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humanizer MCP server

io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizerGPTHuman-aistreamable-httpv1.0.4Scanned

Transform AI-generated text into natural, human-sounding content that bypasses AI detectors.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the humanizer MCP server can do

The humanizer MCP server is published by the GitHub account GPTHuman-ai. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: humanize_text), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (humanize_text).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 2, 2026, version 1.0.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • humanize_textTransforms AI-generated text into a more natural, human-sounding variant while preserving the requested tone and rewrite mode.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Transforms AI-generated text into a more natural, human-sounding variant while preserving the requested tone and rewrite mode. Input must be at least 300 characters and must not exceed 2,000 words.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Humanize AI-Generated Text into a more natural, human-sounding variant while preserving the requested tone and rewrite mode.
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
401
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
no
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint asks for credentials (HTTP 401) but publishes no RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: no resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate and no document at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.

    Matched text

    https://api.gpthuman.ai/mcp: initialize answered HTTP 401, without a WWW-Authenticate header

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 401; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 0 (and 2 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http humanizer https://api.gpthuman.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http humanizer https://api.gpthuman.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__humanizer__humanize_text"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as humanizer. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__humanizer__humanize_text untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizer/verify?hash=b5e29dfa9242a14c9ae93d3dd65fd76700974e359a24723ee9846593335f083f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b5e29dfa9242, from Nov 2, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.GPTHuman-ai/humanizer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.

humanizer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the humanizer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the humanizer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the humanizer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the humanizer MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. humanize_text.

Does the humanizer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and no OAuth protected resource metadata was found.

Does the humanizer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the humanizer MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.