AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server
io.github.Har50/gatewayHar50streamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned
Monetization and execution gateway for autonomous AI agents on Base Mainnet
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server can do
The AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server is published by the GitHub account Har50. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: execute_onchain_intent) and create or change data (2 tools: dry_run_simulation and issue_session_key). 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (execute_onchain_intent and dry_run_simulation).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
execute_onchain_intentSimulates and executes a gasless, sponsored Web3 transaction on Base L2 (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "execute_onchain_intent" says "execute": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulates and executes a gasless, sponsored Web3 transaction on Base L2 (e.g. token swaps, transfers) against operator-allowlisted targets. Simulates before broadcasting: Tenderly when the operator has it enabled, otherwise an RPC gas estimate plus a USDC amount cap. Requires an API key. When the operator charges for execution, the first call returns the x402 USDC payment requirements; sign that EIP-3009 authorization locally (never send a private key) and call again with paymentSignature. Payment settles only after the target and simulation checks pass, and only for the exact price.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Execute on-chain intent
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
dry_run_simulationSimulates a transaction without broadcasting: on Tenderly when the operator has it enabled (gas and balance changes), otherwise an RPC gas estimate only.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "dry_run_simulation" says "run": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "dry_run_simulation" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "dry_run_simulation" says "run": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulates a transaction without broadcasting: on Tenderly when the operator has it enabled (gas and balance changes), otherwise an RPC gas estimate only. Works without an API key (rate-limited per client) unless the operator disables public simulation.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Dry-run simulation
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
issue_session_keyIssue a scoped session key (time limit, USDC spend cap, target whitelist) enforced by the gateway; ZeroDev on-chain permissions only when the operator configures them.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Issue a scoped session key (time limit, USDC spend cap, target whitelist) enforced by the gateway; ZeroDev on-chain permissions only when the operator configures them. Requires an API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Issue session key
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_smart_account_infoRetrieves the Agent Owner EOA address and Safe Smart Wallet address on Base, and whether the Safe is deployed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_smart_account_info" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieves the Agent Owner EOA address and Safe Smart Wallet address on Base, and whether the Safe is deployed. Works without an API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get smart account info
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including execute_onchain_intent (destructive), dry_run_simulation (write), issue_session_key (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "dry_run_simulation" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "dry_run_simulation" says "run": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
- Changed:dry_run_simulationChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:execute_onchain_intentDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_smart_account_infoOnly readsdescription
- Changed:issue_session_keyChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http gateway https://api.agentexec.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http gateway https://api.agentexec.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__gateway__get_smart_account_info"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__gateway__dry_run_simulation",
"mcp__gateway__issue_session_key"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__gateway__execute_onchain_intent"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gateway. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__gateway__execute_onchain_intent untrusted-input
- mcp__gateway__dry_run_simulation untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Har50/gateway/verify?hash=30a5e913c9b3c8639ad8251b2050dc364afff87ff357d653e3b957fba666fd96" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 30a5e913c9b3, from Nov 15, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Har50/gateway/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Har50/gateway)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: execute_onchain_intent.
Can the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. execute_onchain_intent, dry_run_simulation, issue_session_key and get_smart_account_info.
Does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.