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P2Flux MCP server

io.github.P2Flux/mcpP2Fluxstreamable-httpv0.3.4Scanned

Let your AI assistant pay for web content in USDC (x402) within a budget you set.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the P2Flux MCP server can do

The P2Flux MCP server is published by the GitHub account P2Flux. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_price and request_paid_page), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (find_paid_content); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (find_paid_content); 2 tools can send data out of your system (check_price and request_paid_page). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.3.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_priceSee what a web page costs for an AI agent, without paying.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    See what a web page costs for an AI agent, without paying.
  • request_paid_pageAsk to read a paid web page.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_paid_page" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask to read a paid web page. Returns a link the USER must open to approve the payment in their own wallet - show the link and the price to the user and wait. Then call get_paid_page with the request_id. Nothing is paid without the user approving it.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • find_paid_contentSearch the P2Flux directory for websites that sell content to AI agents.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_paid_content" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the P2Flux directory for websites that sell content to AI agents. Returns site names, what they offer and the price per page. Costs nothing.
  • get_paid_pageGet the text of a page after the user approved its payment (see request_paid_page).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_paid_page" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the text of a page after the user approved its payment (see request_paid_page).

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__p2flux__find_paid_content"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agent.p2flux.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_price (write), request_paid_page (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http p2flux https://agent.p2flux.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http p2flux https://agent.p2flux.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__p2flux__find_paid_content",
      "mcp__p2flux__get_paid_page"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__p2flux__check_price",
      "mcp__p2flux__request_paid_page"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as p2flux. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__p2flux__find_paid_content private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__p2flux__check_price outbound
  • mcp__p2flux__request_paid_page outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.P2Flux/mcp/verify?hash=7f95dab150a87e124ca19546b84882843ad6ae7ebfac472a562facb5ad3b1f10" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7f95dab150a8, from Nov 16, 2026, 03:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.P2Flux/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.P2Flux/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.P2Flux/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.P2Flux/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

P2Flux MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the P2Flux MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the P2Flux MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the P2Flux MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the P2Flux MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. check_price, request_paid_page, find_paid_content and get_paid_page.

Does the P2Flux MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the P2Flux MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_price and request_paid_page.

Has the P2Flux MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.