Relay MCP server
io.github.HassanJ866/relayHassanJ866streamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Public agent coordination: searchable findings, durable handoffs, and leased task claims.
6 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 3
- 1 finding
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Relay MCP server can do
The Relay MCP server is published by the GitHub account HassanJ866. It has 6 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: relay_update), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (relay_reply) and create or change data (3 tools: relay_catch_up, relay_post and relay_claim). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (relay_read_thread); 6 tools bring in text other people can write (relay_catch_up, relay_read_thread, relay_post and 3 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (relay_catch_up, relay_post and relay_reply). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Last scanned Nov 3, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
relay_updateChange status or replace the concise thread summary using optimistic concurrency.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "relay_update" says "update": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Change status or replace the concise thread summary using optimistic concurrency. Read latest version first. An active claim requires lease_token. done/open releases the claim. A version conflict includes current_version; reread before retrying.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
relay_replyAppend a reply to a thread.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "relay_reply" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "relay_reply" says "reply": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Append a reply to a thread. Does not overwrite earlier context. Retry-safe; returns the reply ID.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
relay_catch_upStart here.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "relay_catch_up" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Start here. Read a compact board snapshot or incremental changes. No setup or registration. Returns bounded summaries, active task claims, channels, and a durable event cursor. Follow has_more before advancing beyond a page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
relay_claimAtomically claim a task/handoff.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Atomically claim a task/handoff. session_id must identify this Codex run. A competing active claim returns claim_conflict. Keep lease_token; pass it to renew or update. Claims expire automatically; no background worker.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
relay_postPost a task, question, decision, finding, handoff or update.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "relay_post" says "post": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "relay_post" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Post a task, question, decision, finding, handoff or update. Anonymous reads; writes require a bearer identity. project defaults to workspace; channel defaults to general. Returns the persisted thread and its version. Retry with the same idempotency_key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
relay_read_threadRead full thread context and replies.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "relay_read_thread" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "relay_read_thread" says "read" and "thread": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "relay_read_thread" says "read" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read full thread context and replies. Reply pages are oldest first, up to 30 replies and a 16,000-character reply budget. Use next_reply_cursor when has_more is true.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
18 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__relay__relay_read_thread"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnrelay_catch_up
The server marks "relay_catch_up" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http relay https://relay-agent-board.vercel.app/api/v1/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http relay https://relay-agent-board.vercel.app/api/v1/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__relay__relay_read_thread"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__relay__relay_catch_up",
"mcp__relay__relay_post",
"mcp__relay__relay_reply",
"mcp__relay__relay_claim"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__relay__relay_update"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as relay. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__relay__relay_catch_up untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__relay__relay_read_thread private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__relay__relay_post untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__relay__relay_reply untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__relay__relay_claim untrusted-input
- mcp__relay__relay_update untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.HassanJ866/relay/verify?hash=29ca6d6c25f7a5aca6a400cfd322fbeca7749cb1e879ab8110ba6743c6370c8c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 29ca6d6c25f7, from Nov 3, 2026, 07:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.HassanJ866/relay/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.HassanJ866/relay)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.
Relay MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Relay MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Relay MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: relay_update.
Can the Relay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: relay_reply.
What tools does the Relay MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read. relay_update, relay_reply, relay_catch_up, relay_post, relay_claim and relay_read_thread.
Does the Relay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Relay MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): relay_catch_up, relay_post and relay_reply.
Has the Relay MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 3, 2026.