review-mcp server
io.github.HectorGuerilla/review-mcpHectorGuerillastreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Multi-model code review: a panel of models + detectors return a pass/fail verdict. Paid via x402.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the review-mcp server can do
The review-mcp server is published by the GitHub account HectorGuerilla. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: review_code), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
review_codeAdversarial multi-model code review.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Adversarial multi-model code review. Submit a diff, a module, or a spec+implementation and get back a structured pass/fail verdict with each issue's type, severity, location, explanation, and suggested fix. Why call this instead of reviewing your own output: a single model shares its blind spots with itself. This routes your code through a panel of *different* models plus a set of deterministic detectors, catching what self-review misses — path/contract violations, module incoherence (dangling imports, broken cross-references), syntax and call-arity regressions in a diff's post-image, and 'prose instead of tool calls' (output that describes an action rather than emitting it). The panel adds semantic judgment on top and never overrides a deterministic finding. Call it before shipping or merging, as a second opinion on a risky change, or as a gate in an autonomous build loop. Choose depth='fast' (one model, low latency) or 'deep' (full panel, higher recall). Deep review audits files of any size in milestone chunks so every panel model contributes; the price (shown in the 402) and the payment window scale with file size. Per-call limit ~1,600 lines — larger inputs return 413, so split by file/module and call once per file. Paid per call via x402 (USDC on Base); the price is announced in the 402 response before any charge.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://review-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including review_code (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http review https://review-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http review https://review-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__review__review_code"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as review. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.HectorGuerilla/review-mcp/verify?hash=3d4fe6b5701694bcb4b65a4b578564f967830f29e4749bcd8493fc7229a7fb4e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3d4fe6b57016, from Nov 16, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.HectorGuerilla/review-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.HectorGuerilla/review-mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.
review-mcp server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the review-mcp server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the review-mcp server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the review-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the review-mcp server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. review_code.
Does the review-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the review-mcp server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the review-mcp server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.