__aether-developer__partner_search private-data
  • mcp__aether-developer__partner_proxy_search untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__aether-developer__seller_publish_document outbound
  • mcp__aether-developer__seller_register_endpoint outbound
  • mcp__aether-developer__seller_list_my_documents private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developer/verify?hash=5b04a1171c39fd5a6c6d54395af6442713bfd2b768ab6efa3eede71fa1e3545d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 5b04a1171c39, from Nov 15, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.EvidInvest/aether-developer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:15 UTC.

aether-developer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the aether-developer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the aether-developer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the aether-developer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: seller_publish_document.

What tools does the aether-developer MCP server have?

14 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 9 read. seller_publish_document, holdings_by_security, holdings_by_manager, seller_signup, seller_register_endpoint, search, financial_search, transcript_search and 6 more.

Does the aether-developer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the aether-developer MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): partner_proxy_search, seller_publish_document and seller_register_endpoint.

Has the aether-developer MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 15, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.