Skip to content

ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server

io.github.Misterio070/scanpayMisterio070streamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Deterministic code security scan + tx preflight, paid in USDC via x402.

7 tools: 7 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 5 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server can do

The ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server is published by the GitHub account Misterio070. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: scan_code, scan_quick, simulate_tx, audit_token and 3 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (scrape_url); 1 tool can send data out of your system (scrape_url).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • audit_tokenLive on-chain token & smart contract rug-pull / honeypot shield for Base, Ethereum, and Solana.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live on-chain token & smart contract rug-pull / honeypot shield for Base, Ethereum, and Solana. Inspects live EVM bytecode (blacklist selectors, mutable tax fees, pause toggles, unverified proxies) and Solana SPL / Token-2022 mint accounts (active mint authority, freeze authority, Permanent Delegate wallet seizure, Transfer Hook honeypots) plus live DexScreener liquidity and 24h buy/sell ratios. Price: $0.05 Base USDC or 0.00035 SOL.
  • create_session_depositActivate a prepaid session voucher (0.006 SOL or 0.85 Base USDC for 10 operations).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_session_deposit" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Activate a prepaid session voucher (0.006 SOL or 0.85 Base USDC for 10 operations). Eliminates per-request payment prompts and RPC latency in autonomous agent loops.
  • health_checkCheck ScanPay engine health, available AST rules, and x402 payment configurations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check ScanPay engine health, available AST rules, and x402 payment configurations.
  • scan_codeUse before shipping or executing agent-generated code.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use before shipping or executing agent-generated code. Deterministic AST scan for Python, JavaScript and TypeScript with 65 rules (36 Python, 29 JS/TS) covering injection, hardcoded secrets, wallet key exfiltration, SSRF, infinite x402 payment loops and unsimulated Solana transactions. Returns findings with severity, deterministic patches, unified diffs and an execution verdict (PASS, WARN, BLOCK). Pay per call: 0.10 Base USDC or 0.0007 SOL over x402, no signup or API key.
  • scan_quickCheapest way to check a snippet before running it: one deterministic AST pass over Python, JavaScript or TypeScript, returning severity-ranked findings and a PASS/WARN/BLOCK verdic…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cheapest way to check a snippet before running it: one deterministic AST pass over Python, JavaScript or TypeScript, returning severity-ranked findings and a PASS/WARN/BLOCK verdict without patches or diffs. 65 rules, about 0.2 ms. Pay per call: 0.02 Base USDC or 0.00015 SOL over x402, no signup. Upgrade to scan_code for deterministic patches.
  • scrape_urlAnti-bot web access & scraper oracle for AI agents.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "scrape_url" says "scrape": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Anti-bot web access & scraper oracle for AI agents. Fetches web pages with stealth headers to bypass Cloudflare Turnstile, WAFs, and anti-bot challenges. Purifies HTML by removing scripts, stylesheets, tracking pixels, ads, and navigation boilerplate, returning clean, token-efficient Markdown ready for LLM consumption with cryptographic oracle attestation. Price: $0.02 Base USDC or 0.00015 SOL.
  • simulate_txPre-flight transaction & drainer shield for AI agents.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pre-flight transaction & drainer shield for AI agents. Simulates and inspects EVM (Base/Ethereum) and Solana transactions before signing or broadcasting. Detects unlimited approvals, known drainers, honeypots, MEV sandwich exposure (min_output=0), and unauthorized Solana authority takeovers. Returns execution verdict (ALLOW, WARN, BLOCK) and cryptographic oracle attestation. Price: $0.05 Base USDC or 0.00035 SOL.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 28, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
yes
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://scanpay-ob3w.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_code (write), scan_quick (write), simulate_tx (write), audit_token (write), scrape_url (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 warn
  • The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.payment_tx.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.payment_tx.description: "...ransferring USDC to 0xb295E606F38C363b476FC546c27226B5fBcAAEFA, or Solana tx signa..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http scanpay https://scanpay-ob3w.onrender.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http scanpay https://scanpay-ob3w.onrender.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__scanpay__scan_code",
      "mcp__scanpay__scan_quick",
      "mcp__scanpay__simulate_tx",
      "mcp__scanpay__audit_token",
      "mcp__scanpay__scrape_url",
      "mcp__scanpay__create_session_deposit",
      "mcp__scanpay__health_check"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as scanpay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__scanpay__scrape_url untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Misterio070/scanpay/verify?hash=bed68cb1909a47c2b67d95748cae3770cb125213181453ad3454377dbe911b3d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bed68cb1909a, from Nov 9, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Misterio070/scanpay/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Misterio070/scanpay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Misterio070/scanpay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Misterio070/scanpay)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server have?

7 tools: 7 write. scan_code, scan_quick, simulate_tx, audit_token, scrape_url, create_session_deposit and health_check.

Does the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scrape_url.

Has the ScanPay — Code Security Oracle MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.