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MDataAccess MCP server

io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccessMDataAccessstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Paid business, people, company, lead, and web intelligence for autonomous AI agents.

7 tools: 4 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MDataAccess MCP server can do

The MDataAccess MCP server is published by the GitHub account MDataAccess. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: enrich_company, enrich_person, search_people and search_companies), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (search_people and search_companies); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (read_webpage); 1 tool can send data out of your system (read_webpage). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • enrich_companyPrepare a paid company enrichment request when a company name or domain is known.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid company enrichment request when a company name or domain is known.
  • enrich_personPrepare a paid person enrichment request when an email, LinkedIn URL, or name is known.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid person enrichment request when an email, LinkedIn URL, or name is known.
  • search_companiesPrepare a paid PDL SQL company-search request.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_companies" says "search": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.sql), which can change anything it can reach.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "sql": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid PDL SQL company-search request. Exactly one company is returned by the API.
  • search_peoplePrepare a paid PDL SQL person-search request.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_people" says "search": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.sql), which can change anything it can reach.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "sql": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid PDL SQL person-search request. Exactly one profile is returned by the API.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • find_decision_makerPrepare a paid request for one senior decision-maker at a known company and function.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_decision_maker" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid request for one senior decision-maker at a known company and function.
  • find_leadPrepare a paid request for one compact sales-ready lead at a known company and function.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_lead" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid request for one compact sales-ready lead at a known company and function.
  • read_webpagePrepare a paid request to read clean text from a known public webpage URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_webpage" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "read_webpage" says "read" and "webpage": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "webpage": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a paid request to read clean text from a known public webpage URL.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__mdataaccess__read_webpage"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.mdataaccess.com/mcp/: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including enrich_company (write), enrich_person (write), search_people (write), search_companies (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mdataaccess https://api.mdataaccess.com/mcp/
claude mcp add --transport http mdataaccess https://api.mdataaccess.com/mcp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__mdataaccess__find_decision_maker",
      "mcp__mdataaccess__find_lead"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mdataaccess__read_webpage",
      "mcp__mdataaccess__enrich_company",
      "mcp__mdataaccess__enrich_person",
      "mcp__mdataaccess__search_people",
      "mcp__mdataaccess__search_companies"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mdataaccess. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__mdataaccess__read_webpage untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__mdataaccess__search_people private-data
  • mcp__mdataaccess__search_companies private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccess/verify?hash=aff30c619b8c683646e1f9606d70c1d3a898e30b3f86717ef3ee87dcff21fe76" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash aff30c619b8c, from Nov 16, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccess/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccess
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccess.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MDataAccess/MDataAccess)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

MDataAccess MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MDataAccess MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MDataAccess MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the MDataAccess MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the MDataAccess MCP server have?

7 tools: 4 write, 3 read. enrich_company, enrich_person, search_people, search_companies, read_webpage, find_decision_maker and find_lead.

Does the MDataAccess MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MDataAccess MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): read_webpage.

Has the MDataAccess MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.