GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server
io.github.MisfitMEdiAhouse/ghosbc-safety-gateMisfitMEdiAhousestreamable-httpv1.5.0Scanned
Agent governance with A2A/Shopify/MCP trust audits, action screening, and decision UI.
9 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 5 findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
7 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server can do
The GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server is published by the GitHub account MisfitMEdiAhouse. It has 9 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (screen_consequential_action) and create or change data (6 tools: audit_a2a_agent_card, audit_mcp_dependency, screen_agent_request, screen_mcp_tool_definition and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Last scanned Nov 3, 2026, version 1.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
screen_consequential_actionUse immediately before a consequential agent action such as purchase, payment, transfer, send, deploy, publish, execute, cart mutation, checkout mutation, or delete.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
Description, as the server wrote it Use immediately before a consequential agent action such as purchase, payment, transfer, send, deploy, publish, execute, cart mutation, checkout mutation, or delete. Compares the proposed action with caller-declared allowed actions/targets, amount ceiling, currency and expiry. ALLOW only when explicit bounds fit; REVIEW when bounds are missing; BLOCK when limits are violated. Does not execute the action.
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
audit_a2a_agent_cardUse before depending on an unfamiliar A2A agent.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use before depending on an unfamiliar A2A agent. Reads only the public Agent Card and optional public registry metadata, checks declared bindings/protocol versions, skill descriptions, security declarations and registry task-verification evidence, then returns a trust/readiness score plus shareable badge metadata. It does not send a task to or execute any skill on the target agent.
audit_mcp_dependencyUse for a public remote MCP server that an autonomous agent depends on.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use for a public remote MCP server that an autonomous agent depends on. Remembers the tools/list baseline, returns only added/removed/modified tools, screens new or changed tool definitions, and produces one aggregate ALLOW/REVIEW/BLOCK decision. It does not inspect server source code or authenticated/private MCP endpoints.
buy_policy_checksUse only when free usage is exhausted or production volume is needed.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...; it does not charge or receive payment credentials."
Description, as the server wrote it Use only when free usage is exhausted or production volume is needed. Returns Stripe checkout for 10,000 prepaid GHOSBC Safety Gate checks for $19; it does not charge or receive payment credentials.
sanitize_agent_payloadUse before sending context to an external model, tool or agent when the payload may contain credentials or private material.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...l or agent when the payload may contain credentials or private material. Redacts common sec..."
Description, as the server wrote it Use before sending context to an external model, tool or agent when the payload may contain credentials or private material. Redacts common secret patterns and flags policy-extraction language. Not a complete DLP/compliance system.
screen_agent_requestUse before an agent follows untrusted instructions or requests capabilities.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "screen_agent_request" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Use before an agent follows untrusted instructions or requests capabilities. Returns ALLOW, REVIEW, or BLOCK plus an audit digest. Best for prompt/policy routing; use screen_consequential_action for a concrete purchase, write, deployment, deletion or other bounded action.
screen_mcp_tool_definitionUse before exposing a third-party MCP tool to an autonomous agent, or after a tool definition changed.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...nnotations for injection-like language, credential/private-context surfaces, side-effect r..."
Description, as the server wrote it Use before exposing a third-party MCP tool to an autonomous agent, or after a tool definition changed. Screens name, description, schema and annotations for injection-like language, credential/private-context surfaces, side-effect risk and weak contracts. Advisory metadata gate, not source-code verification.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
audit_shopify_agentic_storefrontUse to inspect a public Shopify store's AI-shopping surface before an autonomous agent trusts it.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tes carts, checkouts, orders, payments, credentials, or store data."
Description, as the server wrote it Use to inspect a public Shopify store's AI-shopping surface before an autonomous agent trusts it. Reads only public /.well-known/ucp, /agents.md and /api/ucp/mcp metadata, runs initialize/tools/list, screens exposed tool definitions, and returns a readiness/risk packet. It never creates or mutates carts, checkouts, orders, payments, credentials, or store data.
validate_agent_responseUse immediately before an agent delivers a response outside its trust boundary.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_agent_response" says "validate": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...utside its trust boundary. Flags likely credential leakage or policy-extraction content an..."
Description, as the server wrote it Use immediately before an agent delivers a response outside its trust boundary. Flags likely credential leakage or policy-extraction content and returns a sanitized response when review is needed. Not factuality verification.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 402
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 0
- Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tes carts, checkouts, orders, payments, credentials, or store data."
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...nnotations for injection-like language, credential/private-context surfaces, side-effect r..."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...l or agent when the payload may contain credentials or private material. Redacts common sec..."
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...utside its trust boundary. Flags likely credential leakage or policy-extraction content an..."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...; it does not charge or receive payment credentials."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 0
- Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ghosbc-safety-gate https://cibcxqrqiqvzpardbdrw.supabase.co/functions/v1/ghosbc-safety-gate-mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ghosbc-safety-gate https://cibcxqrqiqvzpardbdrw.supabase.co/functions/v1/ghosbc-safety-gate-mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__audit_shopify_agentic_storefront",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__validate_agent_response"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__audit_a2a_agent_card",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__audit_mcp_dependency",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__screen_agent_request",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__screen_mcp_tool_definition",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__screen_consequential_action",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__sanitize_agent_payload",
"mcp__ghosbc-safety-gate__buy_policy_checks"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ghosbc-safety-gate. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.MisfitMEdiAhouse/ghosbc-safety-gate/verify?hash=0114a517db468f5134f237c6787ed372356f265422cf30ca6b420e7245fa6f70" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0114a517db46, from Nov 3, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MisfitMEdiAhouse/ghosbc-safety-gate/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.MisfitMEdiAhouse/ghosbc-safety-gate)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: screen_consequential_action.
What tools does the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 1 irreversible, 6 write, 2 read. screen_consequential_action, audit_a2a_agent_card, audit_mcp_dependency, screen_agent_request, screen_mcp_tool_definition, sanitize_agent_payload, buy_policy_checks, audit_shopify_agentic_storefront and 1 more.
Does the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the GHOSBC Safety Gate MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 3, 2026.