Autopia MCP server
io.github.MaydayTrey/autopiaMaydayTreystreamable-httpv0.3.1Scanned
Verified, reproduced behavior of public HTTP APIs: spec gaps, errors, pagination, auth.
9 tools: 1 change things and 8 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Autopia MCP server can do
The Autopia MCP server is published by the GitHub account MaydayTrey. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: request_target), but cannot delete data. 8 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_tool_docs).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.3.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
request_targetQueues a public, read-only, credential-free API for probing, from a target object { name, spec_url (OpenAPI 3 document), category?, include_paths?, baseline?1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_target" says "request": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "Queues a public, read-only, credential-free API for probing, from a target obj..."
Description, as the server wrote it Queues a public, read-only, credential-free API for probing, from a target object { name, spec_url (OpenAPI 3 document), category?, include_paths?, baseline? (valid values for required params per path), optional_values?, server? }. The spec is fetched and parsed and the battery planned immediately; probing runs rules-only on the worker's next pass. Requires a per-user key; quota 3 requests per key per day. Returns a request id for get_request_status.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Request a target
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
get_divergencesWhere the live API contradicts its own OpenAPI spec: documented limits not enforced, types not validated, required parameters not required, enums accepting other values.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_divergences" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Where the live API contradicts its own OpenAPI spec: documented limits not enforced, types not validated, required parameters not required, enums accepting other values. Compact evidence; verbose=true adds response previews.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get divergences
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_request_statusStatus of a target request (pending, running, done or failed), with the run id and summary once processed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_request_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Status of a target request (pending, running, done or failed), with the run id and summary once processed.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get request status
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_tool_docsThe verified behavior sheet for an API: Markdown built only from verified claims, with spec contradictions first, then sibling differences, undocumented rules, and per-endpoint beh…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_tool_docs" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_tool_docs" says "get" and "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it The verified behavior sheet for an API: Markdown built only from verified claims, with spec contradictions first, then sibling differences, undocumented rules, and per-endpoint behavior (error shapes, pagination, validation, auth), every line citing trial ids. Accepts a tool name, a host, or the full URL about to be called; a URL or path scopes the sheet to that endpoint plus a one-line index of the others. Brief by default (what would change the request); full=true adds per-parameter validation, response shapes and all evidence ids.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get tool docs
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_tool_knowledgeEvery verified claim about an API as structured records (latest version by default): paginated, filterable by kind, spec divergences flagged, each with compact evidence (trial id, …No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_tool_knowledge" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every verified claim about an API as structured records (latest version by default): paginated, filterable by kind, spec divergences flagged, each with compact evidence (trial id, probe, status, request line). verbose=true adds response previews.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get tool knowledge
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_version_diffWhat changed in verified behavior between two spec versions of an API (changed, added and removed claims), as opposed to what changed in the spec text.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_version_diff" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it What changed in verified behavior between two spec versions of an API (changed, added and removed claims), as opposed to what changed in the spec text.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get version diff
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_toolsThe APIs the compendium covers: each with the hosts its trials hit, trust tier, version count, and counts of verified claims and spec divergences.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The APIs the compendium covers: each with the hosts its trials hit, trust tier, version count, and counts of verified claims and spec divergences.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List tools
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_versionsThe spec versions recorded for one API, newest first, each fingerprinted by its spec hash.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_versions" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The spec versions recorded for one API, newest first, each fingerprinted by its spec hash. The ids identify versions for get_version_diff.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List versions
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_claimsFull-text search over verified claims by host and symptom, e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_claims" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Full-text search over verified claims by host and symptom, e.g. "github per_page 500", "npm search size 0", "is latitude required on /v1/forecast": the lookup for an unexpected 4xx/5xx, a parameter that seems ignored, an odd page, or wrong filter results. Optionally restricted to one API (name, host or URL). Compact evidence unless verbose=true.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search claims
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://autopia-mcp.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including request_target (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Inforequest_target
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "Queues a public, read-only, credential-free API for probing, from a target obj..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http autopia https://autopia-mcp.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http autopia https://autopia-mcp.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__autopia__list_tools",
"mcp__autopia__list_versions",
"mcp__autopia__get_tool_knowledge",
"mcp__autopia__get_divergences",
"mcp__autopia__search_claims",
"mcp__autopia__get_tool_docs",
"mcp__autopia__get_version_diff",
"mcp__autopia__get_request_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__autopia__request_target"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as autopia. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__autopia__get_tool_docs private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MaydayTrey/autopia/verify?hash=bba673d0f0b5cc21096b645d8f0fa0be8830145f20a0d7c718f53543959e973a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bba673d0f0b5, from Nov 16, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MaydayTrey/autopia/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MaydayTrey/autopia)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
Autopia MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Autopia MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Autopia MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Autopia MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Autopia MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 1 write, 8 read. request_target, list_tools, list_versions, get_tool_knowledge, get_divergences, search_claims, get_tool_docs, get_version_diff and 1 more.
Does the Autopia MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Autopia MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Autopia MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.