VoteShip MCP server
io.github.MattKilmer/voteshipMattKilmerstreamable-httpv0.2.3Scanned
Manage feature requests, votes, roadmaps, and changelogs from any MCP client.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the VoteShip MCP server can do
The VoteShip MCP server is published by the GitHub account MattKilmer. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: upvote_post) and create or change data (2 tools: submit_feature_request and add_public_comment). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (browse_board); 2 tools can send data out of your system (upvote_post and add_public_comment).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
upvote_postUse this when the user explicitly wants to add or remove their agent identity's vote on a known VoteShip post.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "upvote_post" says "post": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "upvote_post" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user explicitly wants to add or remove their agent identity's vote on a known VoteShip post. Vote or unvote on a feature request (toggles). Uses a deterministic anonymous ID so the same agent on the same machine has a consistent identity. No API key needed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
add_public_commentUse this when the user wants to add public context or a follow-up to a known VoteShip feature request.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "add_public_comment" says "add": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "add_public_comment" says "add" and "comment": it writes something other people read.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants to add public context or a follow-up to a known VoteShip feature request. Add a comment to a feature request on a public VoteShip board. No API key needed. Requires an author name.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
submit_feature_requestUse this when the user wants to send new product feedback to a public VoteShip board without administering the project.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_feature_request" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants to send new product feedback to a public VoteShip board without administering the project. Submit a feature request to any public VoteShip board. No API key needed. The post is created as PENDING and requires board owner approval. Include metadata.source to identify your agent.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
browse_boardUse this when the user wants to inspect, compare, or interact with approved requests on a public VoteShip board.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "browse_board" says "browse": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe name "browse_board" says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants to inspect, compare, or interact with approved requests on a public VoteShip board. View approved feature requests on a public VoteShip board. No API key needed. Returns posts sorted by vote count and renders an interactive board in MCP Apps clients.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://voteship.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including upvote_post (destructive), submit_feature_request (write), add_public_comment (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http voteship https://voteship.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http voteship https://voteship.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__voteship__browse_board"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__voteship__submit_feature_request",
"mcp__voteship__add_public_comment"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__voteship__upvote_post"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as voteship. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__voteship__browse_board untrusted-input
- mcp__voteship__upvote_post outbound
- mcp__voteship__add_public_comment outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MattKilmer/voteship/verify?hash=97c9f3561435aa13380317e4110e5432db7cddf2b57a4b349c70ec46901fa9a5" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 97c9f3561435, from Nov 16, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MattKilmer/voteship/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MattKilmer/voteship)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
VoteShip MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the VoteShip MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the VoteShip MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: upvote_post.
Can the VoteShip MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the VoteShip MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. upvote_post, submit_feature_request, add_public_comment and browse_board.
Does the VoteShip MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the VoteShip MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): upvote_post and add_public_comment.
Has the VoteShip MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.