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framefetch MCP server

io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetchMarvinRey7879streamable-httpv1.9.1Scanned

Any social-video URL → transcript, metadata, frames, OCR, summary, search, Q&A. MCP server + x402.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the framefetch MCP server can do

The framefetch MCP server is published by the GitHub account MarvinRey7879. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (framefetch_extract) and create or change data (2 tools: framefetch_platform_capabilities and framefetch_account), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (framefetch_extract and framefetch_search); 1 tool can send data out of your system (framefetch_extract).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.9.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • framefetch_extractExtract data from ONE public social-video URL (YouTube incl.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.frames.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.frames.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "framefetch_extract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.frames.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract data from ONE public social-video URL (YouTube incl. Shorts, TikTok, Instagram Reels): metadata/insights/transcript/frames/digest/comments/etc — see `fields`. When NOT to use: non-video pages, private/login-walled content, or bulk crawling (one URL per call). Returns one JSON object with only the requested fields + a `cost` block (micro-USD); shapes: https://framefetch.net/docs. Cost scales with what you request (frames/transcript cost more than metadata). No key? POST /v1/keys {email} -> instant key (~100 free calls); or x402 (USDC), no account. Example: {"url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=...","fields":["metadata","transcript"]}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • framefetch_accountCheck this account's credit balance/usage.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check this account's credit balance/usage. Read-only — never charges; works at zero balance (unlike framefetch_extract). Purpose: check balance before expensive framefetch_extract calls — at session start, periodically, or after a 402. When NOT to use: before every single framefetch_extract call in a tight loop. Returns: balance_micros, spend_7d_micros, calls_7d — micro-USD (1,000,000 = $1). Low balance: top up via x402 (USDC) at POST /v1/topup, or card at POST /v1/checkout.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • framefetch_platform_capabilitiesJSON matrix of data types (metadata, insights, transcript, frames, comments) per platform — YouTube (+Shorts), TikTok, Instagram Reels.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    JSON matrix of data types (metadata, insights, transcript, frames, comments) per platform — YouTube (+Shorts), TikTok, Instagram Reels. Call before framefetch_extract to confirm support. No input.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://framefetch.net/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://framefetch.net
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://framefetch.net/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including framefetch_extract (irreversible), framefetch_platform_capabilities (write), framefetch_account (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "framefetch_extract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.frames.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.9.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http framefetch https://framefetch.net/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http framefetch https://framefetch.net/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__framefetch__framefetch_search"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__framefetch__framefetch_extract",
      "mcp__framefetch__framefetch_platform_capabilities",
      "mcp__framefetch__framefetch_account"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as framefetch. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__framefetch__framefetch_extract untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__framefetch__framefetch_search untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetch/verify?hash=32aaae1010a9bfa24780992263858707b5f617e877da32799f7eb582a0f01830" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 32aaae1010a9, from Nov 16, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetch/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetch
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetch.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MarvinRey7879/framefetch)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

framefetch MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the framefetch MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the framefetch MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the framefetch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: framefetch_extract.

What tools does the framefetch MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read. framefetch_extract, framefetch_platform_capabilities, framefetch_account and framefetch_search.

Does the framefetch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the framefetch MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): framefetch_extract.

Has the framefetch MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.