remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server
io.github.OntoDistro/remirrorOntoDistrostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Psyche audits for AI agents: declared vs self-reported vs revealed objectives, diffed and flagged.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server can do
The remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account OntoDistro. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: remirror_create_audit), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
remirror_create_auditCreate a psyche audit against a target agent endpoint.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "remirror_create_audit" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a psyche audit against a target agent endpoint. The service runs a dilemma trial against the target, elicits self-reports, and computes the three-source mirror (declared vs self-reported vs revealed). Costs $79.00 in prepaid credits; failed audits (target unreachable) are refunded. teleology_weights must sum to 1.0 and exactly match the trial's objectives. Alternatively, pass teleology_id (e.g. 'xijingqingchuang-v1') to adopt a shipped telos: the server loads its canonical name, statement, and weights from the registry, and the audit runs on the telos's own dilemma trial unless trial_id is given explicitly. Supply exactly one of teleology_weights or teleology_id. The target auth_token is held in memory only, never stored. target_protocol selects how the target is reached: 'http-chat' (default) POSTs to an http(s) endpoint; 'agentverse-chat' addresses an Agentverse agent (endpoint must be its agent1... address) over the uAgents chat protocol. Returns audit_id + access_token; poll remirror_get_report for the report. Pass your remirror API key as api_key. When this server enforces signatures (REMIRROR_REQUIRE_SIGNATURES=1), also pass `signature`: a JSON envelope from signing.make_tool_signature over the effective arguments (defaults applied; include target_protocol only when it differs from 'http-chat'), using a key id registered in the server's client trust registry.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
remirror_get_reportFetch the status or final mirror report of an audit session.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "remirror_get_report" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the status or final mirror report of an audit session. Needs the audit_id and the access_token returned at creation.
remirror_list_trialsList available dilemma trials for psyche audits: id, version, objectives covered, dilemma count.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "remirror_list_trials" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List available dilemma trials for psyche audits: id, version, objectives covered, dilemma count. Free.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://remirror.net/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including remirror_create_audit (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http remirror https://remirror.net/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http remirror https://remirror.net/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__remirror__remirror_list_trials",
"mcp__remirror__remirror_get_report"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__remirror__remirror_create_audit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as remirror. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.OntoDistro/remirror/verify?hash=1be88bfaec4bf84b8c3494588f41cac0efca868f1df7a101804bb5ef2e1641fa" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1be88bfaec4b, from Nov 16, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.OntoDistro/remirror/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.OntoDistro/remirror)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. remirror_create_audit, remirror_list_trials and remirror_get_report.
Does the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the remirror (返照) — psyche audits for AI agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.