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citeguard MCP server

io.github.Franksterino/citeguardFranksterinostreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Verify citations in AI text: fetches each cited source, returns verdicts with evidence quotes.

3 tools: 3 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the citeguard MCP server can do

The citeguard MCP server is published by the GitHub account Franksterino. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: verify_claims, check_document and check_links), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_documentAudit every citation in a markdown/plain-text document: extracts claim+source pairs (markdown links, footnotes, DOIs, bare URLs), verifies each against the fetched source, and retu…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit every citation in a markdown/plain-text document: extracts claim+source pairs (markdown links, footnotes, DOIs, bare URLs), verifies each against the fetched source, and returns a report with a citation integrity score (0-100).
  • verify_claimsVerify claim+source pairs: fetches each cited URL and returns a per-claim verdict (supported / partially_supported / contradicted / unsupported / uncertain / could_not_fetch) with …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify claim+source pairs: fetches each cited URL and returns a per-claim verdict (supported / partially_supported / contradicted / unsupported / uncertain / could_not_fetch) with a quoted evidence span from the source.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
429
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 429.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 429
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 429; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 429
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http citeguard https://citeguard.boundy.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http citeguard https://citeguard.boundy.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__citeguard__verify_claims",
      "mcp__citeguard__check_document",
      "mcp__citeguard__check_links"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as citeguard. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Franksterino/citeguard/verify?hash=22be412faba0ad423992aa1eb5e5d3946fea21646631a4ad5a0e6698d21cb19a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 22be412faba0, from Nov 15, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Franksterino/citeguard/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Franksterino/citeguard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Franksterino/citeguard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Franksterino/citeguard)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.

citeguard MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the citeguard MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the citeguard MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the citeguard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the citeguard MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 write. verify_claims, check_document and check_links.

Does the citeguard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the citeguard MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the citeguard MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.