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SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server

io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-complianceINJprotocolstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

AML/CFT compliance oracle: wallet screening, sanctions, PEPs, jurisdiction risk.

12 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 8 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 7 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server can do

The SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server is published by the GitHub account INJprotocol. It has 12 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: cancel_watchlist_monitor), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (screen_cross_border_payment) and create or change data (8 tools: screen_entity, screen_wallet, run_due_diligence, create_travel_rule_packet and 4 more). 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search_mauritius_registry); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (search_mauritius_registry, create_watchlist_monitor, check_watchlist_monitors and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (create_watchlist_monitor). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 7 findings (base64-blob, annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • cancel_watchlist_monitorPermanently stop a watchlist monitor: re-screening ends, its webhook URL is deleted and later checks report status cancelled.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "cancel_watchlist_monitor" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...the monitor was created: it is the only credential, so anyone holding it can cancel the mo..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Permanently stop a watchlist monitor: re-screening ends, its webhook URL is deleted and later checks report status cancelled. It cannot be resumed; create a new monitor with create_watchlist_monitor instead. Use it when monitoring is no longer needed or the webhook endpoint is retired; to read a monitor's status use check_watchlist_monitors. Pass the MON- id returned when the monitor was created: it is the only credential, so anyone holding it can cancel the monitor. Free, limited to 30 calls per minute per client.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cancel a Watchlist Monitor (Free)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • screen_cross_border_paymentScreen both parties of a payment before it is sent: sender and receiver names against global watchlists, their countries' AML risk, and an optional Bank of Mauritius exchange rate …1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "screen_cross_border_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "screen_cross_border_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "screen_cross_border_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen both parties of a payment before it is sent: sender and receiver names against global watchlists, their countries' AML risk, and an optional Bank of Mauritius exchange rate for the corridor (set currency_from; currency_to defaults to MUR). Returns PROCEED (risk score below 15), REVIEW (15-39, minor indicators such as partial name matches), FLAG (40-74, enhanced due diligence) or BLOCK (75+, e.g. an exact sanctions match: stop and escalate), with a reason and each party's risk. Use it for fiat or crypto payments where you have names; use screen_wallet for wallet addresses only, and create_travel_rule_packet for a stored, verifiable Travel Rule record. The result states when each list was last updated (lists_as_of). Costs $0.008 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Pre-Screen a Cross-Border Payment
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • check_watchlist_monitorsRead the status of watchlist monitors created with create_watchlist_monitor.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_watchlist_monitors" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the status of watchlist monitors created with create_watchlist_monitor. With exactly one id, the target is re-screened against the latest lists right now (and its webhook fires if the status changed); with 2-20 ids, the stored statuses from the last 6-hourly re-screen are returned without re-screening. Use one id when you need a fresh answer before acting and several ids for a periodic sweep; for a name or wallet without a monitor use screen_entity or screen_wallet, and to stop monitoring use cancel_watchlist_monitor. Unknown ids are reported as not found. Costs $0.001 USDC for one id or $0.002 for 2-20 ids via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check Watchlist Monitor Statuses
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • create_travel_rule_packetScreen the originator and beneficiary of a crypto transfer (wallets, plus names and countries when given) and store the result as a Travel Rule packet.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_travel_rule_packet" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen the originator and beneficiary of a crypto transfer (wallets, plus names and countries when given) and store the result as a Travel Rule packet. The strictest threshold among the parties' countries applies (EU/EEA 0, Japan about 700, otherwise the FATF Recommendation 16 de-minimis of 1,000 USD); pass amount_usd to learn whether it applies. Returns a packetId, a free verification URL and an EdDSA-signed attestation valid for 90 days for the counterparty VASP. Use it when a transfer needs a Travel Rule record; use screen_wallet for a quick address check, and verify_travel_rule_packet to check a packet you received. Each call stores a new packet; names are stored only as keyed hashes and never returned, wallet addresses are stored. Costs $0.005 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create a Verifiable Travel Rule Screening Packet
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • create_watchlist_monitorStart 30 days of watchlist monitoring for one wallet address (type wallet) or one person/company name (type entity): it is screened now, re-screened every 6 hours against the lates…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_watchlist_monitor" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start 30 days of watchlist monitoring for one wallet address (type wallet) or one person/company name (type entity): it is screened now, re-screened every 6 hours against the latest lists, and an optional HMAC-signed webhook (a public HTTPS URL) is called whenever its status changes between clear, review and alerted. Use it for ongoing monitoring after onboarding; use screen_entity or screen_wallet for a one-off check, check_watchlist_monitors to read statuses, and cancel_watchlist_monitor to stop. Each call creates a new monitor. The response contains the monitor id and, if a webhook is set, its signing secret, both shown only once: store them. Costs $0.010 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Monitor a Wallet or Name for 30 Days
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • run_due_diligenceProfile one person or company in a single call: global watchlist screening, AML risk of every country found in the hits, Mauritius registry records (with their FSC-licensing and PE…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "run_due_diligence" says "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "run_due_diligence" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "run_due_diligence" says "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Profile one person or company in a single call: global watchlist screening, AML risk of every country found in the hits, Mauritius registry records (with their FSC-licensing and PEP-role links), and a composite 0-100 risk score with its factors. Use it for onboarding (KYC/KYB) or enhanced due diligence; use screen_entity when a list check is enough and screen_cross_border_payment for both parties of a payment. Names match as case-insensitive substrings; exact matches weigh far more than partial ones, which alone only reach review level. Bank of Mauritius exchange rates are added when countries are found, unless include_forex is false. The score is a triage aid from public lists, not a legal determination. Limited to 10 calls per minute per client. The result states when each list was last updated (lists_as_of). Costs $0.010 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Run Entity Due Diligence with a Risk Score
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_entityScreen one person or organisation name, including aliases, against sanctions lists (US, EU, UK, UN, Canada, Australia and national lists aggregated by OpenSanctions), politically e…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen one person or organisation name, including aliases, against sanctions lists (US, EU, UK, UN, Canada, Australia and national lists aggregated by OpenSanctions), politically exposed persons, wanted persons (incl. Interpol Red Notices), development-bank and US debarments, crypto-linked entities, ransomware groups and OFAC-listed vessels. Use it for a quick list check of a name; use run_due_diligence for a scored profile with country and Mauritius registry context, search_mauritius_registry for Mauritius licences, offshore records and local PEPs, and screen_wallet for blockchain addresses. Matching is case-insensitive substring: each hit is labelled exact or partial, and partial hits need human review. The result states when each list was last updated (lists_as_of). Costs $0.002 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a Name Against Sanctions & Watchlists
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_walletCheck a blockchain address (any chain) against active sanctioned and frozen addresses: OFAC SDN, OpenSanctions, UK, Circle USDC and Tether USDT freeze lists, and Ransomwhere ransom…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...', '_' or '-' (e.g. 0x08723392Ed15743cc38513C4925f5e6be5c17243)"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a blockchain address (any chain) against active sanctioned and frozen addresses: OFAC SDN, OpenSanctions, UK, Circle USDC and Tether USDT freeze lists, and Ransomwhere ransomware wallets. Use it before sending or accepting funds; owner_name also screens the owner's name and returns a composite risk (critical when the address is listed, elevated when only the name matched). For names alone use screen_entity, for a Travel Rule record create_travel_rule_packet, and for an EVM agent's on-chain reputation verify_agent_identity. Matching is exact and case-insensitive on the full address: clear means the address itself is not listed, not that its counterparties are clean. The result states when each list was last updated (lists_as_of). Costs $0.001 USDC, or $0.003 with owner_name, via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a Crypto Wallet Address
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_agent_identityRun a Know-Your-Agent check on an AI agent's EVM wallet: ERC-8004 agent-registry lookup and operator, sanctions screening (result clear or sanctioned), on-chain behaviour (wallet a…Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...critical), and a signed W3C Verifiable Credential plus a sanctions-list Merkle proof that..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "verify_agent_identity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a Know-Your-Agent check on an AI agent's EVM wallet: ERC-8004 agent-registry lookup and operator, sanctions screening (result clear or sanctioned), on-chain behaviour (wallet age, activity, fund-flow taint, mixer and scam contacts, threat-intel alerts), a 0-100 risk score with its band (minimal, low, moderate, elevated, high or critical), and a signed W3C Verifiable Credential plus a sanctions-list Merkle proof that third parties can verify. Use it before paying, hiring or accepting payment from an autonomous agent, passing that agent's 0x wallet address; for an address on another chain, or a list-only check, use screen_wallet. Free, limited to 60 calls per minute per client; it reads public blockchain data live, so it can take several seconds and results change as the wallet transacts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify an AI Agent's Wallet (Know Your Agent, Free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_travel_rule_packetVerify a Travel Rule packet you received from a counterparty: returns its stored risk level, recommendation, flags, threshold result and masked wallet addresses.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a Travel Rule packet you received from a counterparty: returns its stored risk level, recommendation, flags, threshold result and masked wallet addresses. Pass the packet_id you received and, optionally, the originator and beneficiary names and wallet addresses you hold; each is compared with what was screened and reported only as match true/false, so names are never revealed. Use it on the beneficiary side after receiving a packetId; use create_travel_rule_packet to create one. Free, no payment needed, limited to 60 calls per minute per client; an unknown packet_id returns a not-found error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a Travel Rule Packet (Free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_jurisdiction_riskLook up one country's anti-money-laundering risk: FATF status (black/grey list), Basel AML Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, EU and US high-risk designations, tax-haven flag, an…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_jurisdiction_risk" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up one country's anti-money-laundering risk: FATF status (black/grey list), Basel AML Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, EU and US high-risk designations, tax-haven flag, and a derived risk level (critical, high, medium, low or standard). Use it to assess a counterparty's country or a payment corridor; it takes one country code per call, so check each end of a corridor separately. For a named person or company use run_due_diligence, which already assesses the countries found in its hits. A code not in the dataset returns found=false with risk_level unknown (a successful, charged call). Costs $0.001 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a Country's AML Risk Profile
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_mauritius_registrySearch Mauritius-specific records by name: Financial Services Commission licensees (category fsc_licensee), licensed banks, insurers, payment and other financial institutions (lice…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_mauritius_registry" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "database": it reads databases.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "mention": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Mauritius-specific records by name: Financial Services Commission licensees (category fsc_licensee), licensed banks, insurers, payment and other financial institutions (licensed_entity), offshore entities from the ICIJ leak databases (offshore_entity), local politically exposed persons (pep) and adverse-media mentions (adverse_media); omit category to search all. Use it for Mauritius counterparties or to confirm a licence; use screen_entity for global sanctions and watchlists, and run_due_diligence to combine both with a risk score. Case-insensitive substring match on the name; an offshore-leak or adverse-media record is a lead to investigate, not proof of wrongdoing. The result states when each list was last updated (lists_as_of). Costs $0.005 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base; unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired result and failed calls are not charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Mauritius Regulatory & Offshore Records
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__create_watchlist_monitor"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
10
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mru-oracle.com/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including cancel_watchlist_monitor (destructive), screen_cross_border_payment (irreversible), screen_entity (write), screen_wallet (write), run_due_diligence (write) and 5 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 warn2 info
  • The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...', '_' or '-' (e.g. 0x08723392Ed15743cc38513C4925f5e6be5c17243)"

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "run_due_diligence" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "run_due_diligence" says "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "screen_cross_border_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "screen_cross_border_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "check_watchlist_monitors" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "verify_agent_identity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...the monitor was created: it is the only credential, so anyone holding it can cancel the mo..."

    What this check looks for
Show 1 more finding

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sentinel-compliance https://mru-oracle.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http sentinel-compliance https://mru-oracle.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__get_jurisdiction_risk",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__search_mauritius_registry"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__screen_entity",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__screen_wallet",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__run_due_diligence",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__screen_cross_border_payment",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__create_travel_rule_packet",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__verify_travel_rule_packet",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__create_watchlist_monitor",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__check_watchlist_monitors",
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__verify_agent_identity"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__sentinel-compliance__cancel_watchlist_monitor"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sentinel-compliance. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__sentinel-compliance__search_mauritius_registry private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__sentinel-compliance__create_watchlist_monitor untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__sentinel-compliance__check_watchlist_monitors untrusted-input
  • mcp__sentinel-compliance__verify_agent_identity untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-compliance/verify?hash=05fa185a6e1da5879ebe1e2e6052e2ba6db58fca2265c33131cb08039840ad5c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 05fa185a6e1d, from Nov 15, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-compliance/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-compliance
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-compliance.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.INJprotocol/sentinel-compliance)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.

SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 7 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: cancel_watchlist_monitor.

Can the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: screen_cross_border_payment.

What tools does the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server have?

12 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read. cancel_watchlist_monitor, screen_cross_border_payment, screen_entity, screen_wallet, run_due_diligence, create_travel_rule_packet, verify_travel_rule_packet, create_watchlist_monitor and 4 more.

Does the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_watchlist_monitor.

Has the SENTINEL Compliance Intelligence MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.