jobstack-mcp server
io.github.IsaiahDupree/jobstack-mcpIsaiahDupreestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Unified jobs search over official feeds + ATS boards (USAJOBS, Adzuna, Muse, Greenhouse, Lever...)
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
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Import an OpenAPI spec →What the jobstack-mcp server can do
The jobstack-mcp server is published by the GitHub account IsaiahDupree. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (search_jobs and get_job).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 2, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_jobFetch one job posting by its source engine and native id, returned as { meta, job } with the same flat Job shape search_jobs yields.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one job posting by its source engine and native id, returned as { meta, job } with the same flat Job shape search_jobs yields. The id is the native upstream id as returned by that source in search results (NOT prefixed with the source name). Exception: for source="ats" the id is a composite "board:company:nativeId" string (e.g. "greenhouse:airbnb:7995153") so the lookup can round-trip to the right ATS board. Not every source supports single-job lookup — a search-only source returns a not_supported / not_found error.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
search_jobsSearch job postings across every configured source and merge the results into one flat Job shape.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_jobs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search job postings across every configured source and merge the results into one flat Job shape. Fans out in parallel to USAJOBS, Adzuna, Jooble, The Muse, Reed, and the ats engine (Greenhouse/Lever/Ashby/Workable/SmartRecruiters), then merges + sorts by postedDate (newest first) and paginates the combined set. Each Job has id, source, title, company, location, remote, url, description, postedDate, salaryMin, salaryMax, salaryCurrency, department, and employmentType. The response envelope carries meta, the echoed query, sources_requested, an optional sources_errored map, total, count, limit, offset, and results. Use sources= to restrict to specific engines.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:58 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
- Nov 13, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Protocol version: none -> 2025-06-18.View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 503; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Protocol version: 2025-06-18 -> none.View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http jobstack https://jobstack-mcp.vercel.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http jobstack https://jobstack-mcp.vercel.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__jobstack__search_jobs",
"mcp__jobstack__get_job"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as jobstack. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__jobstack__search_jobs untrusted-input
- mcp__jobstack__get_job untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.IsaiahDupree/jobstack-mcp/verify?hash=7e005d449d1dbd5f41ebaf286861ecf805f6333bac75a7d937f4cd3e173d4a7b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7e005d449d1d, from Nov 2, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.IsaiahDupree/jobstack-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.IsaiahDupree/jobstack-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:16 UTC.
jobstack-mcp server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the jobstack-mcp server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the jobstack-mcp server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the jobstack-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the jobstack-mcp server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. search_jobs and get_job.
Does the jobstack-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the jobstack-mcp server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the jobstack-mcp server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 2, 2026.