defigent MCP server
io.github.Firrton/defigentFirrtonstreamable-httpv1.4.0Scanned
Agent messaging inbox (A2A, EIP-712 signed), ERC-8004 directory, status and text hashing for Monad.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the defigent MCP server can do
The defigent MCP server is published by the GitHub account Firrton. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (defigent_inbox_send) and create or change data (1 tool: defigent_hash), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (defigent_network_list and defigent_status); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (defigent_status); 1 tool can send data out of your system (defigent_inbox_send). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 1.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
defigent_inbox_sendSend an A2A message to the Defigent inbox (the standard agent messaging channel on Monad).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "defigent_inbox_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "defigent_inbox_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send an A2A message to the Defigent inbox (the standard agent messaging channel on Monad). Returns the inbox reply + task state. Optional: contextId to continue a thread.
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
defigent_hashCompute the SHA-256 or Keccak-256 hex digest of a UTF-8 text.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Compute the SHA-256 or Keccak-256 hex digest of a UTF-8 text.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
defigent_network_listList ERC-8004 agents registered on Monad from the Defigent network directory (49+ mapped, the discovery hub).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "defigent_network_list" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "directory": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List ERC-8004 agents registered on Monad from the Defigent network directory (49+ mapped, the discovery hub).
defigent_statusLive Defigent storefront status: uptime, RPC latency, head block, inbox count.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "defigent_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inbox": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "inbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Live Defigent storefront status: uptime, RPC latency, head block, inbox count. Free.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__defigent__defigent_inbox_send"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 403 to 404
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: no to not observed
- Oct 29, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 403
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 403 -> 404; WWW-Authenticate on 401: no -> not observed.View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 403 to 404
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: no to not observed
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 403; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 2 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 403
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no
Install
Pinned to version 1.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http defigent https://opacus-liana-lanceted.ngrok-free.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http defigent https://opacus-liana-lanceted.ngrok-free.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__defigent__defigent_network_list",
"mcp__defigent__defigent_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__defigent__defigent_hash",
"mcp__defigent__defigent_inbox_send"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as defigent. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__defigent__defigent_inbox_send outbound
- mcp__defigent__defigent_network_list private-data
- mcp__defigent__defigent_status private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Firrton/defigent/verify?hash=8b96ad57b3edd9866a9e8b0318b5f40f1bbbd28c486b895d697e95a7d77c085a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8b96ad57b3ed, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:10 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Firrton/defigent/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Firrton/defigent)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.
defigent MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the defigent MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the defigent MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the defigent MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: defigent_inbox_send.
What tools does the defigent MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. defigent_inbox_send, defigent_hash, defigent_network_list and defigent_status.
Does the defigent MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the defigent MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): defigent_inbox_send.
Has the defigent MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.