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LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history

io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verifyLegion33shadowstreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

Check if an MCP server changed its tools: signed history, per-server coverage, offline proofs.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

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What the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history can do

The LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history is published by the GitHub account Legion33shadow. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: verify_evidence_bundle, verify_mcp_server and check_mcp_server), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_checkpoint, get_server_changes, verify_mcp_server and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (verify_mcp_server).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 2, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_mcp_serverOne-call summary for an MCP server registry id (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-call summary for an MCP server registry id (e.g. "ai.alphaquantlabs/propertycheck"): tool-list fingerprint history observed by LEGION, last change, per-server coverage from the signed COVERAGE_V1 register (COMPLETE only if observed in every register cycle, UNKNOWN if partial), proof references and a command that verifies everything offline. Read-only. Unknown id -> state UNKNOWN (absence from the log is not a verdict). A change is not an attack; this log does not certify that a server is secure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • verify_evidence_bundleVerify an evidence bundle OFFLINE (no network call): keyring chain from the pinned root fingerprint, record signature and integrity, signed tree head, RFC 9162 inclusion proof.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify an evidence bundle OFFLINE (no network call): keyring chain from the pinned root fingerprint, record signature and integrity, signed tree head, RFC 9162 inclusion proof. If `approved_tools_sha256` is given, also reports whether the signed tool list still matches the version you approved (UNAPPROVED_CHANGE if not). Bundle = {record, proof, sth, keyring} as returned by get_server_changes (max 256 KB).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • verify_mcp_serverCheck an MCP server URL against LEGION's signed transparency log.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an MCP server URL against LEGION's signed transparency log. Read-only. For each registry server at this URL: latest signed tool definition (leaf index, date, tools_sha256), number of tool changes (total and 30 days), date of the last change, RFC 9162 inclusion proof + signed tree head (re-verified here from the pinned root key), an evidence bundle for `verify_evidence_bundle`, and — if live=true — whether the tool list served NOW differs from the signed one (live check by LEGION: initialize + tools/list only, public addresses only, NOT signed). A change is not a fault; history = what LEGION observed, not what other clients see.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_checkpointLatest signed tree head of the LEGION MCP transparency log.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_checkpoint" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Latest signed tree head of the LEGION MCP transparency log. The signature is checked against the keyring, anchored on the pinned root key fingerprint. Read-only. Returns tree_size, root_sha256, timestamp, signer and signature_valid. For a trustless check, verify it yourself (see `how_to_verify_yourself`).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_server_changesSigned tool-list history of one MCP server as observed by LEGION (registry id, e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_server_changes" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Signed tool-list history of one MCP server as observed by LEGION (registry id, e.g. "xyz.signomy/civitae"), newest first, at most `limit` (1-50) changes, plus an evidence bundle for the latest record (record + RFC 9162 inclusion proof + signed tree head + keyring) that `verify_evidence_bundle` checks offline. A change is not a fault; history = what LEGION observed, not what other clients see.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_evidence_bundle (write), verify_mcp_server (write), check_mcp_server (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http legion-verify https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http legion-verify https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__legion-verify__get_checkpoint",
      "mcp__legion-verify__get_server_changes"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__legion-verify__verify_evidence_bundle",
      "mcp__legion-verify__verify_mcp_server",
      "mcp__legion-verify__check_mcp_server"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as legion-verify. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__legion-verify__get_checkpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__legion-verify__get_server_changes untrusted-input
  • mcp__legion-verify__verify_mcp_server untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__legion-verify__check_mcp_server untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify/verify?hash=f1f1bd2331010628b94b8f24e22a6da6f0c2af185a4dc0ba853c9233d55f4161" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f1f1bd233101, from Nov 2, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. verify_evidence_bundle, verify_mcp_server, check_mcp_server, get_checkpoint and get_server_changes.

Does the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_mcp_server.

Has the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 2, 2026.