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provenance MCP server

io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenanceMarkovianProtocolstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Stamp or notarize data into a public witnessed transparency log. Proves timing, not truth.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the provenance MCP server can do

The provenance MCP server is published by the GitHub account MarkovianProtocol. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: markovian_notarize, markovian_stamp, markovian_verify and markovian_trace), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (markovian_notarize, markovian_stamp, markovian_verify and 1 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Nov 2, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • markovian_notarizeNotarize any file or hash into a public transparency log cosigned by 7 witnesses from 6 operators and anchored to Bitcoin.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Notarize any file or hash into a public transparency log cosigned by 7 witnesses from 6 operators and anchored to Bitcoin. Hash-only: pass a sha256 hex string, or with the local stdio server a file path (hashed on your machine; the file never leaves it) — only 32 bytes reach the log. Returns a receipt with the leaf index, inclusion-proof URL, an offline c2sp.org/tlog-proof bundle URL, and the witness trust policy. Proves the hash existed no later than the covering checkpoint, in a single history everyone sees identically; does NOT prove authorship or that the content is true. Rate-limited (10/hour). Typical use: notarize an output the moment it is produced, keep the file, hand anyone the proof URL.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Markovian Notarize
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • markovian_stampCommit any data (an AI output, a decision, a record) into a public, witnessed transparency log and get back a verifiable, tamper-evident provenance stamp (canonical markovian-prove…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "commit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Commit any data (an AI output, a decision, a record) into a public, witnessed transparency log and get back a verifiable, tamper-evident provenance stamp (canonical markovian-provenance/v1). It proves the data existed and was committed at this time; it does NOT assert the data is correct (provenance, not truth). No wallet, account, or funding is required, the first stamp just works, and only the SHA-256 hash of your data is sent to the public API, the raw data is never stored. The returned merkle_root is the handle: save it, then call markovian_verify(merkle_root) to prove integrity later, or pass prior stamps in derived_from to build a lineage you can walk with markovian_trace. Typical use: stamp an agent output the moment it is produced, so anyone can later confirm it was not altered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Markovian Provenance Stamp
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • markovian_traceWalk and verify a stamp's full provenance lineage by merkle_root.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Walk and verify a stamp's full provenance lineage by merkle_root. Use this when a stamp was created with derived_from links, to map what an output was built from. Returns a MAP of the graph (not a yes/no verdict): each node carries hash_binds and anchored, each edge carries edge_verified, and `valid` is true only if every node and edge checks out. A node whose payload was never published is an unresolved frontier (resolved:false). Read-only. Provenance, not truth.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Markovian Trace
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • markovian_verifyLook up a Markovian stamp by its merkle_root against the public verifier, with no key or account.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up a Markovian stamp by its merkle_root against the public verifier, with no key or account. verified:true means the stamp record exists and the response echoes its committed data_hash — recompute your content's SHA-256 and compare it to that data_hash yourself to confirm the content is unaltered. An unknown merkle_root returns verified:false. The trust-nobody path is the stamp's witnessed transparency-log leaf (log_index / inclusion URL from markovian_stamp): its inclusion proof verifies against the witnessed log head with no trust in this endpoint. Read-only; anyone can run it, including a party who does not trust the stamper.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Markovian Verify
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
530
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 530.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 530
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 530; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 530
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http provenance https://api.markovianprotocol.com/mcp/
claude mcp add --transport http provenance https://api.markovianprotocol.com/mcp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__provenance__markovian_notarize",
      "mcp__provenance__markovian_stamp",
      "mcp__provenance__markovian_verify",
      "mcp__provenance__markovian_trace"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as provenance. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__provenance__markovian_notarize untrusted-input
  • mcp__provenance__markovian_stamp untrusted-input
  • mcp__provenance__markovian_verify untrusted-input
  • mcp__provenance__markovian_trace untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenance/verify?hash=44e1faf1d7fc3bd072c8ee6164b2ac21c13bab3ff5fb0da26ba190fab707dfd9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 44e1faf1d7fc, from Nov 2, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenance/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenance
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenance.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MarkovianProtocol/provenance)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

provenance MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the provenance MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the provenance MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the provenance MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the provenance MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. markovian_notarize, markovian_stamp, markovian_verify and markovian_trace.

Does the provenance MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the provenance MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the provenance MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 2, 2026.