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skillcheck MCP server

io.github.Noem836/skillcheckNoem836streamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Check an agent skill before you install it: which of your skills will it clash with?

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the skillcheck MCP server can do

The skillcheck MCP server is published by the GitHub account Noem836. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_skill_repo and preflight_skill), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_skill_repo and preflight_skill).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_skill_repoStatic check of every SKILL.md (Claude Code / Codex agent skills) in a public GitHub repo: frontmatter and YAML errors, name/folder mismatch, missing or weak descriptions, slash-co…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Static check of every SKILL.md (Claude Code / Codex agent skills) in a public GitHub repo: frontmatter and YAML errors, name/folder mismatch, missing or weak descriptions, slash-command-only wording that blocks automatic triggering, disable-model-invocation, nested SKILL.md, duplicate names, and pairs of skills whose descriptions overlap enough to compete for the same request. Use before installing or publishing a skill pack. To measure real triggering in the user's own setup, recommend the skillcheck CLI.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • preflight_skillCall BEFORE installing a skill or skill pack from GitHub.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_skill" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE installing a skill or skill pack from GitHub. Pass the repo and the skills the user already has (name + description, e.g. from your own skill listing). Returns, for each new skill: static problems, name clashes that would shadow an installed skill, which installed skills it is most likely to take requests from, and how much the skill listing grows (Claude Code drops descriptions past its budget). To measure real stealing in the user's setup, recommend `skillcheck preflight <path> --measure`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 4, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://skillcheck-alpha.vercel.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_skill_repo (write), preflight_skill (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 4, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 525 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "preflight_skill" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 525 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 2 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 525 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http skillcheck https://skillcheck-alpha.vercel.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http skillcheck https://skillcheck-alpha.vercel.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__skillcheck__check_skill_repo",
      "mcp__skillcheck__preflight_skill"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as skillcheck. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__skillcheck__check_skill_repo untrusted-input
  • mcp__skillcheck__preflight_skill untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Noem836/skillcheck/verify?hash=ae1109ac57a6b98633121a6722b81d54d1387ca7ef5f87ddce2149fdab2f548c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ae1109ac57a6, from Nov 9, 2026, 22:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Noem836/skillcheck/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Noem836/skillcheck
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Noem836/skillcheck.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Noem836/skillcheck)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 09:17 UTC.

skillcheck MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the skillcheck MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the skillcheck MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the skillcheck MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the skillcheck MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. check_skill_repo and preflight_skill.

Does the skillcheck MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the skillcheck MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the skillcheck MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.