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GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server

io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheckLarryLemonBotstreamable-httpv0.1.3Scanned

One-cent x402 and MCP readiness checks plus fixed-price marketplace launch packs.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 5 findings, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server can do

The GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server is published by the GitHub account LarryLemonBot. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: boundary_guard_check, probe_x402_paid_path, check_agent_tool_readiness, generate_x402_launch_pack and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (boundary_guard_check, scan_x402_resource, probe_x402_paid_path and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (scan_x402_resource).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings, 1 of them high severity (annotation-conflict, sensitive-path and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.3.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • boundary_guard_checkCreate a deterministic, read-only pre-action receipt from request, policy, and optional result evidence.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "boundary_guard_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a deterministic, read-only pre-action receipt from request, policy, and optional result evidence. Use before an agent posts, spends, lists, or writes so the decision can be audited; no external action is executed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Boundary Guard Check
  • check_agent_tool_readinessGateCheck readiness: check whether an x402/agent-facing tool is ready for agent routing, marketplace listing, and paid-path monitoring, including public agent discovery surfaces (/…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "/.well-known/mcp.json".

      Matched text

      description: "...overy surfaces (/llms.txt, /agents.txt, /.well-known/mcp.json, /mcp). Pass target plus optional tier,..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    GateCheck readiness: check whether an x402/agent-facing tool is ready for agent routing, marketplace listing, and paid-path monitoring, including public agent discovery surfaces (/llms.txt, /agents.txt, /.well-known/mcp.json, /mcp). Pass target plus optional tier, marketplace_url, expected_resources, and paid_path; deep/report tiers add unpaid 402 probing when paid_path is supplied. Tiers: quick $1, deep $5, report $10.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: GateCheck Readiness
  • generate_trust_receiptGenerate a deterministic trust receipt from sanitized request/policy/result/payment summaries.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_trust_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.request.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.request.description: "...y to hash; omit raw prompts, documents, credentials, cookies, auth headers, signatures, and..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_trust_receipt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_trust_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a deterministic trust receipt from sanitized request/policy/result/payment summaries. Do not submit raw auth headers, cookies, API keys, private keys, payment signatures, payment response headers, customer prompts, customer documents, or payer-identifying evidence.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Trust Receipt
  • generate_x402_launch_packGenerate marketplace-safe launch assets for an x402/MCP seller: listing copy, buyer FAQ, checklist, approval packet, and claim boundaries.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_x402_launch_pack" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_x402_launch_pack" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_x402_launch_pack" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate marketplace-safe launch assets for an x402/MCP seller: listing copy, buyer FAQ, checklist, approval packet, and claim boundaries. Pass target plus optional product_name, audience, primary_use_case, marketplace_url, and paid_path; service/premium tiers include readiness evidence. Tiers: single $9, service $29, premium $49.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: x402 Launch Pack Generator
  • probe_x402_paid_pathProbe a public x402 paid endpoint without signing or paying, then parse the HTTP 402 challenge.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Probe a public x402 paid endpoint without signing or paying, then parse the HTTP 402 challenge. Pass target plus optional expected network/asset/price to verify payment metadata and receive a deterministic health receipt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: x402 Paid-Path Health Probe
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • scan_x402_resourceRead-only scan of a public API/provider URL for x402, OpenAPI, pricing, and agent-discovery metadata.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read-only scan of a public API/provider URL for x402, OpenAPI, pricing, and agent-discovery metadata. Pass url, and optionally marketplace_url plus expected_resources, to get a readiness score, issues, and fixes; no private endpoints are called.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: x402 Resource Scan

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://proofbeforepay.vercel.app/gatecheck/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including boundary_guard_check (write), probe_x402_paid_path (write), check_agent_tool_readiness (write), generate_x402_launch_pack (write), generate_trust_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high3 warn1 info
  • The description refers to "/.well-known/mcp.json".

    Matched text

    description: "...overy surfaces (/llms.txt, /agents.txt, /.well-known/mcp.json, /mcp). Pass target plus optional tier,..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "boundary_guard_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_x402_launch_pack" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_x402_launch_pack" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_trust_receipt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_trust_receipt" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.request.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.request.description: "...y to hash; omit raw prompts, documents, credentials, cookies, auth headers, signatures, and..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http gatecheck https://proofbeforepay.vercel.app/gatecheck/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http gatecheck https://proofbeforepay.vercel.app/gatecheck/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__gatecheck__boundary_guard_check",
      "mcp__gatecheck__scan_x402_resource",
      "mcp__gatecheck__probe_x402_paid_path",
      "mcp__gatecheck__check_agent_tool_readiness",
      "mcp__gatecheck__generate_x402_launch_pack",
      "mcp__gatecheck__generate_trust_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gatecheck. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__gatecheck__boundary_guard_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__gatecheck__scan_x402_resource untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gatecheck__probe_x402_paid_path untrusted-input
  • mcp__gatecheck__check_agent_tool_readiness untrusted-input
  • mcp__gatecheck__generate_x402_launch_pack untrusted-input
  • mcp__gatecheck__generate_trust_receipt untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheck/verify?hash=cd0556ff384715738d743991db69c28c833287303039f99d203d3840d6a8f7db" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash cd0556ff3847, from Nov 16, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheck/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheck
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheck.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.LarryLemonBot/gatecheck)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. boundary_guard_check, probe_x402_paid_path, check_agent_tool_readiness, generate_x402_launch_pack, generate_trust_receipt and scan_x402_resource.

Does the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_x402_resource.

Has the GateCheck by LarryBuildsAI MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.